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Abstract
A Shock to the System: Analyzing Ethnocentric Populist Support Before and After Crises

Kyu Chul Shin

Using the question of what is driving the support for populists in the mid-late 2010s in Western
Europe and the United States as the starting point, this dissertation attempts to answer a number
of different questions related to populists: Were the reasons behind support for populists in
countries that saw an increase in support for populisms similar to those that saw a decrease in
support? Are the reasons for supporting right-wing populists different from more general
ethnocentric populists? Are the reasons that Americans supported Donald Trump similar or
different from the reasons behind support for Western European populists? Following migrationrelated crises in the 2014-2015 time period, many parts of Western Europe and the United States
saw an increase in electoral support for populist actors. This dissertation argues that the
activation of status threat, or the perception that a dominant social and/or ethnic group’s position
is being threatened by an influx of newcomers, along with ingroup salience and outgroup bias,
are key factors that helped increase electoral support for populist actors. The results provide a
complicated picture on the state of populism in Western Europe and the United States; while
there is evidence of a growth in outgroup bias in Western Europe, this is not the case in the
United States. However, there is evidence of a convergence between Trump supporting
Republicans and Western European populists.
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Chapter 1: A Shock to the System
Introduction: A Populist Powder Keg?
Populist political actors have been a part of the Western political scene for many decades
with some of the parties, such as the National Front/Rally in France, having operated for many
decades (Judis 2016). While some populist political actors experienced success, such as the
Freedom Party of Austria securing a place in a coalition government after 1999 legislative
elections (McGann and Kitschelt 2005), electoral success was often isolated to a single country.
However, something unusual occurred in the late 2010s. Like a fuse detonating multiple
consecutive charges, populist party after populist party enjoyed increased vote shares. In
September 2014, the Sweden Democrats won parliamentary seats for the first time (Aylott and
Bolin 2015). In June 2015, the United Kingdom Independence Party earned over 12 percent of
the vote cast that election (Cutts et al. 2017). A month later the Danish People’s Party won over
21 percent of the votes cast in an election that saw the party become the second largest in the
country (Kosiara-Pedersen 2016). Later that year, the Swiss People’s party won 29.4 percent of
all votes cast for the lower house; this was the highest percentage earned in the party’s history up
to that point (Bernhard 2016). The powder keg did not stop going off in 2015. The next year, in
the 2016 United States presidential election, a populist presidential candidate, Donald Trump,
secured victory (Judis 2016).
This surge continued. In May 2017, the National Front of France won a place in the
second round of presidential elections and secured the party’s best performance in history with
33 percent in the second-round vote (Ivaldi 2018). In September 2017, during the German
Federal Election, the Alternative for Germany, which did not win five percent of the vote during
the 2013 election, secured its historic record of 13 percent of the votes (Hansen and Olsen 2019)
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and became the first populist party to enter the German parliament (Bundestag) since the end of
the Second World War (Siri 2018).
Populist momentum continued in 2017. In March 2018, the Northern League of Italy
secured a plurality of the seats in the lower house of the Italian legislature (D’Alimonte 2019). In
September 2018, the Sweden Democrats again enjoyed an increase in support and earned over
17.5 percent of the vote (Aylott and Bolin 2019).
The big finale occurred in Spain. While in Germany populist actors tended to win seats at
the regional level, such as the Republicans during the 1980s (Art 2007), this was not the case in
Spain. In December 2018, the regional legislative elections held in Andalusia saw the populist
Vox Party, which previously failed to win a single seat in regional elections, win 11 percent of
the votes cast and 12 seats during the Andalusian Regional Election. This was the first time that a
populist political party had won seats at any level of government since Spain’s return to
democracy in the 1970s (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). The next year in April 2019, the Vox Party
won 10.7 percent of the vote and won 10 out of 99 seats in the Valencia regional parliamentary
election. That same April, in elections for the national parliament (the Cortes), the Vox Party
won about 10 percent of the vote and 24 out of 350 seats. After a failure to form a coalition
government, a second national election occurred in November and Vox increased its vote share
to 15 percent and acquired 52 seats; it was at this point the third largest party in the Spanish
parliament. In a span of over a year, Vox secured its place as a mainstay of Spanish politics and
ended the region’s long history of not electing populists (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020). While
this narrative suggests that the Migrant Crisis led to a string of populist victories across the
whole of Western Europe, the actual vote totals in the region tell a different story.
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Table 1.1: Western European Populist Party Election Results, Pre and Post-Migrant Crisis
Country

Legislative Election Results
Pre-Migrant Crisis
(Before 2014)
2013: 20.5%
2010: 7.8%
2011: 1.1%

Difference

2014 and After

Austria (Freedom Party)
2017: 26.0%
Belgium (Vlaams Belang)
2014: 3.7%
Cyprus (National Popular
2016: 3.7%
Front)
Denmark (Danish People’s
2011: 12.3%
2015: 21.1%
Party)
Finland (True Finns)
2011: 19.1%
2015: 17.7%
France (National Front)*
2012: 8.9%
2017: 11.2%
Germany (Alternative for
2013: 4.7%
2017: 12.6%
Germany)
Greece (Golden Dawn)
2012: 6.9%
2015: 6.3%
Italy (Northern League)
2013: 4.1%
2018: 17.4%
Luxembourg (Alternative
2013: 6.6%
2018: 8.3%
Democratic Reform Party)
The Netherlands (Party for
2012: 10.1%
2017: 13.1%
Freedom)
Norway (Progress Party)
2013: 16.3%
2017: 15.3%
Sweden (Sweden
2010: 5.7%
2014: 12.9%
Democrats)
Switzerland (Swiss People’s
2010: 26.3%
2015: 29.4%
Party)
United Kingdom (United
2010: 3.1%
2015: 12.6%
Kingdom Independence
Party)
*French legislative election results combine the first and second rounds.

+5.5%
-4.1%
+2.6
+8.8%
-1.4%
+2.3%
+7.9%
-0.6%
+13.3%
+1.7%
+3.0%
-1.0%
+7.2%
+3.1%
+9.5%

Table 1.1 presents electoral data from fifteen Western European countries. The parties
highlighted have been considered populist by other scholars and the table outlines the percentage
of votes these parties received in the last pre-Migrant Crisis election and the first election to take
place after the pre-Migrant Crisis election. A short examination of the fifteen different parties
indicates that in the pre-Migrant Crisis, the parties run the gamut in popularity. The Freedom
Party of Austria and the Swiss People’s Party managed to secure over twenty percent of the votes
in the years before 2014 but are the only ones to do so among the fifteen. There are an additional

3

four parties, Danish People’s Party, True Finns, Party for Freedom, and the Progress Party,
which managed to secure at least ten percent of the vote. In other words, only six out of fifteen
parties were popular enough to secure at least ten percent of the vote and only two out of fifteen
received twenty percent of the vote.
Vote shares for these fifteen parties change markedly during and after the Migrant Crisis.
While only three of the fifteen, the Freedom Party of Austria, Danish People’s Party, and the
Swiss People’s Party, crossed the twenty percent threshold, the True Finns, National Front,
Alternative for Germany, Northern League, the Party for Freedom, Progress Party, Sweden
Democrats, and the United Kingdom Independence Party secured at least ten percent of the vote.
This indicates a rise from six out of fifteen to eleven out of fifteen.
Yet the story in four of these countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway, is
different. Rather than witnessing an increase in vote shares, the populist parties in these countries
suffered a decline in support. This brings up a key research question beyond a general question
asking what is driving ethnocentric populist parties: Are the reasons behind supporting populists
in countries that witnessed an increase in vote shares different from the reasons behind
supporting the populists in countries that failed to increase their vote shares? In other words, will
the marginal effects of certain variables differ between the two groups of countries?
2014-2015: Immigration Crises and Increases in Support for Ethnocentric Populists
While the 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis did not lead to a universal surge in support for
populist actors across the Western European region, it is an integral part of the story presented
here. The European Migrant Crisis, along with the Immigration Crisis in the United States, were
major socio-political events which occurred in the 2014-2015 time period. This section presents
information on why these years are landmarks and then explains both events. In Europe, a sharp
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increase in the number of migrants entering the continent in 2014-15 subsequently became
known as the Migrant Crisis. In the United States, the summer of 2014 also saw a sharp increase
in the number of migrants. This, combined with President Barack Obama’s attempt at expanding
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) for undocumented migrants
(Aldana 2016; Zug 2014), represented an American equivalent of the European Migrant Crisis.
While the surge in the number of migrants entering both regions was temporary, the argument
here is that the effects of these shocks lasted beyond the initial events.
Prior to 2015, Western nations on both sides of the Atlantic had taken in large numbers of
immigrants from all over the world for approximately five decades. In many Western European
nations, such as the United Kingdom and France, large numbers of migrants from former
colonies made their way to these places (Caldwell 2009; Heisler 1986; Jackson et la. 2001;
Pettigrew 1998). In the United States, large numbers individuals from Latin America and Asia
entered the country (Massey 1981; Reimers 1983; Yang 2010).
On Europe
This subsection assesses the political culture in Europe surrounding immigration, the
demographic change occurring in Europe, and how the Migrant Crisis changed political and
social culture in Europe. Many Western European states decided to accept large numbers of
migrants from non-European regions of the world after World War II. Most countries looked to
former colonies as a source for immigration. The United Kingdom brought in many individuals
from its former colonies such as India (Algan et la. 2010; Girma and Yu 2002), while France
looked to the Maghreb and Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa (Algan et al. 2010; Caldwell 2009).
A number of individuals started to speak out against immigration, such as British
politician Enoch Powell, in the late 1960s (Tomlinson 2018). Shortly afterwards, Powell lost his
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cabinet position and never held a senior post for the rest of his political career (Caldwell 2009).
Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the National Front (later National Rally) in France, also
criticized lax immigration policy forcefully in the 1970s but failed to find success at the ballot
box (Stockemer and Amengay 2015). These attempts at speaking out did not gain much traction
in the 20th century because migrants were thought to be contributing economically as Europe
suffered a labor shortage in the years following World War II (Hansen 2003; McDowell 2009).
Changes started to occur in the 1990s when conversations about the place of immigration
in Western Europe became more commonplace (Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2013; Oesch 2008).
During this time period, a number of populist parties increased their electoral support. Mudde
(2013) argued that the average vote shares of actors he labels “populist radical right parties”
increased from 1.7 percent in the 1980s to 4.8 percent in the 1990s. Data also indicated that
certain demographics, such as the working class, were supporting populist actors (Oesch 2008).
The increasing support for such actors was connected with different circumstances in Western
Europe by the early 1990s. The economic boom years, where extra labor was needed, had ended
in the 1970s. The size of the immigrant community, however, had continued to grow during this
time period. Eurobarometer data indicated that between 1988 and 1991, there were sharp
increases in the number of respondents who believed that there were "too many foreigners" in
their countries, with a majority of respondents in Belgium, West Germany, France, and Italy
stating this to be the case (Pettigrew 1998).
While there was a change in fortunes for populist parties and their supporters, there were
still clear lines on what was publicly acceptable discourse for politicians. For example, Hans
Janmaat, a Dutch politician, declared that the Netherlands was not a multicultural society and
asserted his desire to get rid of multiculturalism if given power. Not only did these comments
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effectively end his political career, he was indicted and convicted for making discriminatory
statements (Maussen and Grillo 2014; Vink 2007). Tensions started to increase by this time as
the large number of neighborhoods that were majority-minority, among the most famous the
“suburbs” of France, were portrayed by populists as bastions of crime and a symbol of the
inability of these newcomers to integrate (Wiles 2007). Such feelings became especially
powerful in the aftermath of riots led by the children and grandchildren of immigrants who were
born and raised in these suburbs (Haddad and Balz 2006).
This level of demographic change represents a new political environment in which
members of specific ethnic groups who long dominated the politics of their home societies reach
a point when they are no longer dominant. The possibility of changing representation in
governing legislative bodies means fewer resources and other benefits for the once dominant
group (Mansbridge 1999). If this is the case, why did support for populist actors increase in the
late 2010s instead of the 1990s or the 2000s? One possibility is the lack of an exogenous shock.
Such events can change an existing environment and create an opening that incentivizes changes
to one’s behaviors and actions (Todd 2017). A sudden rush of new information sometimes forces
individuals to reevaluate existing beliefs (Jervis 1976). Just before the rise in populist support
across much of the Western World, two major exogenous shocks occurred in the 2014-2015 time
period.
Starting in 2014, the European Union experienced a large influx in the number of
individuals who attempted to cross into its territory (Pachocka 2016). For many years, migrants
had used the Mediterranean Sea to enter European countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain.
From 1998-2013, the yearly total of migrants entering through this route never exceeded 70,295.
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However, in 2014, the total increased to 209,553 and in 2015 the number of entrants grew to
895,934 (Fargues 2016).
By Autumn 2014, some Europeans felt uneasy with the changing situation. For example,
protests against the acceptance of migrants by the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization
of the West (PEGIDA) became a weekly occurrence in the city of Dresden (Czymara and
Schmidt-Catran 2017). In 2015, more than 1.3 million migrants from the Middle East/North
Africa region, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia made their way to the European Union’s borders
(Karolewski and Benedikter 2017). This large influx was partly the result of events that had
occurred around the same time. The year 2011 saw the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and the
fall of longtime Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi which made both Syria and Libya unsafe for
civilians. Large numbers of sub-Saharan Africans left their homes to look for work, Iranians
sought to flee their home country’s regime, Afghans looked to escape violence in their country,
and Eritreans sought to leave behind their country’s dictatorship (Bhambra 2017; Judis 2018;
Karolewski and Benedikter 2017).
The large number of migrants fomented debate regarding whether the European Union
should accept these newcomers. Notably, a number of politicians from mainstream parties
dissented. The Bavarian Christian-Social Union Party’s chief Horst Seehofer, head of a party that
was in a coalition with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, argued that accepting so
many migrants was not a good idea as many Germans did not like this policy (Karolweski and
Benedikter 2017). Some of the other arguments moved away from the practical towards more
identity lines. PEGIDA, an anti-immigrant group, argued that bringing in so many migrants from
the Middle East would turn Germany into an Islamic country while the political party PRO
NRW, which operates predominately in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, argued that male
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migrants from the region would be dangerous to German women (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran
2017). At times, disagreements did not remain civil. In 2015 alone, there were over 1,000
documented attacks on migrants in Germany (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017). Despite these
dissenting voices, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, argued that Europe was able to
handle this influx of newcomers and allowed large number of migrants into Germany. The over
one million individuals almost quadrupled the number of new arrivals from the 259,000 who
sought to enter the continent in 2010 (Judis 2018) and doubled the number of individuals who
sought entry in 2014 (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017).
Many migrants chose to settle in specific parts of the European Union. Approximately a
third of the arrivals from 2015, or about 442,000 people, settled in Germany, increasing
Germany’s population to 81.8 million (Eckardt 2016). The number of migrants entering
Germany that year accounted for about 0.54 percent of the country’s population. This figure
doubles the percentage of individuals who entered West Germany during the late 1950s and early
1960s.
Such a rapid change netted a negative reaction from the populace. In July 2016, polling
data from the Pew Center showed that a majority of respondents from Western European
countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden believed that
admitting more migrants would increase terrorism in their home countries (Judis 2018).
Politically, openly discussing immigration and its repercussions was a major component of the
partisan effort to extract the UK from the EU (pro-Brexit) and played an important role in the
decision to leave the EU in June 2016 (Judis 2018; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018). Western
Europe had now changed.
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On the United States
The Migrant Crisis did not have a direct effect on the United States. However, a different
exogenous shock related to immigration, which occurred around the same time as the European
Migrant Crisis, happened on the other side of the Atlantic: the 2014-2015 American Immigration
Crisis and the subsequent attempt by the Obama administration to expand the Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).
While the United States experienced an exogenous shock, the country has a distinct
political history from most Western European countries. While there is no major political party
completely dedicated to a populist platform, there have been a number of presidential candidates
such as William Jennings Bryan (DeCanio 2011; Frieden 1997), Pat Buchanan (Jelen 1993), and
Ross Perot (Barr 2009) who have adopted populist tactics. Nevertheless, none of these
individuals became president.
The United States, like many Western Europe countries, had developed certain norms in
the post-World War II era regarding race and immigration. Partly due to the Civil Rights
movement that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, American politicians became extremely
reluctant to support policies that affect the delicate racial balance of the country. While indirect
racialized appeals occurred, particularly among Republican presidential candidates, direct attacks
on a specific group remained taboo in the United States (Mendleberg 2001).
While this taboo was widely understood by politicians through the early 2010s, the
United States experienced an event similar to that of the Migrant Crisis of Europe which had the
opportunity to change this norm. In the summer of 2014, large groups of migrants from Central
American countries, predominately El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, attempted to enter
the United States through the Mexican border (Zug 2014). By the end of 2014, it was clear that
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an increasing number of individuals had attempted to enter the United States. The number of
unaccompanied children alone increased from 24,481 in 2012 to 38,833 in 2013. In 2014, that
number increased to 68,684. While the numbers dropped in early 2015, attempts to cross the USMexico border again grew as the weather warmed in 2015; the number of children taken into
custody in August and September 2015 exceeded the numbers from August and September 2014
(Musalo and Lee 2017). While the poor economic health of many Central American nations
played a role in decision of many to escape, many of these migrants were fleeing gang violence
(Cruz 2015).
This spike in the number of individuals attempting to enter the United States had a
chilling effect on attempts at immigration reform in the United States. In 2012, then-president
Obama created Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) by executive order as a way to allow
undocumented migrants who had arrived in the country as children to live and work in the
United States. However, opponents of DACA became vocal in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis as
they believed that the program would be seen by undocumented migrants as a way to secure their
children’s place in the United States (Zug 2014).
Ultimately, the United States government decided to resettle about 54,000
unaccompanied children across the United States. The effects of this decision and subsequent
decisions taken by the Obama administration had long-lasting impacts. Some local communities
resented these children. Anti-migrant sentiment grew as many Americans questioned why the
country accepted so many migrants and challenged the idea that the southern border was secure
(Chisti and Hipsman 2014; Zug 2014).
While the Migrant Crisis in Europe and the Immigration Crisis in the United States are
different events, they share similarities. Both Europe and the United States, around the same time
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period, were faced with a decision. Large numbers of migrants were attempting to enter the two
regions due to political and social instability. The Europeans and the Americans could have
refused entry, but both decided to allow many of the migrants into their countries. In both
situations, vocal opposition to the decision emerged.
These two events provided an exogenous shock to both regions. Immigration, and the
question of what type of immigration policy should be adopted, became prominent topics of
political debate. The incumbent governments in Europe and the United States opted to let in
migrants despite opposition. This policy decision provided an opening for populist actors to
publicize their immigration stances. In the United States, it gave an opening for an outsider like
Donald Trump to make a mark on the political scene.
Existing norms made it difficult for politicians to make direct appeals against policies
calling for cuts on immigration and at times calling for more resources towards curbing illegal
migration. However, in the United States, the Immigration Crisis of 2014 opened the door for
debate. Genuine anger over the handling of the crisis led those opposed to the Obama
administration to start questioning whether the borders were truly secure and whether the
incumbent was capable of handling this situation (Chisti and Hipsman 2014).
Worries over the situation spilled over into 2015 with a number of states attempting to
challenge the Obama administration’s DACA expansion (Kagan 2016). These events provided
an opportunity for an actor willing to present hardline views on immigration. In June 2015,
around a year after the start of the 2014 crisis, Donald Trump, a real estate mogul who was at
that point was probably best known as the star of the reality TV show The Apprentice,
announced his candidacy for the United States presidency. Initially, Trump’s candidacy was not
considered to be serious by observers of US politics. However, during the primary season, he
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defeated his Republican Party rivals and then his Democratic rival, former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, to become president (Judis 2016).
Trump’s victory was not expected when he first announced his candidacy in 2015, in part
due to his willingness to blatantly flaunt post-Civil Rights era norms that made explicitly
targeting specific ethnic, racial, or religious groups unacceptable (Mendleberg 2001). On the
campaign trail, he called illegal migrants from Mexico "rapists" and "criminals" while also
calling for a shutdown on Muslim immigration (Judis 2016). Trump directly attacked members
of the establishment, such as career politicians, and members of the media in a way that most
previous presidential candidates had not. Part of the reason behind the effectiveness of these
attacks was that Trump had no political experience before running (Donovan and Redlawsk
2018; Judis 2016). Trump’s rhetoric focusing on criticizing immigration was similar to existing
strategies used by populists in Europe.
Just a year before Trump declared his candidacy for the presidency, the United States
also experienced its own version of an immigration crisis. While in scale it was much smaller
than the 1.3 million new arrivals experienced by Europe in 2015 (Judis 2016), over 66,000
unaccompanied minors, predominately from Central American countries, attempted to enter the
United States (Hernandez 2015). While the number of unaccompanied minors increased steadily
since 2008, 66,000 represented almost double the 38,833 recorded in 2013, and almost triple the
24,481 minors found in 2012 by the United States Border Patrol (Hernandez 2015; Musalo and
Lee 2017). Major media platforms such as Fox News extensively covered the surge and public
opposition to accepting these migrants increased (Zug 2014). Considering this shift in public
opinion, Trump’s willingness to tackle immigration, despite his harsh rhetoric, may have been
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the key to his growth in support during the primary season and his eventual victory during the
general election cycle.
Plan of the Dissertation
This investigation examines how exogenous events, particularly migration, can
potentially change partisan support and focuses on how these changes can affect populists. This
project is also interested in examining whether there are any major differences between
supporters in the nine countries that saw a rise in support in the immediate aftermath of the
Migrant Crisis and the countries that did not see a rise in support. The final section of the
analysis related to Western European examines whether there is a major difference between
right-wing populists and more general ethnocentric populists.
This investigation also extends the discussion to the American case. This project
examines whether an exogenous shock also played a role in affecting support for the Republican
Party's presidential candidate. As a secondary question, the project also examines whether there
are any changes to the composition of the Republican Party support base over time. In particular,
it addresses the question of whether the supporters of the Republican Party have become more
like supporters of European ethnocentric populist parties over time.
Beyond the key research questions, the overall purpose of this investigation is to
understand what populism is and what direction its adherents want to take society. While there is
no agreed upon definition of populism (Otjes and Louwerse 2015), a number of scholars have
noted that adherents emphasize a conflict (Halikiopoulou 2019; Schmuck and Matthews 2017)
between "regular people," who can be defined in either in an exclusive manner such as an ethnic
group (Stavrakakis et al. 2017) or as a more inclusive group that deemphasizes ethnicity such as
working class (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). These "regular
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people" are often seen as being on the side of good (Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007;
Schmuck and Matthews 2017). This good group is seen as being in conflict with an enemy group
which can take many different shapes or forms. Sometimes the enemy is portrayed as a minority
group that is threatening cultural and/or ethnic homogeneity (Schmuck and Matthes 2017),
cosmopolitan individuals who seek to change society (Halikiopolou 2019) or elites such as
establishment politicians who are portrayed as uncaring (Stavrakakis et al. 2017). Regardless of
how the enemy group is defined, it is seen as not having the interests of those who are part of the
group at heart and a danger to the side of good (Lamour 2021).
While populism is often seen as a “thin ideology” (Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Jupskas
and Ivarsflaten 2016; Kalsnes 2019; Mudde 2004), this thinness allows a proponent to infuse it
with different policy stances. For example, one subset of populists, right-wing populists, have
instituted anti-immigration policies that are radically different from more mainstream
administrations that preferred policies friendlier to immigrants (Judis 2016; Zaslove 2004).
With a large number of strains, however, comes a degree of confusion regarding
definitions. The term right-wing populism is used extensively by scholars (Arzheimer 2015;
Halikiopoulou 2019; de Lange and Mugge 2015; Lees 2018; Schmuck and Matthes 2017;
Rydgren 2005; Shehaj et al. 2021; Swank and Betz 2003; Winberg 2017 among many others)
and definitions often emphasize the importance of excluding foreigners from participating in
national life as a way to restore power to the people (Berbuir et al. 2015; Halikiopoulou 2019;
Winberg 2017). In other words, these scholars emphasize the social policy aspect of the rightwing.
However, these scholars tend to ignore another crucial aspect of right-wing parties:
Economic attributes. The terms left and right-wing have also extensively been used to refer to
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economic policy positions with many scholars considering left-wing economics to emphasize
more government intervention and right-wing economics less intervention (Conover and
Feldman 1981; Jost et al. 2003; Neumayer 2004; Powell and Whitten 1993; Tsebelis and Garrett
2000). Considering the prominence of the economic definition of the term right-wing, some
consideration of this definition should be discussed when conceptualizing right-wing populism.
If populism, particularly the right-wing variant, continues to grow in prominence, the
fundamentally contentious nature of populism that emphasizes conflict between groups (Roberts
2006) may prove to have far-reaching consequences in the political sphere. While many
mainstream politicians attempt to stay away from racially divisive language (Mendleberg 2001),
many populists use direct and controversial language that could create a more contentious
environment. For example, Donald Trump, then candidate for president of the United States,
explicitly called for a shutdown of Muslim immigration to the United States (Judis 2016) while
Filip Dewinter, a Vlaams Belang politician, once stated that Muslims were attempting to
colonize the West (Betz and Meret 2009). If such language continues, tensions between groups
could become increasingly inflamed in the years to come.
While these are questions that the entirety of the dissertation tackles, each of the
individual chapters also have their own specific purposes. This chapter sought to introduce an
empirical puzzle and lay out the basic research questions. There was less focus on analysis and
more emphasis on telling a story about how the events of 2014-2015 changed the political
environment of many Western countries.
Chapter two moves away from a story-telling narrative to focus more on understanding
the empirical puzzle in general. This chapter is divided into two components: Discussion of
previous findings and a theory section. The discussion’s purpose is to lay out various concepts
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that are of importance. While populism is an important term, the survey will start by examining a
number of different concepts that are closely related. As political parties are an important part of
the story, there is discussion on party categorization in the Western context. The review section
will also examine definitions of left, right, ideology and then conclude with a review of the most
important concept for this investigation: populism.
The second half of chapter two focuses on theory. After examining alternative theories
that explain support for populists and discussing why these approaches fail to explain what we
have observed, the chapter presents the main theory to explain growth in populist support: Status
threat. This concept argues that individuals who feel that they are being threatened
demographically and/or politically will attempt to prevent a further decline in group power. This
theory will be combined with political psychology theories which discuss the importance of
exogenous shocks in affecting support for populists.
Chapter three focuses on describing the research design and data. Initially, much of the
discussion focuses on what type of data is appropriate in order to test the hypotheses including
the Manifesto Project, European Social Survey (ESS) and the American National Election Study
(ANES). There will also be a focus on what types of variables serve as good indicators for
analysis.
The second half of chapter three focuses on research design, and especially, case
selection. The discussion addresses why the United States is included and why analysis involving
the United States deserves its own chapter. After discussing the cases, the next step is to explain
which type of analysis is most appropriate. Reflecting back on the basic research questions
posited in the first chapter, a placement analysis, difference of means tests, and logistic analysis
will be presented as the bulk of the analysis presented in chapters four, five, and six.
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Chapter four involves conducting a placement analysis of all the major parties from
countries chosen in the previous chapter. It takes a first step towards answering the main research
question regarding the surge in electoral support among populist actors in major Western
countries. To do this, it looks at the remaining case countries that were outlined in the case
selection section of chapter three. In this chapter, using the Manifesto Project, populism scores
and left-right scores are created to place all parties that won at least one seat in the last preMigrant Crisis election and the first post-Migrant Crisis election. These scores are used to create
cutoff points for whether a party can be considered populist. After doing this, the European
parties are pooled together with the median populism score and median left-right score adjusted
to be zero. The purpose is to take into account any regional variation on populist and left-right
scores. Afterwards, the parties from each country are looked at separately to see where the
populist parties lie. The objective is to see whether within each country, the populist actor is
considered to be closer to the center or not.
Chapter five continues the analysis by looking at the European case. This chapter uses the
European Social Survey to conduct two different types of tests. First, difference of means tests
are used to see whether there are any statistically significant differences between voters who
support populist and non-populist parties. The second part of the analysis utilizes logistic
regression analysis.
This chapter also emphasizes a slightly different conceptualization of the term “rightwing populist.” While the term generally refers to a variation of populism that focuses on putting
out an anti-immigration platform (Judis 2016), there tends to be little emphasis on whether these
actors also follow right-wing economic policy prescriptions. The chapter emphasizes that rightwing populists are distinct from another type of populists (called ethnocentric populists) and
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evaluates whether supporters of right-wing populist parties are voting for them because of their
right-wing economic policies, right-wing social policies, or both.
Chapter six applies the approach of chapter five to the distinct case of the United States.
The chapter uses the American National Election Survey to determine what variables drive
support for Donald Trump. Difference of means tests are again used to see whether there are
statistically significant differences between Republican supporters, the main unit of interest, in
different time periods.
Chapter seven is the conclusion. Here, the findings are summarized and there is
discussion about the broader contributions of this dissertation. The chapter also outlines potential
ways to move this research agenda forward. The concluding section provides some parting
remarks on populism.
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Chapter 2: Previous Scholarship and the Issue of Conceptualization
Introduction
The introductory chapter argued that in the late 2010s, populist parties in much of the
Western world started to earn larger electoral shares than they had historically. A brief
examination of vote shares from 2004 through the late 2010s indicated this to be the case within
some European Union member states. While the chapter noted the importance of populists and
populism, it did not define these terms. This chapter defines these and other critical concepts
including such as left-wing, right-wing, and ideology.
This chapter also lays out other important pillars of the research design and analysis.
Research within the social sciences is driven by theories (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
Before presenting the theory guiding this project, the chapter outlines competing theories and
their weaknesses. It subsequently presents the theoretical approach arguing that status threat, a
feeling of fear driven by no longer being the dominant social and political player due to the rise
of newcomers (Morgan 2018), drove individuals to support populists. The chapter then discusses
how the theory applies to Western Europe and the United States. It concludes by connecting
theoretical expectations to the research design.
Introduction to Previous Scholarship
Both colloquially and within the scholarship, there are a number of parties which have
been considered populist. In Europe, several parties are commonly identified as populist,
including: Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Party for Freedom in the
Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, and the Swiss People’s Party. While it did not do
particularly well electorally, the United Kingdom Independence Party helped spearhead the
United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union (Judis 2016) and is also a populist party.
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These parties share a number of attributes. Most notably, they advocate for white
Europeans and policies disadvantageous to immigrants and minorities. The Freedom Party of
Austria is firmly anti-immigrant (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016) while the Sweden Democrats are
described as ethnonationalists who seek a more ethnically homogenous nation-state in which
social order and traditional values are prioritized (Jylhä, Rydgren, and Strimling 2019). The
Swiss People’s Party espouses xenophobic and anti-immigrant views (Bernhard 2017) while
supporters of the Alternative for Germany often value Germany’s cultural legacy and are
concerned with the levels of immigration to the country (Lees 2018). The Dutch Party for
Freedom, in the 2010 election program, notes that the Dutch people are distinct and have no
equals (Lubbers and Coenders 2017). While a cursory look, the available scholarship indicates
that these parties are ethnonationalist, anti-immigrant, and are not advocates of change (Rydgren
2005).
This list of traits also suggests that there are multiple types of populism. For example, the
American populist candidate Bernie Sanders shared a disdain for the establishment just like the
populist parties mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, he deliberately made no attempt
at discussing racial or ethnic divisions nor did he attempt to discuss immigration in a negative
light. His take on populism was often labeled as “left-wing populism” while those who espoused
a more racially and ethnically divisive form of populism were said to follow “right-wing
populism” (Judis 2016).
The variation in views held by different types of populists appears to add another layer to
the broader research question on populism. Depending on the types of views held, scholars have
called the parties either left-wing or right-wing populists. When discussing the types of populist
actors who are anti-immigrant and ethnonationalist, the scholarship tends to label them right-
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wing (Judis 2016). However, the term “right-wing” by itself has many different connotations that
are related to both economic and social policy positions. The variations in how right-wing is
defined requires a conversation regarding the accuracy of this label. While many populists prefer
more government intervention in the economy, or traditionally left-wing policies, and often call
for protectionist measures for workers, this is not universally the case. Kitschelt and McGann
(1997) called a number of political actors who called for a curbing of immigration and the
shrinking of the welfare state the “new radical right.”
However, even within the discussion of the radical right, there is little agreement about
how these actors should be defined. Mudde (2000) indicated that there was not much support for
less government intervention in the economy among members of the radical right. De Lange
(2007) argued that some of these parties, such as the National Front of France and the Vlaams
Blok of Belgium, desire curbs to immigration and oppose further expansions of the welfare state.
However, others such as the List Pim Fortuyn did not. Further complicating matters is the
possibility that parties could change over time. Kriesi et al. (2006) indicated that the Austrian
Freedom Party moved further right on economic policy in the post-Cold War era.
The discussion about parties, populism, and right and left cannot be conducted in
isolation from a discussion of ideology. While there are questions on what ideology means at its
core (Gerring 1997), within the scholarship there have been questions on whether populism and
its variations constitute an ideology or not (Stanley 2008). In particular, the ability to say
whether populism is an ideology can greatly contribute to categorizing parties into either populist
or non-populist varieties.
The disputes in the scholarship raise important questions: What are some of the important
concepts related to the main research question in the introductory chapter? How have populist
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parties been categorized by scholars? How do related concepts such as left and right play a role
in defining populism?
Party Categorization
While finding a clear method of categorizing parties is central to the analysis, discussion
of previous scholarship presents methods that go beyond dividing parties into populist or nonpopulist camps. While applying the language of party categorization is common in research,
there is no universally agreed upon method of classification. Nevertheless, a useful starting point
is the seminal review essay by Mair and Mudde (1998) which notes the challenges of classifying
political parties. Taking a page from biology scholars, the two emphasize that party “family”
classifications can be deeply problematic as at times there is disagreement on “genetic” relations
among parties.
Despite these challenges, this section examines how scholars have classified parties and
some of the strengths and weaknesses of each major method. It then chooses one of these and
digs into some of the concepts that are key to this method and define terms such as left and right
while discussing what traits scholars have given to each. It repeats the process with the concepts
of populism and left-wing and right-wing populism. The attributes found through this
examination are then used to find policy variables in the Manifesto Project, a collection of party
platforms that code specific policy positions. This data are then be used to place parties on a leftright spectrum and give each a populism score.

The Interest Approach
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Mair and Mudde (1998) provide a widely-cited approach emphasizing four different
types. The interest, or constituency, approach emphasizes that parties exist due to the desires of
various social groups and are the result of whatever dominant social groups happen to operate in
the broader political environment in a given time. There is an unequal relationship between the
party and the constituency, where the party’s survival is contingent on a constituency’s
willingness to see the party as a vehicle for its interests (Panebianco 1988). Of particular interest
is who the party serves. This approach is rooted in previous scholarship including that of Lipset
and Rokkan (1967). The argument here is that parties are founded on the basis of similar
interests. Because of this, one needs to take a closer look at examining the many different
constituencies that formed.
Transnational Approach
Other interests and constituencies represent important components of a party. In the years
since the Cold War, actions taken by a number of parties provided another opportunity at
creating a new classification method. For example, parties with similar beliefs and philosophies
have formed transnational groups such as the Asia-Pacific Socialist Organization (Mair and
Mudde 1998). This approach looks the actions of the parties themselves and at the rosters of
these transnational clubs.
While the transnational party lists have grown to encompass many different parties, it is
unlikely that all types of specific parties from across the world would be on any specific list.
There is also the potential issue of “coding.” While the existence of these transnational rosters
simplifies the coding process, there remains the question of whether the lists are truly
representative of the parties themselves. For example, some parties belong to two different lists
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at the same time (Mair and Mudde 1998): A party highly focused on environmental issues could
also be Socialist.
Label Approach
While creating a transnational roster list is a straightforward method of classification,
some scholars believe that classification using party names or labels is sufficient. In other words,
it is best to let the party itself judge where it belongs. For example, parties that call themselves
Socialist or Green parties should be considered as such and self-classification should be taken at
face value (Mair and Mudde 1998). While this method is simple, some parties have names that
do not correspond with their policies. For example, the PILZ List of Austria was given its name
due to founder Member of Parliament Peter Pilz and does not say anything about where the party
stands (Buzogany and Scherhaufer 2018).
Ideology Approach
While transnational roster lists, party labels, and interests/constituency-based approaches
are prominent approaches to labeling parties, other scholars believe that ideology should be the
main source for classification. While there is no universally agreed upon definition of ideology,
Gerring (1997) indicated that many scholars, at a minimum, agree that ideology involves a group
of ideas that come together as a coherent bundle. In this way, this method focuses on examining
what a party says and does rather than simply examining its name (Mair and Mudde 1998). The
ideological approach lines up well with the rational model of examining organizations as it
argues that a party’s internal composition and membership should line up with a specific goal in
mind (Panebianco 1988).
While this method has the advantage of grouping parties on the basis of how they behave,
there are a number of challenges to this approach. For example, how can one measure how
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“Christian Democratic” a party happens to be. It is unlikely that the strength of adherence to the
set of beliefs labeled Christian Democracy is equal for all parties that fit the category. While
some prefer looking at party rhetoric such as statements made by leading politicians in the
chambers of the legislature or documents such as party platforms (Laver and Schofield 1990;
Laver and Hunt 1992), this method assumes that there is consensus among leaders of the party
when this may not be the case.
In addition, there is also some debate on whether ideology can travel cross-nationally.
While labels or transnational groups have the advantage of being able to travel across the world,
ideology may mean something different in each part of the world (Sartori 1970). A summary of
the four methods is outlined below in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Four Major Classification Methods
Interests Approach-Focus on the constituencies and interests of a party.
Strength(s)-Easy to follow priorities of parties, rooted in empirical realities of Western
Europe.
Weakness(es)-Rooted too deeply in Western Europe. Difficult to generalize beyond that
region.
Transnational Groups Approach-Group by international party group membership.
Strength(s)- Straightforward and simple as one is examining a list.
Weakness(es)-Not all parties that belong to a type will be on the list.
Labels Approach-See what the party calls itself.
Strength(s)-Gives agency to the party. Simple as one is reading the name of a party.
Weakness(es)-Not all parties have names that match a label. Even when the name does match
a label, no guarantees of perfect replication of party ideology/actions and name.
Ideology Approach-Code a party’s ideological rhetoric or actions.
Strength(s)- Places strong emphasis on a party’s actions.
Weakness(es)-Difficult to agree on how to code, difficult to use same coding scheme for
parties across time and space.
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While each of these methods has its strengths and weaknesses, the analysis here is best
served by using the classification method that focuses on ideology and coding party
actions/rhetoric. This method is the most useful because it emphasizes what a party says/does
rather than just taking its name at face value, and allows the researcher to map out the different
parties visually.
On Left and Right
The next step addresses the concepts of “left” and “right” when discussing ideology.
While the general bundle of ideas of what constitutes the left and right has remained relatively
consistent in the 21st century, there is still debate on some of the finer points on conceptualizing
these terms. A major issue is that the terms left and right are used to describe social policy,
economic policy, and sometimes both simultaneously. It is difficult to find unanimity in what
constitutes each, but examining scholarship on these different dimensions is useful.
In general parlance, the right became conflated with conservativism. Reflecting the
centrality of the word “conserve,” the term is often used to define someone who prioritizes
defending the status quo over change (Allen 1981). Historically, on the social dimension, this led
to a commitment to long-standing values such as the importance of family, nation, and monarchy
(Greiffenhagen 1979). On the economic dimension, right-wing meant opposition to changing
existing economic hierarchies. This extends to opposing the working class and socialism (Boix
1999) while also being suspicious towards redistribution (Iversen and Soskice 2006).
On Left and Right: Economics
The left, also defined in many different ways over time, has been equated with liberalism
and an emphasis on equality, social reform, and tolerance of those who are different from the
majority (McClosky and Zaller 1984). In economics, the left has been synonymous with the need
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for more equitable economic policies that emphasize redistribution (Piurko et al. 2011). The
important thread connecting these arguments is that the left, unlike the right, has been portrayed
as more open to change especially when it is designed to help those believed to be in need (Jost
et al. 2003).
Despite the use of the terms left and right for many years, conceptualization proved to be
a challenge in the 21st century. On the economic side, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) indicate that a
major divergent point for left and right-wing parties in the European context is their differing
views on economic regulation; the left desires more regulation while the right prefers
deregulation. Powell and Whitten (1993) note that right-wing governments are concerned with
fighting inflation, curbing taxes, and staying away from using the powers of the state when
possible.
One of the most important divergent points between the left and right is how they think
about unregulated markets; the left is skeptical of any positive benefits while the right embraces
limitations on regulations. On the issue of environmental regulation, parties classified as leftwing across the industrialized world appear to prefer policies which focus on environmental
protection such as the preservation of natural resources (Neumayer 2004). This indicates that at
least on the issue of environmental policy, left-wing parties prefer a degree of government
intervention.
Iversen and Soskice (2006) discuss left-wing political parties as entities that desire
redistribution and decreasing inequality. Powell and Whitten (1993), when discussing left-wing
governments, note that they are concerned with full employment, income redistribution, and
state-sponsored intervention. Neumayer (2004) notes that the left is highly skeptical of
unregulated markets while Potrafke (2010) emphasizes that leftist governments generally prefer
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more government responsibility and action in the economic realm. Overall, these scholars,
despite writing in different time periods and examining different policy dimensions, look at leftleaning political actors as those who are less comfortable with the economic status quo than
those who are right leaning. This is especially reflected on right-leaning individuals holding
more favorable views on capitalism and big business (Conover and Feldman 1981). Writing in
the 1960s, Rossiter (1968) also noted that those who are more conservative or right leaning are
more resistant to economic changes. On economic policy, this line of thinking appears to be
reasonably consistent through time (Jost 2003 et al; Jost 2006).
On Left and Right: Social
While there is a degree of difference depending on the country (Zechmeister 2006), under
a social-focused framework, right-wing emphasizes the importance of deference to authority
figures and a heightened sense of prejudice towards outgroups such as homosexuals and those of
different racial backgrounds (Hodson and Busseri 2012). Thorisdottir et al. (2007) also
emphasize the social aspect of the right-wing; for them, traditionalism, or resistance to change,
acceptance of inequality, the need for order, high need for security and low need for openness is
associated with the right. Jost et al. (2003) emphasize the social nature of the right-wing by
noting a strong resistance to change. Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002) echo these sentiments
by noting the importance placed on power, security (including national security), and conformity
while exhibiting more trust in status quo institutions. While each of these authors focus on
different aspects of the right, they all maintain a common thread. Whether it involves outsiders
or a desire for more conformity, there is general suspicion towards change (Jost et al. 2003).
This same issue plays out with regards to defining the left. From a social dimension,
Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002) note that left-wing supporters tend to reject hierarchical
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organizations of society and promote the welfare of outgroup individuals such as minorities and
the poor. Jost et al. (2003) indicate that the left favors more equality and desire a breakdown of
hierarchy. In other words, change in favor of decreasing inequalities is a central tenet.
While discussions on the economic aspects of left and right are ultimately rooted in
whether the government should play a big or smaller role in economic matters (Jost et al. 2003;
Tsebelis and Grant 2000), there is considerable variation in how those on the left and right
position themselves on social policy. If debates regarding policy are ultimately rooted in what is
considered to be acceptable and/or moral (Koch 2017), the expectation is that there is strong
variation in what positions are taken by the left and right in a given country and time period.
Positioning is also affected by salience at a given time. For example, in many Latin American
countries, the role of religion in public life has been a major flashpoint between the left and the
right for much of the twentieth century (Zechmeister 2006). Advocates for homosexuals, before
the 1960s, had trouble finding advocates among both left and right-wing groups in the West
(Hekma et al. 1995).
If being left or right-wing involves specific views on social and economic policy, then
what qualifies as mainstream left and right? Mulloy (2004) notes that what does not constitute
the mainstream is anything that falls outside of established norms or rules of engagement. It is
difficult to systematically parse out norms and rules because of the difficulty in finding
unanimous agreement on specific courses of action. The existence of these rules indicates that
the oppression of dissent and the lack of desire to negotiate could be considered a violation of the
mainstream in most Western societies because such actions constitute violations of existing
methods of interaction. This indicates that the mainstream left and right, at least as a baseline,
should accept the importance of protecting debate, deliberation, and the acceptance of respecting
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proper institutional channels. With this definition in mind, the mainstream right espouses social
views that are highly skeptical of change and outsiders, prefers an economic policy that is
reluctant to pursue government intervention, and generally accepts the importance of status quo
institutional mechanisms of political action. The mainstream left desires to change status quo
society, and advance acceptance towards outsiders, institute an economic policy where inequality
is mitigated, and maintain the importance of status quo institutional mechanisms of political
action with mostly peaceful means. A summary of the discussion on the left and right is below
on table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Short Survey on Left and Right-Wing Attributes (Historic and Contemporary)
Left-Wing

Right-Wing

Social Dimension

Social Dimension

•

Human/individual rights

•

Deference to authority figures

•

Helping minority groups

•

Emphasis on conformity and hierarchy

•

De-emphasis of traditional values such

•

Emphasis on tradition

as family, nationalism

•

Acceptance of social inequality

Government role in addressing social

•

Suspicion of government role in social

•

inequalities

policy

Economic Dimension

Economic Dimension

•

Preference for redistribution

•

Suspicion of redistribution

•

Desire to help those in the working

•

Suspicion of the working class

classes

•

Preference for free markets

Preference for market regulation

•

Suspicion of government role in

•

addressing economic inequality
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•

Government role in addressing
economic inequalities

On Ideology
Ideology is an important component of categorization as it potentially provides attributes
that could be used to group parties together. While ideology is often used to group parties
together (von Beyme 1985) and is a ubiquitous part of political jargon, many definitions have
been used. However, by the post-World War II era, ideology’s purpose had changed from being
a way to examine different belief systems to examining policy preferences. It was now a mark
for understanding how the average person thought about specific policy points (Converse 1964;
Knight 2006). The movement towards using ideology to describe the general public also gave
rise to the belief that ideology could predict voting behavior although scholars in the Michigan
school of voting suspected that party identification was more important (Campbell et al. 1960).
Ideology has also become a popular way of dividing up parties. Mair and Mudde (1998)
and others have noted that Communist parties, social democratic parties, labor parties, Christian
democratic parties, agrarian parties, conservative parties, liberal parties, left-libertarian parties,
regionalist parties, nationalist parties, extreme right parties, and green parties, are among some of
the labels given to parties based on their bundle of ideas. Bakker et al. (2015) also classify
parties based on ideology and put labels depending on how far left or right the party appears to
be. For example, parties labeled radical left, green, and liberal belong on the left side of the
spectrum while Christian democrats are placed closer to the center-right, and the radical right on
the right most part of the spectrum. Each of these types of parties hold distinct groups of ideas
and use these as a guide to move towards one side of an issue (Levitin and Miller 1979).
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While many definitions of ideology have been used within the scholarly community,
Gerring (1997)’s examination indicated that most of these researchers consider ideology to be a
set of ideas that are bound together. Knight (2006) corroborates Gerring’s findings and notes that
as one moves closer to the end of the 20th century, an increasing number of political scientists
define ideology as a stable set of ideas that compete and contrast another set of interrelated ideas.
Knight (2006) notes that most scholars have converged on utilizing a continuum of left-right or
liberal-conservative to place actors spatially. This dissertation uses the Gerring/Knight definition
of ideology as a set of ideas that are coherently bound together in some logical way.
Discussion of Populism
For some, populism entails a specific style of governance where those in power should do
what the people desire. In other words, the will of the people should be the dominant factor in
what sort of policies get passed. As long as a majority of people want it, it should be done.
However, there are a number of potential issues with this line of thinking. When discussing the
issue of preferences, knowing the true will of the people is at times impossible. This is especially
true in a situation where there is no clear majority of individuals who want a specific policy
(Riker 1982). Nevertheless, this definition of populism describes it as a tool to help restore
popular sovereignty in which majority rules dominate over the backroom dealings of career
politicians who may or may not respond to the general will of the people (Abts and Rummens
2007). Using this definition, populism argues against negotiating; if a policy has a clear majority,
then there is no need to negotiate with the minority as it is the will and desire of the majority
(Canovan 2002).
Another definition focuses on populism as a campaign style where politicians attempt to
rally the masses and espouse rhetoric that rails against mainstream politicians and their failures
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(Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017). Here, populists agree that elites are a distinct and separate
group that do not have the interests of the general population at heart (Ivaldi et al. 2017). It is
then a way to appeal to the general population against established power players (Canovan
1999).
While this second definition is more focused on rhetoric than governance, it shares an
important connection to populism as a style of governance; they both divide political actors
between “the people” and some sort of governing class that is often presented as uncaring and/or
incompetent (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017; Riker 1982). Populism as a rhetorical device
requires those who utilize it to appeal to those in the margins of society such as the working class
and those who operate in the informal economy.
While one definition focuses more on examining populism as a mode of governance and
another as a rhetorical style, there is a general thread connecting both viewpoints. In essence, the
thought process behind populism is that there are powerless individuals who can be considered
the “have-nots” of the world, while those who are considered the “haves” are in power (Ellner
2003; Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017). For populists, either the people or the elites are
victorious in this struggle. There cannot be a middle ground. An overview of the definitions is
presented below on table 2.4.
Table 2.4: An Overview of Three Definitions of Populism
Populism as a Style of

Populism as a Style of

Governance

Campaigning

•

Institute policies in the
name of the people

•

No need for negotiation if
majority of people want
something

•

Belief that world
divided between elites
and non-elites

•

Focuses on directing
anger towards elites

Populism as a Mindset

•

Politicians
should heed the
desires of the
people
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•

Sometimes difficult to
know the will of the
people

•

•

Career
politicians do
not care about
regular people

•

World divided
into one or the
other

Appeal to have-nots

On Left and Right-Wing Populism
What further complicates defining and labeling populism is that there are also left and
right-wing variations. While both variations believe that there is currently a competition between
elites and “regular people” in which regular people should rule, the two disagree on a number of
issues including the question of where to direct their anger. For left-wing populists, anger is
focused mostly on an economic elite that is believed to be exploiting the working class (March
2007). This means that toppling that wealthy elite is the main goal for left-wing populists (Abts
and Rummens 2007). Left-wing populists also seek to supplement protections for workers by
emphasizing the importance of economic protectionism and the dangers of an uncontrolled free
market (Judis 2016).
Right-wing populists also believe that economic injustices are pervasive and are weary of
free market economics. While they do not ignore economic elites, there is an ethnocentric
element to right-wing populism. The logic behind this ethnic element is that the unity of the
general population is not possible under a more ethnically and culturally heterogeneous
environment (Abts and Rummens 2007). In other words, there is a core group of individual
insiders who make up the “heart” of the people (Taggart 2000). Because of this belief, outsiders,
such as immigrants and ethnic minorities, are considered as big of a threat as economic elites.

35

Ivarsflaten (2008) goes as far as to say that anti-immigration sentiment is the only thing that
binds all successful right-wing populist parties together.
Both left-wing populists and right-wing populists emphasize a narrative where ingroups
and outgroups are fighting for control. However, the main difference between the two is rooted
in their targets. Left-wing populists believe that wealthy elites who refuse to help the working
class should be criticized. For right-wing populists, while wealthy elites are often a target,
immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities also exist as a target outgroup (Mudde 2007).
The idea of right-wing populism requires more scrutiny. While conceptualization of leftwing populism is relatively consistent with modern day leftism on both the social and economic
dimension, there appears to be a gap between right-wing populism and the right in some ways.
On the social dimension, while right-wing populism highlights the differences between ingroups
and outgroups, the mainstream right often tries to minimize tensions between individuals of
different ethnicities and races and will often outright ignores differences (Hawley 2017).
Nevertheless, a general coolness towards broad changes to society color the perceptions of both
the mainstream right and right-wing populism.
There is a strong disconnect on economic policy. Right-wing populists desire to
dismantle free market policies in favor of protectionism and prefer government intervention into
the economy. However, that does not appear to be consistently the case among populist parties
given the label right-wing (Mudde 2000). Otjes and Louwerse (2015) note this definitional issue
when they state that parties labeled as right-wing populists will sometimes prefer free market
policies while others prefer more state intervention. The general right-wing traditional
conservative, on the other hand, prefers a hands-off approach when dealing with economic
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policy. This disconnect indicates that on the economic dimension, labeling right-wing populists
as “right-wing” can be misleading.
A number of European scholars have abandoned the term right-wing populist and prefer
radical right or radical right-wing (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Jylhä et
al. 2019), radical right populism/populist radical right (Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rydgren
2002), and extreme right (Golder 2003). However, the fundamental issue of the usage of the
word “right,” which has the aforementioned economic connotations, remains. Rather, it may
make more sense to use the already existing term ethnocentric populist (Rydgren 2005) to refer
to these actors.
Table 2.5: Attributes Specific to Left-Wing Populism and Ethnocentric Populism
(Differences Italicized)
Left-wing Populism

Ethnocentric Populism

•

Focuses anger at economic elite and
institutions

•

Focuses anger at economic elite and
institutions

•

Anyone who is not an elite is welcome
as member of “the people”

•

Argues that there is a core group of
individuals who are “the people”

•

Does not focus anger at immigrants

•

Highly suspicious of immigration

•

Attempts to mitigate differences
between ethnic and racial groups

•

Highly suspicious of ethnic/racial
outsiders and minorities

The attributes of ethnocentric populism are be divided into three ways above in table 2.5:
General mindset, economic, and social. The general mindset, which is shared with all variations
of populism, is that politicians and policymakers should heed the desires of the people, career
politicians do not care about the welfare of regular people, and the world is divided those who
have and those who have-not. In economics, populists of all stripes prefer redistribution, more
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government intervention, and a rejection of the free market. On the social side, however, there is
some variation. While populism does not say much about immigration and ethnic minorities in
general, different strains have different views on the subject. Ethnocentric populism is strongly
against immigration and is highly suspicious of ethnic minorities while left-wing populism is not.
A summary of the concepts is presented below in table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Summary of Concept Definitions for This Investigation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Party Categorization- Use ideology and coding party actions/rhetoric as the basis for
dividing up populist and non-populist parties.
Left- Can refer to social or economic policy. On social policy it emphasizes a desire
for change while on economic policy a desire for more government intervention. Will
be used mostly in relation to economic policy.
Right- Can refer to social or economic policy. On social policy it emphasizes suspicion
of change while on economic policy a desire for less government intervention. Will be
used mostly in relation to economic policy.
Ideology- Bundle or set of ideas that is coherently bound together in a logical way
Populism- Mindset in which an individual believes that the foremost political issue is
the conflict between the elites and people
Left-wing Populism- Follows fundamentals of populism. Focuses on economic
inequality and attempts to minimize any racial or ethnic divisions among people
Right-wing Populism- Follows fundamentals of populism. Emphasizes antiimmigration sentiment and ethnonationalism while also espousing less government
intervention in economy.
Ethnocentric Populism- Follows fundamentals of populism. Emphasizes antiimmigration sentiment and ethnonationalism.

Introduction to the Theory
The introduction of the term ethnocentric populism forces a modification of the main
research question guiding this dissertation: What is causing an increase in the electoral support
for ethnocentric populist actors in the late 2010s? The cursory examination indicated that the
parties doing well in the late 2010s tended to be a part of this strain of populism and so the
theory needs to address what is driving support for ethnocentric populists in particular. To do
this, the theory is divided into a number of different sections. To start, the theory and alternative
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theories will be discussed. The final section of this chapter connects these ideas to the research
design.
Theory for This Dissertation
The theory has a number of different components. It is rooted in the difficulties of
changing fundamental political orientations and the importance of group-based identity as
important antecedents. It moves to a discussion of exogenous shocks and their effects on support
for populist actors by activating a feeling of status threat among individuals of a dominant group.
The argument concludes by noting that individuals who feel status threat will most likely
consider voting as their primary option of bringing changes that push back against the exogenous
shock of mass migration.
Scholars have long debated how partisan attitudes affect political attitudes and form
behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960). The impressible years hypothesis argues that individuals, on
average, in their early adulthood years often change their views but generally maintain their
fundamental political attitudes in their later adult years (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). This
indicates that human beings are wired to maintain world views that are solidified in adulthood
(Hatemi et al. 2009; Jervis 1976; Prior 2010). In particular, fundamental political orientations
tend to remain in place through one’s adult life (Searing et al. 1976; Sears and Funk 1999). This
appears to be especially true for highly symbolic political attitudes such as partisan attachments
and loyalties (Krosnick 1991), suggesting that short-term changes in partisanship and
consequently election outcomes should be less likely.
However, spikes in populist support have happened over time. What causes these
increases in support to occur? One of the fundamental building blocks of humanity is the
creation of societies in which groups of individuals work together to improve their station
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(Shinada et al. 2004). Enforcing collective action to help make sure that a society is capable of
running is not an easy task and there is always the possibility of individuals reneging on their
duties (Olson 1965). However, one way to encourage cooperation is working alongside with
individuals who look similar and share cultural norms. In circumstances where a person is forced
to interact with others, showing more trust in someone who looks similar can be a noncognitively taxing action that helps establish a relationship (Hammond and Axelrod 2006).
Establishing cooperation and trust is difficult; in order to facilitate group-building, individuals
will even use mundane and inconsequential traits as a heuristic to build a relationship (Woolley
and Fishbach 2017). A more substantive attempt at building relations can be through working
with those of the same ethnic group as such individuals tend to be more closely related
genetically than those who are of a different background (Axelrod 1984; Jones 2018).
Conversely, according to this argument, it is more difficult to establish relations with
those who are of a different. Without the ability to utilize simple heuristics like ethnic affiliation,
hostilities may erupt more quickly. Realistic group conflict theory argues that tangible reasons
for conflict could include the finite nature of resources and divergent life goals that different
groups may hold (Sherif and Sherif 1969). Conflict leads to a zero-sum circumstance where
victory by one group automatically leads to defeat for the other.
What the realist group theory indicates is that insiders consider outsiders to be rivals
worthy of suspicion. Consider this within the context of the Immigration Crisis and the
Migration Crisis in the United States and Europe respectively. In both countries, a large influx of
newcomers brought the possibility of new competition with the possibility of future citizenship
extending competition to the political arena. Conflict between an already existing group and a
newcomer outsider group generates an opportunity for populist parties, particularly those of the
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ethnocentric strain, to break the mostly solidified political orientations of individuals formed
during their most impressionable years (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). The exogenous shock of
being forced to deal with a new political and social landscape can force some individuals
consider voting and supporting actors once considered to be outside the mainstream.
An exogenous shock is an unexpected external event that can affect actors who may not
be directly involved in causing the occurrence (Rosenfeld 2018). People desire physical safety
and when this is taken away, they may be willing to look to ideas and actors who can provide
this (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006). An exogenous shock can activate fear that
can also threaten not just the individual but entire groups (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Larsen
et al. 2020). Considering such events, individuals may reevaluate what they consider to be the
best ways to protect themselves (Haner et al. 2019).
When evaluating the new environment, an individual may consider trading freedom for
more physical security (Morella and Zechmeister 2009). There is also evidence that during such
a shock, there may also be increased negative sentiments directed at outgroups which may be
considered a threat (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006). These sentiments could
produce policy preferences for strict border controls and ending immigration for outgroups
(Haner et al. 2019). The effect may be particularly powerful in relatively homogenous
communities that have little experience with outsiders (Nussio et al. 2019).
The possibility of an exogenous shock causing changes to one’s thoughts can occur in
non-security related scenarios as well. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political norms that
limited participation were suddenly gone. Russians, who for decades had been socialized to
accept authoritarian values, were forced to accept a new environment of multi-party elections.
Mishler and Rose (2007), by examining data from 1992 through 2005, concluded that some older
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Russians were willing to embrace democratic values such as multi-party elections, but younger
Russians were more likely to embrace these changes.
This examination into exogenous shocks indicates that there is the possibility of
individuals changing their minds given the right circumstances. When experiencing a security
threat such as terrorist attacks, some evidence shows that individuals are more willing to give up
their personal liberties (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Morella and Zechmeister 2009) while also
being more willing to take up more hardline stances on immigration (Echebarria-Echabe and
Fernandez-Guede 2006; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013).
With the understanding that individuals tend to retain their fundamental political stances
under most situations, but are willing to change under circumstances in which an exogenous
shock forces a reassessment on how to live safely, ethnocentric populists have a strong
opportunity to present themselves as a potential solution. As such actors are keen on espousing
the importance of maintaining ingroup solidarity while maintaining suspicion of outsiders
(Rydgren 2005), they are a natural choice for those who feel troubled by the growing number of
outsiders.
The 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis presented a strong opportunity for ethnocentric populists
to present their case to the general public as it showed, in real time, large numbers of migrants
entering the European continent. The effects of these events were not temporary. The immigrants
who entered the United States and Europe planned on making these places their permanent
homes. This influx of permanent residents represents a possibility of a change to the low salience
of group-based identification around 2014-2015. An influx of outsiders may represent a
multifaceted threat to an existing group. Collectively, these threats could be seen as representing
a threat to the existing dominant group and in particular, a threat to that group’s ability to remain
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as the largest actor in a country. This event was especially threatening to whites, representing the
possibility that their power would be reduced on both sides of the Atlantic.
An anxiety born out of the dual issue of security and cultural-based challenges could
cause enough of a shock to individuals to start reconsidering their options. In the event of a large
influx of individuals who are believed to cause increased security issues while also diluting
cultural homogeneity, it is reasonable to consider that many individuals feel a certain degree of
fear. Fear potentially forces individuals to reconsider existing frameworks of reference and look
for ways that could help better protect their interests (Barbalet 1998). In particular, whenever
possible individuals may feel inclined to be around people who have similar qualities while
attempting to distance themselves from those who are different (Blanton et al. 2000). This helps
explain the phenomenon of white flight from urban areas in the United States along with the
phenomenon of white avoidance in Europe in which whites, when they attempt to move, avoid
areas that are home to many ethnic minorities (Andersen 2017; Bråmå 2006).
Figure 2.1 Graphic Illustration of Theory

Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of how the theory works. The ways in which an
individual perceives ingroups and outgroups is a key point regarding what type of parties an
individual may choose. If a person believes that an outgroup is not a threat to their safety, they
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have no incentive to vote for ethnocentric populist parties. However, if they feel that their safety
is being compromised, as was the case during the Immigration and Migrant Crises, they may
start to feel status threat. If they no longer feel that their dominant place in society is secure, then
they may choose to vote for ethnocentric populist parties. Overall, perceptions at the individual
level, and a feeling of decreased safety, are key driving forces of attitudes and behavior.
While there is a possibility that the Immigration and Migrant Crises have changed the
political landscape permanently, it should also be noted that the rise in support for ethnocentric
populist actors may be a temporary phenomenon. The crises which had been salient in the 20142015 time period did not continue beyond those years. With immigration no longer being as
salient, the vote shares for ethnocentric populists may start to decrease. Without a migrantrelated crisis, individuals may no longer feel that their safety, demographic or otherwise, was
being threatened. As the argument focuses on immigration-related issues being the primary
driver of support for ethnocentric populists, the end of the crises may cause some voters to
rethink their voting preferences. This could lead to a situation in which ethnocentric populist
vote shares may start to return to pre-Crisis levels.
How does this translate into support for ethnocentric populist actors? The previous
paragraph mentioned that decades of immigration already changed the West’s demographic
composition. The children of immigrants sometimes maintain a distinct identity within Western
countries. If a group maintains a distinct identity, it is plausible that it could also exercise this
identity through political action. For example, the Dutch Denk Party, a party founded by
Muslims and focusing on the interests of Muslims, won seats in the 2017 Legislative Election
(Otjes and Krouwel 2019). The rise of such parties creates a situation where status threat could
be felt more tangibly. Groups may desire “descriptive representatives,” or those who mirror their
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own background in experience and personal characteristics. The assumption is that such a
representative has a stronger attachment, understanding of their own groups’ interests and
sentiments, and loyalty to that group’s interests (Mansbridge 1999).
The rising numbers of outsiders could potentially undermine the psychological benefits
individuals accrue when seeing their group do well (Brown 2000). Witnessing the loss of their
own group’s dominance could lead to resentment and negative attitudes towards the newcomers
(Mutz 2018). These sentiments may be compounded by a feeling that immigrants can usher in a
cultural change that may not be welcomed by the existing population. The belief among some is
that such a large influx could make society harder to navigate as a more diverse society can make
it difficult for individuals to build social capital and trust (Putnam 2007).
The fear born from these shocks may encourage individuals to consider new ways to
protect themselves (Barbalet 1998). One way is using physical violence to intimidate a minority
group and attempting to get them to leave through the threat of violence. However, physical
conflict and the possibility of large-scale armed conflict is not enticing due to the costs. While
this does not mean that armed conflict is impossible, a long-term fight forces people to make
many sacrifices and so a dominant group often desires to maintain the status quo by doing the
bare minimum (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In addition, actions such as protests, riots, and
intimidation of rivals are costly in terms of time and resources (Nadler and Halabi 2002). These
costs make any form of physical conflict difficult to pursue.
However, one political act that is not particularly costly, in most situations, is voting.
While it sometimes requires an individual to spend a day in line, it is a relatively painless act that
should not put a participant’s life in danger and does not require long-term investment. Because
it is not as costly of an action as long-term violent conflict, those feeling status threat might
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consider making an adjustment to their voting patterns (Mutz 2018). Those who have dominated
the political, economic, and social landscape, such as White Americans and the various white
ethnic groups across Europe, may be incentivized to choose policies that reinforce status quo
demographic and political power (Halabi, Dovidio, and Nadler 2008).
The theory here is multistep. It first argues that, as an antecedent, human beings are wired
to maintain worldviews that are solidified in adulthood. It also argues that humans are interested
in forming group identities, and one major outlet for forming these identities is on ethnic and/or
racial lines. While these identities exist, they are not always salient. However, if a dominant
ethnic or racial group feels challenged by another group, particularly when an exogenous shock
occurs, some individuals may feel status threat. Operating in such an environment, those who
feel threatened consider actions that will help stop change. While violence is possible, the
potential costs are high. There are other potential options such as protesting, rioting, attempting
to influence members of the legislature, and pressuring large companies, but these require
solving a collective action problem; many individuals will need to coordinate their actions
(Olson 1965). A less costly alternative that does not require solving the collective action problem
is voting. Ethnocentric populist actors, because of their xenophobic attitudes (Rydgren 2005),
make choices that advance their interests.
An important aspect of the theory is the intervention of the exogenous “treatment.” The
theory indicates that due to events from the 2014-2015 time period, attitude changes are a
possibility. One hypothesis is whether anti-immigration sentiment is playing a stronger role in
supporting ethnocentric populists in the post-2014/2015 time period. The argument here is that a
large influx of outsiders makes some individuals prefer being around those who look more like
themselves as it provides a certain degree of comfort and peace of mind (Blanton et al. 2000).
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This provides a second hypothesis: Those who support ethnocentric populists should feel more
ingroup solidarity in the post-2014/2015 time period than in the pre-2014/2015 time period.
Ultimately, the argument is that in the pre-2014/2015 time period, the economic stances
of right-wing populists played a role in whether a person supported them or not. Considering the
importance of the 2014-2015 shocks, the expectation is that new voters for these parties are more
interested in their social/immigration stances. This is the basis for the third hypothesis: More
right-leaning economic stances increase support for right-wing populists, but this should lose
salience in the post-2014/2015 time period as immigration issues increase salience.
H1: On average, the coefficient for anti-immigration sentiment should be larger in the post2014/2015 time period than the pre-2014/2015 time period.
H2: On average, the coefficient for ingroup salience for ethnocentric populist actors should be
larger in the post-2014/2015 time period than the pre-2014/2015 time period.
H3: On average, the coefficients for right-leaning economic stances for right-wing populists
should be larger in the pre-2014/2015 time period and smaller in the post-2014/2015 time period.
Alternative Theories
Many competing theories attempt to explain the causes of support for populism. At times,
contradictory findings make it difficult to say whether any one reason absolutely holds across all
cases (Arzheimer 2009). Overall, the scholarship appears to make a distinction between these
two groups (Judis 2016; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Rodrik 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis
2014). Rodrik (2017) and argues that left-wing populism, which focuses predominately on
economic grievances, is mostly fueled by economic destabilization. Right-wing populism is
fueled, according to this approach, by large scale migration of individuals who hail from
countries with distinct cultures and religions. For the purpose of this discussion, ethnocentric
populism, radical right, far right, and other related terms are subsumed under right-wing
populism.
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If loathing of elites is the key link among all populists, then a combination of
dissatisfaction with the status quo and a feeling of helplessness in changing the system may play
a role in supporting populists. The logic is that if an individual feels that those in power are not
capable of bringing positive changes to society, they should be voted out (Cutts et al. 2011;
Lubbers et al. 2002; Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Roodujin et al. 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016; Zhirkov
2014). Notably, these findings appear to hold when examining right-wing populist-style parties
(Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Lubbers et al. 2002; Werts et al. 2013) and also left-wing populiststyle parties (Ramiro and Gomez 2017).
Dissatisfaction differs from feelings of social alienation in which an individual believes
that he or she is being left out of society (Oesch 2008). This argument focuses on individuals
feeling that they are not welcome and because of this, will go on to support populists who also
happen to be outsiders (Gest 2016; Gidron and Hall 2020; Oesch 2008). The theory on social
alienation can be extended to a phenomenon in which rural voters who have felt the rise of
urbanization feel the need to support populists (Sänkiaho 1971; Scoones et al. 2018).
Scholars have studied the importance of an individual’s psychological status as a
potential driving force for supporting right-wing populism. Particularly when conceptualizing
right-wing populist parties, authoritarian values are considered to go hand in hand with such
actors (Mudde 2007). Authoritarian values, which can be defined as the desire for more law and
order and stability (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Muis and Immerzeel 2017), have been found
to play a role in increased support for right-wing populist parties’ desire to prevent change (Eke
and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel
2017).
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Some research links gender and support for populists. Particularly for many right-wing
populist parties, there tends to be a culture of promoting traditional gender norms which may not
be agreeable to many women (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). This factor could create a situation
in which more men vote for right-wing populists than women (Harteveld et al. 2015; Rashkova
and Zankina 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). Support even appears to extend to other forms
of participation, such as liking Facebook posts by populist parties (Bobba et al. 2018). However,
it is not always the case that populist parties completely fail with female voters. After the ouster
of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the beginning of his daughter Marine Le Pen’s control over the
National Front, the party softened a number of its stances on traditional gender norms which may
have contributed to increased support from women (Mayer 2013).
Those with lower levels of education, who have often been hurt by economic
globalization, also appear to be more likely to support populists (Matthes and Schmuck 2017;
Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Schmuck and Matthes 2015). Individuals with higher education may
have already formed opinions regarding political topics and may be less likely to be swayed
(Schmuck and Matthes 2015; Zaller 1992).
There may also be a link between religiosity, particularly a commitment to Christianity
and its teachings, and support for right-wing populists. Populists often try to appeal to religious
individuals by incorporating Judeo-Christian values into their platforms, but religious individuals
historically have avoided right-wing populism. This may be the result of Christianity’s stances
regarding charity and tolerance which differ from right-wing populism’s general hostility to
those who hail from different backgrounds (Huber and Yendall 2019). Religious individuals also
tend to be firmly attached to more mainstream conservative parties such as Christian Democrats
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and appear to be less likely to vote for right-wing populist parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009;
Immerzeel et al. 2013; Montgomery and Winter 2015).
Evidence suggests that a party’s stance on the welfare state can play a role in support for
populists. As a more robust welfare state can better protect working class individuals, this group
is less inclined to vote for outsider parties such as right-wing populists who are not interested in
expanding the welfare state (de Koster et al. 2013; Swank and Betz 2003).
While somewhat beyond the more individual-level focused nature of this overview, there
are also some scholars who have researched broader structural variables which may play a role in
increasing or decreasing support for populists. One possible influence in support for populist
parties depends on how elections are conducted. For example, countries with large district
magnitudes and low electoral thresholds give populist parties the opportunity to increase their
seat totals and gain a voice in a national legislature (Golder 2003; Smith 2010; Veugelers and
Magnan 2005).
Economic Anxiety, Euroskepticism, and Immigration
A major branch of the literature connects economic anxiety to the rise of populist
support. The argument is that non-populist political actors, who have maintained control over
policy for many decades, are perceived to have failed a large segment of the population. From
the 1970s through the 2010s, a number of large-scale structural changes occurred in the
economies of many Western countries. Working class individuals, who had been able to enjoy a
stable middle-class lifestyle, slowly but steadily lost their jobs due to a combination of
offshoring and automation (Gest 2016; Rodrik 2018).
Areas with high unemployment rates also appear to increase the likelihood of support for
populists (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). It is
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possible that right-wing populist parties’ rhetoric painting immigrants as scapegoats who are
taking jobs away from native-born residents during hard times was effective (Cochrane and
Nevitte 2014). However, while the Great Recession helped bring populists to government in
Greece (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016), it did not serve as a catalyst for a right-wing populist
party’s electoral success in Spain (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015). According to Anduiza and
Ricio (2019), who conducted work on nine different European countries and examined an
individual’s vulnerability, deprivation, and negative sociotropic perceptions, there appears to be
widespread variation in the effects of these variables. However, they did find some crossnational evidence that of the three, sociotropic perceptions appear to have the biggest influence.
At its surface, the theory is logical. Individuals who are struggling economically may
consider moving away from more mainstream parties to support populists. However, when
examining the events that occurred across the Western world, economic anxiety is unlikely to be
the main cause of this surge in support. If economic anxiety were the most salient variable, then
why did the spike occur in the late 2010s? The West had collectively experienced a recession in
the late 2000s. Around the late 2000s and early 2010s, on the European side, there was also a
Eurozone crisis that threatened to irreparably damage the integrity of the European project
(Pisani-Ferry 2014). Yet across the West, the surge did not happen until the late 2010s. Studies
also indicate that those who suffered economically do not necessarily support populist actors
(Lubbers and Scheeper 2002; Ramiro and Gomez 2017).
Aside from economic anxiety, another high-profile theory is Euroskepticism. The
argument is rooted in a mistrust of the European Union. The logic is that the growth in support
for populism emanates from changes in European political life in which the European Union has
gained more strength and influence. Following the end of the Second World War, a number of
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Western European policymakers decided to strengthen economic, political, and social ties among
the different nations of the continent. They argued that stronger ties would reduce chances of war
and generate more unity. To create this stability, they instituted a single currency, the Euro
(Pisany-Ferry 2014). While in the latter years of the twentieth century the growing strength of
the European Union did not engender widespread opposition, the implementation of the Euro and
other projects, such as the breakdown of movement between member states, was not universally
supported (Judis 2018). These policies, which were championed by the European Union,
appeared to be infringing on the independence of individual European Union members. This in
turn upset some individuals who were not happy that a supranational organization was gaining
more power (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013).
The lack of borders within the European Union permitted the large number of migrants
who entered the EU to disperse throughout the member states. The 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis is
also not the first time that anger was directed at increased European integration. During the
Eurozone Crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s, Southern European countries such as Greece,
Spain, Italy, and Portugal experienced financial hardships due to their strong budget deficits;
they had borrowed and spent large amounts of money after adopting the Euro and ran large
budget deficits (Judis 2018). While countries can devalue their currencies if they control their
own monetary policies, this was not the case among Eurozone countries (Pisani-Ferry 2014). In
addition, Euroskepticism’s effects are not constant across all demographic groups; for those who
have less education and work in blue collar jobs, the marginal effects of perceived ethnic threat
are great than that of Euroskepticism’s (Werts et al. 2013).
Considering this predicament, why did a spike in support for populists fail to occur
during this time period? If Euroskepticism was the key, then what explains spikes in support in
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other parts of the world such as North and South America? In particular, Euroskepticism is a
European phenomenon and does not help explain why Donald Trump, an American presidential
candidate who adopted populist talking points succeeded electorally in 2016.
Another possible explanation for populism's success is immigration (Zhirkov 2014).
Immigration has changed the social landscape of many Western countries. In places such as the
United Kingdom and France, large numbers of migrants dominate housing in many
neighborhoods and districts. This demographic change has caused a number of issues, including
complaints by some native Europeans who argue that many immigrants have segregated
themselves and are not integrating into society (Caldwell 2009).
The theory suggests that a stronger presence of minorities causes more right-wing
populist support because the newcomers are perceived as an economic, cultural, or security
threat (Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Hangartner et al. 2018; Janssen et
al. 2019; Strömblad and Malmberg 2016). In an analysis of Sweden, living in areas with large
minority populations appears to increase support for right-wing populists (Stromblad and
Malmberg 2016). An analysis of the British National Party in the United Kingdom produced
similar results (Bowyer 2008; Ford and Goodwin 2010).
However, it is not always the case that living near non-whites causes more hostility
towards minority groups; increased exposure and a chance to get to know minorities on a
personal level could dampen hostilities (Kaufmann and Harris 2015). There is also evidence that
the relationship is not linear; an analysis in the Netherlands indicates that areas with small
minority populations exhibit high support for the right-wing populist Party of Freedom.
However, as the percentage of minorities gets closer to 25 percent, support for the Party of
Freedom decreases. When the percentage is over 25, support for the Party of Freedom again
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increases (van Wijk et al. 2020). The difficulties in establishing hard connections between
immigration and populist support could be partly due to preexisting attitudes among individuals.
Some evidence also indicates that whites who remain in communities that become more diverse
feel more hostility towards minorities than those who choose to move into more diverse
communities (Laurence and Bentley 2016). It is also possible that immigration by itself is not
enough but requires a mediating variable, such as political cynicism (Bos et al. 2018). The
broader theory that immigration is the cause of a spike in populist support does not tell the whole
story.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined two fundamental building blocks that are needed to create a feasible
research design. The theory is also important guide for the research design as it is meant to lay
out the causal pathway of the analysis. The theory allows for the operationalization of
independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s) that could be used to test hypotheses. For the
research design and analytical chapters, this means finding appropriate variables that measure
status threat and ingroup salience will be an important task.
The next chapter describes the countries will be included in the analysis, discusses the
dependent variable, the type of data needed for the analysis, which datasets will suffice, and also
some flaws of the data.
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Chapter 3: The Research Design
Introduction
In order to present the overall direction of the analysis, this chapter has a number of
missions. The first mission is to lay out the country case selection process. The second is to
provide a selection process for deciding which parties should be considered ethnocentric populist
parties. The third is to delineate which parties should be considered “left” and “right” on a
traditional economic policy scale. The next step is creating a dependent variable. Afterwards, the
discussion moves on to discusses what type of data might be appropriate for analysis and then
outlines the datasets chosen for the analytical chapters.
Case Selection by Other Scholars
The introductory chapter suggested that the increase in populist support occurred in
Western Europe and the United States. Case selection needs to take into consideration what
"Western Europe" means. In other words, which countries have membership?
To better understand the selection process, 65 different peer-reviewed articles which
either have the term “Western Europe” in the title or make reference to the term in the text have
been gathered. To keep the articles relatively close to the topic at hand, all the articles were
related to, in one way or another, elections, parties, and/or political behavior.
Table 3.1: List of Western European Countries Selected by Researchers
Austria (33)

Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier
(2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans
(2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman
and Volpert 1996, Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al.
(2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Mudde
(2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2008), Schumacher and
van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and
Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),
Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
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Belgium (36)
(Individual
Analysis of
Flanders and
Wallonia
Combined)

Cyprus (3)
Denmark (35)

Finland (22)

France (42)

Germany (33)
(West

Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter
(2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans
(2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and
Volpert 1996, Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009),
Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and
Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Montgomery and Winter
(2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2008),
Rydgren (2009), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann
(2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der
Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts
et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Gomez et al. (2016), Ramiro (2016),
Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter
(2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe
(2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016),
Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert 1996, Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit
et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde
(2013), Ramiro (2016), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009), Schumacher and
van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and
Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),
Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan
(2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville
and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al.
(2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016),
Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al.
(2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank
and Betz (2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter
(2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009),
Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder
(2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Husbands (1988),
Jackman and Volpert (1996), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler
and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017),
Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew
(1998), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Rydgren (2008),
Rydgren (2009), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010),
Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and
Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and
Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and
Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005),
Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Husbands (1988),
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Germany
Included)

Greece (18)

Iceland (7)
Ireland (17)

Italy (31)

Luxembourg
(12)

Malta (3)
The
Netherlands
(38)

Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler
and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Mudde
(2013), Pettigrew (1998), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017),
Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010),
Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010),
Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and
Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld
et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and
Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Ramiro
(2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll
(2010)
Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Smith
(2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010)
Adams et al. (2006), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe
(2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and
Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde
(2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011),
Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugelers and
Magnan (2005)
Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009),
Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017),
Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld
et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013),
Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge
(1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Ramiro (2016),
Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies
and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz
(2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and
Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Adams et al. (2006), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005),
Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and
Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and
Franzmann (2011), Stoll (2010)
Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Harteveld et al. (2015)
Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter
(2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009),
Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et
al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Husbands (1988), Jackman and Volpert
(1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et
al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery
and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Pettigrew (1998), Ramiro (2016),
Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Rydgren (2008), Schumacher and van
Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and
Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),
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Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan
(2005), Werts et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Norway (27)
Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Dassonneville
and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016),
Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008),
Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck
(2017), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009),
Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al.
(2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank
and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov
(2014)
Portugal (17) Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville
and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016),
Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt
(2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann
(2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),
Spain (19)
Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark
(2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003),
Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau
and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies
and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz
(2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005),
Sweden (21)
Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe
(2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman
and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde
(2013), Ramiro (2016), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith
(2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer
(2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers
and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Switzerland
Allen (2017), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier (2010), Dassonneville
(25)
and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Husbands (1988),
Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008),
Kriesi et al. (2006), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck
(2017), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008),
Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2009), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017),
Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010),
Zhirkov (2014)
United
Adams et al. (2006), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark
Kingdom
(2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003),
(Great Britain Harteveld et al. (2015), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert (1996),
Included) (26) Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers
et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Pettigrew (1998),
Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011),
Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010),
Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012),
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An examination of the 65 different articles, presented as table 3.1, shows that twenty
different countries have been included in the analysis. It is worth noting that microstates
(Andorra, Vatican City, and San Marino, Liechtenstein, and Monaco) do not appear in any of
these papers. This may be because smaller countries are often considered to have distinct
political traits which make analyzing them with larger countries difficult (Anckar 2002). In
addition, the authors do not include any of the former members of the Warsaw Pact. For these
scholars, the main distinguishing factor between Western Europe and Eastern Europe appears to
be whether the country was under Soviet influence. Beyond this point, there appears to be a wide
range of case selection criteria that may be contingent on data availability, the identity of the
scholars, the research question asked by the scholars, and/or other factors.
Many of the scholars were explicit in the reasoning behind their case selection and these
varied widely. Some scholars noted that their selection process for Western European countries
relied on another source. Mudde (2013) explicitly notes that his selection criteria for Western
Europe was based on the website Electionresources.org. Werts et al. (2012) state that they used
the CIA World Factbook (2009) in order to make distinctions between the regions of Europe.
Another group of scholars noted that their selection was the result of data availability.
Depending on the dataset, sometimes scholars were limited by the questions that were available
and for how long (Adams et al. 2006). Spierings et al. (2017) note that their selection process for
Western European countries depended on whether the respondents could choose to vote for a
populist radical right party. Gomez et al. (2016) limit their analysis to countries that were part of
the European Election Studies and had at least one radical left party among the list of parties that
respondents voted for in the previous national elections. Jesuit et al. (2009) also note that
available data limited their analysis to seven countries. Kessler and Freeman (2005) state that
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they had to exclude Sweden because eonly two respondents were known to have supported an
extreme right party.
The most common justification was the result of a scholar’s research interest and
question. Allen (2017) focuses on comparing far right voters and honed in on countries where far
right parties managed to win at least 3.5% of the vote or more in a national election between
2001 and 2008. This limited his sample to eight countries. Arzheimer and Carter (2009) analyze
Western European countries that experienced a strong and persistent support for the radical right
and this also limited their case selection to eight countries. On a similar note, Kessler and
Freeman (2005) examine countries with national organized extreme right parties. Bornschier
(2010)’s focus was on countries where right-wing populist parties managed to trigger a new
cultural divide. Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017) scrutinize established democracies and opted
to exclude post-Communist democracies. Gidron and Hall (2017)’s inquiry applies to developed
democracies and includes not just Western European countries but also a number of East-Central
European countries that had also successfully transitioned to democracy by the 2010s. Ivarsflaten
(2008) examines countries that had successful populist right parties and conceptualizes such
parties as those that were identified as populist right by other scholars and achieved at least 5%
of the vote in the previous national election. Veuglers and Magnan (2005), on the other hand,
focus on any Western European country where a new radical right party competed in elections.
Montgomery and Winter (2015) select their countries on the basis of whether a serious populist
contender was active in the most recent legislative election. Rydgren (2008), Oesch (2008),
Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), and Van der Brug et al. (2000) use a similar criterion. An
important consideration for Ramiro (2016) was whether a radical left party gained parliamentary
representation in either the national parliament or European parliament from 1989-2009 to
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exclude smaller groups from the analysis. Stockemer (2017) looks at the relationship between
economic crises and electoral support and only includes countries with official subnational unit
data. Veuglers and Magnan (2005) echo Kitschelt (1995) and examine ten Western European
countries which they believed to have experienced post-industrial capitalism, the convergence of
the main left and right parties, and the development of a patronage-based party system and
political economy dubbed partocracy.
Many of these scholars omitted a number of Western European countries depending on
how much success an ethnocentric populist-style party enjoyed. Golder (2003) challenges this
approach, explicitly stating that the omission of prominent Western European countries, such as
Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg, undermines causal inferences
because case selection decisions could overestimate the marginal effects of certain variables that
purportedly increase the success of extreme right parties. Jackman and Volpert (1996) provide a
different argument, stating that adding these countries and coding electoral support for far-right
parties as zero assumes that traditional factors considered to increase support for such parties
such as unemployment and immigration had no effect in those countries.
Country Case Selection
Before discussing the selection process of Western European countries, this section will
outline why Eastern European countries that fell under Soviet hegemony in the Cold War are not
included. It is true that Eastern European countries were affected by the Migrant Crisis. Over
350,000 migrants moved through Hungary with some even choosing to settle there (Kallius et al.
2016). Considering this shared experience, why not include Eastern European countries in the
case selection?
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Eastern European populist actors experienced increases in support before the Migrant
Crisis. The reasons behind the success of populists may be due to differences in historical
experiences. Eastern Europe was exposed to longstanding rule under Communist governments
(Allen 2017) creating major institutional differences that may have aided ethnocentric populists.
Some scholars argued that long-term Communist rule weakened social trust and civil
society in Eastern Europe and may have contributed to trust of ethnocentric populists. Under
Communism, many spies and informers were embedded into society, although the intensity of
scrutiny varied across time and countries. Because anyone could be working for the Communist
Party, it was difficult to develop trust in others. Consequently, even after the end of Communist
rule in the early 1990s, the region suffered from lower levels of trust and weaker civil society
(Rydgren 2011). However, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that those who feel lower
levels of social trust, on average, are more likely to support ethnocentric populist actors
(Rydgren 2011; Zhikov 2014).
One clear advantage Eastern European populists enjoyed over their Western European
counterparts was that almost all parties were created at the same time in Eastern Europe. Parties
in Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Communist Party, are fairly new as they only
emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 80s/early 90s. All of these parties,
including populists, started operating almost simultaneously allowing each an equal opportunity
to reach out to voters (Allen 2017).
In Western Europe, many non-populist parties had already planted themselves firmly in
certain ideological niches and controlled certain voting blocs (Allen 2017; Hanley 2004). By the
time the first wave of ethnocentric populist parties gained prominence in the 1980s (Judis 2016;
Rydgren 2010), Western Europe had already experienced many decades of multiparty democracy
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(Boix 1999). In many Western Europe countries, Christian religious voters, who may have been
a target of interest for ethnocentric populists, had long given their allegiance to Christian
Democratic or other types of mainstream right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009). However,
such voters were up for grabs in Eastern Europe (Allen 2017).
While displays of overt racism are considered a taboo in mainstream Western European
society (Fennema 1997), this is not necessarily the case in Eastern Europe. For example, strong
anger and mistrust directed towards the Roma, an ethnic minority that lives across Europe, is
observable in much of Eastern Europe (Kende and Kreko 2020). This general hostility allows
politicians such as Viktor Orban, longtime Prime Minister of Hungary, to make statements
calling immigrants a threat to Hungary without facing severe repercussions (Bocskor 2018).
Due to historical experiences, Eastern European countries operated under differing
institutional legacies that may have aided ethnocentric populists. Because ethnocentric populists
in Eastern Europe did not get a late start, they were able to compete for a much larger portion of
the electorate than their Western European counterparts. In addition, they benefited from a
different culture in which general mistrust of outsiders and overt displays of this mistrust were
more commonly accepted. Because of these differences, Eastern Europe represents a distinct
institutional and cultural environment that may have allowed ethnocentric populists to gain
prominence there before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis.
While a case can be made to include such parties, Eastern European countries are not
included because Communist rule resulted in a distinct institutional legacy that makes such
countries different from their non-Communist counterparts (Allen 2017; Bustikova and Kitschelt
2009; Harteveld et al. 2015). This project echoes the scholarship by noting that different political
traditions resulted in differences between the Eastern and Western European populist radical
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right parties in ideology and style (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015; Montgomery and Winter 2015).
In Eastern Europe, even mainstream right parties have adopted staunchly exclusionary rhetoric
calling against immigration and more freely employ ethnocentric, racist, and anti-Semitic
appeals (Butikova and Kitschelt 2009; Montgomery and Winter 2015). This has caused a
situation where ethnocentric populist parties operating in Eastern Europe have made even more
ideologically extreme appeals than their Western European counterparts (Harteveld et al. 2015;
Montgomery and Winter 2015). In addition, ethnocentric populist-style parties in Eastern Europe
have not experienced Muslim immigration at the same levels of Western European countries and
so rhetoric directed at outgroups in Eastern Europe often target minority groups such as the
Roma and Jews that have resided in the region for many centuries (Montgomery and Winter
2015).
There are a few Western European countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, and Iceland,
which do not have a prominent ethnocentric populist-style party operating in the national
legislature (Golder 2003). The relatively new Moviment Patrijotti Maltin of Malta, which
adopted the xenophobic and ingroup orientation espoused by ethnocentric populists (Cachia et al.
2020), did not exist until after the height of the Migrant Crisis. Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015)
noted that Spain was not home to any successful ethnocentric populist-style parties. However,
like Malta, Spain would eventually see the rise of the ethnocentric populist-style Vox Party
following the end of the Migrant Crisis (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019).
Because Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Spain did not host an ethnocentric populiststyle political party during the years preceding the Migrant Crisis, these five countries are left out
of the analytical chapters. This is in line with scholars who have argued that the existence of a
successful and well-organized populist party was an important driving force behind their case
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selection (Rydgren 2008; Montgomery and Winter 2015; Oesch 2008; and Van der Brug et al.
2000).
While not explicitly outlined here, other countries such as Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand are also home to parties which might be considered ethnocentric populist. These include
the One Nation Party in Australia and New Zealand First in New Zealand (Donovan and
Redlawsk 2018). These countries did not experience the large influx of migrants that the United
States and Europe experienced in the 2014-2015 time period. The People’s Party of Canada did
not exist during the time period under evaluation. They are also excluded from the analysis.
There is also one final consideration related to the size of a country. The Migrant Crisis
was an international exogenous shock that involves a large number of countries. Some of the
countries might be deemed small states, or countries that have populations less than five million.
Because of their smaller size, scholars have argued that such states are often not fully
independent and often more easily affected by outside forces (Jervis 1976; Vanhanen 1997). If
case selection is also at least partly built on the idea that only countries most similar to one
another should be grouped together (Knigge 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006), then countries that would
not be similarly affected by an exogenous international crisis like the Migrant Crisis should be
excluded (Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009). On this basis, Cyprus and Luxembourg are
omitted.
This leaves Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as part of the main analysis. These Western Europe
countries share similarities in patterns of state formation, nation-building, and democratization
(Caramani and Manucci 2019). They also experienced increases in support for ethnocentric
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populist parties. They will be examined separately from Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway
which experienced a downturn during this time period.
On the Decision to Include the United States
The introductory chapter noted the 2016 success of President Donald Trump. A number
of scholars have noted that Trump’s behavior rhetoric greatly resembled that of a populist
(Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Lammers and Baldwin 2020). As someone who embodied the
style of past populists, he has also been called the avatar of American populism (Guth 2016).
With Trump’s subsequent electoral victory, the United States merits inclusion in the analysis.
Instead of analyzing the United States together with Western European countries, it will
be analyzed separately. While the United States differs from Western Europe is many ways,
there are two pertinent reasons related to the analysis: The United States has a different history
regarding government intervention in the economy and a distinct populist experience. On the
issue of welfare, all Western European countries have adopted some sort of welfare state. While
some, such as those in the Nordic countries, are more generous than others, redistributive
policies have been the norm in Western Europe (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). While there have been
calls for a reduction in how much is spent by some parties (Afonso and Rennwald 2018), a
complete cut of the social welfare system does not have much traction.
In the United States, there is no cradle to grave social welfare system. In addition, for
many conventional conservatives, the expansion of government intervention into the economy is
not particularly popular. For many conservatives in the United States, a free-market along with
cuts to existing social welfare policies, which are already less extensive than those in Europe, is
preferable (Hawley 2018). The possibility of a cradle to grave system is out of the question.
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While the United States has seen its share of populist actors over its history, it has not
experienced a long and constant post-World War II history with populist actors. There is no
dedicated major, national-level populist party. Instead, on occasion there have been populist
political candidates who have attempted to take over a party and win the presidential election.
The only populist political candidate who has managed to not only win the party nomination but
also the general election is Donald Trump (Judis 2016).
Aside from differences regarding the political legacy of populism on both sides of the
Atlantic, there is also a major difference in terms of the salience of ethnonationalist-style politics.
Such a political style would involve open hostility towards minorities and immigrants that
emphasizes the need for societal and demographic consistency (Mayer 2013). In the pre-Civil
Rights era, and in particular the years before World War I, ethnonationalist-style politics was
common in the United States. Presidential candidates made openly racialized appeals that called
for segregating blacks and whites and strongly advocated for the United States to remain a white
man’s country (Mendleberg 2001). However, this rhetoric lost acceptance by the end of the Civil
Rights era.
This was not the case in Western Europe where parties with strong Nazi and/or more
general Fascist roots such as the Vlaams Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the National
Front managed to run candidates and provide a small, but very public, outlet for ethnonationalist
viewpoints. Such actors have not been afraid to openly come out against certain cultural
practices by newcomers such as the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women nor have they
tried to hide their disdain for accepting large numbers of migrants (Mayer 2013). In Europe,
these parties have held ethnonationalism as core beliefs. Table 3.2 below summarizes the major
relevant differences.
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Table 3.2: Relevant Differences between US and Western European Cases
•
•
•
•

United States-History of populism but no large dedicated populist party
United States-Declining acceptance of ethnonationalist appeals in post-WWII era by
almost all political actors
Europe-Ethonationalist appeals made by ethnocentric populists
United States-Idea of social welfare and government intervention in economy not as
popular

Discussion of the Time Period
This project seeks to extend existing findings that emphasize the importance of
exogenous shocks on public opinion and policy preferences. Past scholarship indicated that
external shocks can cause shifts in policies and public opinion even before the beginning of the
Migrant Crisis. The 9/11 attacks are illustrative. While the events did not occur in Europe, there
was strong interest in Western Europe as the region was home to large number of Muslims
(Bowen 2009). Following the attacks, there was a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany
despite the attacks not occurring there (Schuller 2012). A similar surge occurred following the
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim man. Data from the European Social
Survey indicated an uptick in the percent of those who were interested in restrictive immigration
policies not just in the Netherlands but across Europe (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). Similar
findings are presented by Ratcliffe and Von Hinke, Kessler, and Scholder (2015) who noted that
following the 7/7 bombings, neighborhoods with large numbers of South Asians saw housing
prices drop.
While clear shifts in attitudes have occurred in the past, these did not lead to the
unprecedented electoral successes that many ethnocentric populists enjoyed following the
Migrant Crisis. For example, in Germany, a country that had long resisted supporting any actor
that resembled ethnocentric populism (Art 2007), the AfD won unprecedented levels of support
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and became the first ethnocentric populist-style party of win seats in the Bundestag since the end
of the Second World War (Art 2018). A similar situation unfolded in Switzerland where the
Swiss People’s Party had its best election by winning 29.4 percent of lower house votes
(Bernhard 2016). In 2019, the ethnocentric populist Vox became the first ethnocentric populist
actor to win seats in Spain’s national parliament since the country’s return to democracy in the
1970s (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020).
Discussion on Populism and Left-Right Classification
With the discussion of case selection complete, the next major step of the research design
is classifying ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties. This requires the creation of
ethnocentric populism scores and left-right scores. While there has been a surge in attention
devoted to the study of populism (Rooduijn 2019), scholars have not yet developed systematic
methods to empirically measure populism across cases and over time (Rooduijn and Pauwels
2011). Rather, a multitude of different methods have been presented by researchers. Overall, one
can argue that measurement of populism has developed into two different tracks; one track
focuses on examining the supply side, or the parties and politicians, while the other track, the
demand side, focuses on the study of regular individuals who might support parties/politicians.
While there was difficulty in measuring populism, particularly before the 2010s, due to a
lack of agreement on conceptualization (Akkerman et al. 2014) and a lack of common features
which binds populism research (Canovan 1981), the scholarship appears to have coalesced
around a definition of populism as an ideational approach (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). As a brief
summary, scholars argue that populists believe that “regular people” are noble; elites, or those in
charge, are corrupt and uncaring; and the right to rule should held by regular people. In other
words, there is a deeply antagonistic relationship between the people and the elites and a zero-
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sum struggle for power (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; Canovan 1999; Elchardus and Spruyt
2016; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2011; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001).
This ideational approach, which emphasizes that populism is a set of ideas, has become
popular within the subfield as the ideational approach is arguably the easiest to measure
quantitatively (Meijers and Zaslove 2020; Rooduijn 2019). Through the use of the ideational
approach, scholars have, at a minimum, noted that a people-centrism and an anti-elite sentiment
are key components of populism (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; Canovan 1999; Elchardus
and Spruyt 2016; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001). This has been an important
starting point for the scholarship and has become particularly important for those who attempt to
measure populist attitudes of the people.
The Dichotomous vs. Continuous Debate
Through the 2000s, most attempts at measuring populism were qualitative in nature and
some scholars even classified parties as populist as long as other scholars before them had done
so. An example comes from Rooduijn et al. (2014) who classified parties as populist if at least
two other scholars called them such.
However, since the beginning of the 2010s, scholars have moved towards quantitative
approaches (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). An ideational approach has been popular because it
allows for measuring the populist positions of both regular individuals and also the parties (Van
Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018).
While scholars appear to agree on the ideational approach, there is less agreement on
whether attempts at classifying populist actors and supporters should emphasize a dichotomous
or continuous approach. Among scholars who prefer a dichotomous measure (Leininger and
Meijers 2020), the logic is rooted in its simplicity and clarity. Aslanidis (2016) notes that for
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followers of certain ideologies such as Socialism, Marxism, or Liberalism, in colloquial speech it
is extremely rare for people to speak of degrees; one is either a Socialist, Marxist, a Liberal or
not. Using this logic, an actor or party would either be a populist or not. Dichotomous variables
emphasize that there is a clear and transparent boundary unlike continuous variables which
potentially allow for gray spaces between concept poles.
While such a method is particularly useful in situations where a clear quantitative cutoff
point is available (Wuttke et al. 2020), other scholars have noted that these dichotomous
measures cannot account for the multi-dimensionality of populism and cannot differentiate
between degrees of populism; they instead opt for a continuous measure (Meijers and Zaslove
2020). However, continuous measurements, while providing more detail, come with the caveat
of not being providing any guidance on at what point a party or actor becomes populist (Wuttke
et al. 2020).
Both dichotomous and continuous measurements have been used extensively within the
scholarship and each comes with their strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, scholars have
chosen to pursue different paths depending on their goals. Continuous measurements have
gained momentum among scholars who examine populist attitudes among the people while those
who use manifestos and party documents often use dichotomous measurements.
Use of Manifestos and Party Documents
Among scholars who have attempted to measure populism and classify populist parties,
many researchers focused on the supply side with party manifestos, speeches, interviews, and
broadcasts (Aslanidis 2016; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; March 2017; Mudde 2007; Van
Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). These scholars often worked on content analysis and often
trained individuals who would examine the various manifestos and see whether the documents
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referred to the people or elites. Generally, the coder would be responsible for picking out each
word referring to the people or elites or coding the paragraph. The percentage of words or
percentage of paragraphs with references to populism would then be calculated (Bernhard &
Kriesi, 2019; Hawkins et al., 2012; March 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011).
This approach held sway, particularly in the 2000s and the early 2010s, because the
parties and politicians were considered to be active players who were influencing what was
thought to be a mostly passive public (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Hawkins 2009; Jagers and
Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et. 2014). In addition, many scholars chose to use
manifestos and other documents officially released by the party because they are authoritative
and give a clear idea of where a party stands (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014).
While party members can and sometimes will diverge from a manifesto, they can be punished if
stray too far from official party stances (Laver and Garry 2000). In addition, such documents are
well-suited for cross-national analysis because most parties will release a manifesto (Rooduijn
and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014).
Some examples of work using documents include Hawkins (2009) who looked at more
than 200 speeches by 40 political leaders and relied on textual analysis of speeches. Rather than
relying on word count or sentence counts, a group of undergraduates trained to look for specific
themes were asked to give each of the speeches a grade of either 0 (nonpopulist), 1 (mixed), or 2
(populist). In other words, the readers were asked to interpret the speech as a whole. Pauwels
(2011) also used a similar method and measured the relative share of words pertaining to
“populism” in party manifestos and internal party communication. Reungoat (2010), like
Pauwels (2011), also examined the proportion of manifestos, by word number, dedicated to
specific concepts related to populism.
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Rooduijn et al. (2014) coded paragraphs within manifestos and decided whether they
were populist or not. Coders identified whether paragraphs contained traces of people-centric or
anti-elite elements to determine which party programs were populist. However, unlike Hawkins
(2009) who preferred a 0-1-2 coding, Rooduijn et al. (2014) opted to give individual party’s
scores which ranged from 0 through 100 scale. Scores were calculated on the basis of the
percentage of a paragraph with a populist reference.
Other scholars preferred two-dimensional spatial analysis to map out where parties stand
relative to one another. They used two equal subdimensions to measure populism. Jagers and
Walgrave (2007) use political party broadcasts to create two subdimensions: Proportion of
populism and intensity of populism. They explain that proportion is the share of broadcasts
which can be considered populist because they refer to the people. Intensity for the authors is the
number of times the people are mentioned in a broadcast. They then create a compound peopleindex and also map out parties in two-dimensional spatial analysis.
Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) do something similar. They were interested in
the welfare positions of populist parties and opted to use the Manifesto Project to create a
welfare score, and a multiculturalism score which served as a proxy for the populist nature of the
party. The welfare score was created by adding the percentages of phrases or sentences referring
to welfare state expansion in a manifesto and then subtracting it from the number of references to
welfare state limitation. For multiculturalism, they subtracted the number of positive references
to multiculturalism from the number of negative references.
Jungar and Jupskas (2014) focused on Nordic populist radical right parties and created
two-dimensional spatial analysis using the Comparative Manifesto Project. For their project,
economic issues were plotted on the x-axis and an authoritarian/liberal scale the y-axis. Using
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the Comparative Manifesto Project, they found a number of variables which are relevant to both
subjects and created scales ranging from -100 through +100. This was possible as the
Comparative Manifesto Project gives a percentage score to each variable depending on how
much of the manifesto is dedicated to a topic. For example, if a party spends 4.5 percent of the
manifesto railing against multiculturalism, its negative references to multiculturalism score is
4.5. If the content pertained to an economic issue and called for more government intervention,
the score would be subtracted from zero while if calling for less intervention, it would be added
to zero. A similar procedure exists for the authoritarian/liberal scale; if a variable measures
authoritarianism, it would be added to zero and if it measures liberalism, it would be subtracted
from zero.
Individual-Level Survey Data
While party documents can be useful for measuring parties or politicians, another group
of scholars focuses on individual-level survey data to measure populist attitudes. Particularly
starting in the 2010s, researchers have emphasized the individual citizens and the extent of
populist attitudes they might hold at a given time (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017).
Scholars who look at individual attitudes share a methodological consideration with those who
have created two-dimensional spatial analysis to measure and classify populists; authors of
attitudinal studies recognize that measuring populism requires not looking at one dimension but
multiple dimensions (Aslanidis 2016). These scholars have come to a consensus that populism is
not a dichotomous variable but one of degrees (Pappas 2016). A key objective was measuring
populism in a valid and precise manner which acknowledges the concept to be multiple and
related but distinct subdimensions. These scholars believe that populism is latent and in order to
successfully measure it, one needs to acknowledge that there are multiple parts (Meijers and
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Zaslove 2020). All the subdimensions of populism must be present as missing even one would
not be an accurate reflection of all parts of the concept (Schulz et al. 2018; Wuttke et al. 2020).
Akkerman et al. (2014) are in many ways the pioneers of the multidimensional approach
in which questions that measure pluralist attitudes and elitist attitudes make up their populism
score. These are recorded using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (I very much disagree) to 5 (I very
much agree) in which the means of the sum scores are tallied. Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) also
use a similar approach in which four survey items that measure the antagonism between ordinary
people and elites were presented to respondents. They had five different categories, which
ranged from completely disagree through completely agree, as choices. Aslanidis (2015);
Hawkins (2009), Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009); Jagers and Walgrave (2007); March
(2017); Meijers and Zaslove (2020); Muller et al. (2017); Mohrenberg et al. (2019); Pauwels
(2011); Pauwels and Rooduijn (2015); Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011); Rooduijn et al. (2014),
Schulz et al. (2017); Stavrakakis et al. (2017), among others use similar methods. Because of the
growing popularity of this method in measuring populist attitudes of individuals, the approach is
becoming the standard (Van Hauwaert et al. 2020).
On Cutoffs
Regardless of whether a scholar chooses a dichotomous or continuous measure of
populism, a method that clearly shows where a line is drawn between populism and nonpopulism is necessary. While there are a number of works which have attempted to address this
topic, there is no clear consensus on the matter.
Many scholars who have worked on classifying or measuring populism have avoided this
topic. Rather, they have worked with the assumption that some parties have already earned a
populist designation and examined whether those parties differ from parties which do not have
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the label. Jungar and Jupskas (2014), through their use of two-dimensional analysis, looked at
the mean distance between parties in the same party family. In other words, the authors had
already accepted the labels given by other scholars and tested to see whether those considered
populist are clustered together. Reungoat (2010) created a populism index and noted that there is
a strong difference between parties that were considered populist and non-populist, with
mainstream parties with non-populist parties having a high score of 2.34 while populist parties
ranged from 1.61 to 23.08 (Rooduijn et al. 2014). Stavrakakis et al. (2017) noted that parties
generally not considered populist by other scholars scored less than 3.5 while parties generally
considered populist scored over 3.5.
While many researchers have relied on a priori designations, others have touched on
addressing cutoffs. Particularly among those who focus on using multidimensional scales, strong
emphasis has been placed ensuring that a party or actor cannot be considered populist unless it
has high scores across all indices (March 2017; Wuttke et al. 2020). In other words, while each
writer might subscribe to different aggregation rules, an individual cannot have a high populism
score when anti-elitist sentiment is low even when a person strongly supports the remaining
components of populism (Wuttke et al. 2020).
A number of these scholars have created more explicit cutoff points. Lubbers et al. (2002)
considered only parties which scored higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration question to
be considered extreme right-wing. Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2007) used nine different
questions which allowed for three possible answers and then converted the values into either 0,
0.5, and 1. Lubbers et al. (2002) considered only parties which scored higher than 8.5 on a tenpoint anti-immigration question to be considered extreme right-wing. Meijers and Zaslove
(2020), in a 0-11 scale, state that a low-level populism score is anything below 5, a moderate
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level populism score anything between 5 and 7.5, and a high populism score to be anything
above 7.5.
While these attempts at creating continuous scales are an advancement in the study of
measuring populism, there is no standard method for creating a clear cutoff point (Pappas 2016).
Rather, any cutoff points employed within the scholarship are arguably idiosyncratic (Aslanidis
2016). Despite the advancements which have occurred since the beginning of the twenty-first
century, when undertaking quantitative analysis, scholars have struggled to separate populism
from non-populism or interpret the substantive meaning of populism scores (March 2017). This
has led to the suggestion that rather than relying on a continuous populism variable, the subfield
might be better served by an ordinal scale (Pappas 2016).
On Left and Right
Previous discussion showed that the term right-wing populist is not necessarily accurate
unless a party is right-wing in both a social and economic sense. Because not all ethnocentric
populist parties meet the criteria to be considered a right-wing populist party in the social and
economic sense, it is worth examining whether right-wing economic policy stances play a role in
votes for right-wing populist parties. This will require not just categorizing parties into
ethnocentric populist parties and non-ethnocentric populist parties, but also further dividing
ethnocentric populist parties into general ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist
parties.
On Expert Surveys
In the expert survey method, scholars are asked to place parties and/or other actors on a
spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). This approach can be
advantageous because of its simplicity; Huber and Inglehart (1995) mailed one-page
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questionnaires to over 800 political scientists across dozens of countries and asked these experts
to place parties on a one-to-ten-point space representing a left-right scale and asked them to list
key hot topic issues in their respective countries (Pedersen et al. 1997). Castles and Mair (1984)
also created their own survey and used a twelve-point scale. For the most part, the two surveys
produced similar results. The smallest distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in the
Castles and Mair (1984) survey was the United States at 0.18 while the greatest distance was a
tie between Italy and the Netherlands at 0.78. In Huber and Inglehart (1995)’s version of the
survey, the smallest distance also was in the United States at 0.27 and the greatest was in Italy at
0.83 (Pedersen et al. 1997).
There is a relatively high degree of correlation among expert surveys (Volkens 2007).
While these can be useful in showing a degree of unity among researchers, expert surveys are
infrequent and often use different formatting (Gabel and Huber 2000). In addition, a survey will
often not have any information on a scholar’s reasoning for giving a score nor do they show what
an expert considers to be left or right. It is also unclear what happens when scholars have
conflicting views (Jahn 2010).
On Mass Surveys
While expert surveys can be useful for creating left-right placement scores, other scholars
have opted for mass surveys, such as the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer, which
asks individual respondents from the general population where they stand on the ideological
spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). There is some evidence indicating
that, on average, supporters of different types of parties differ from one another. For example,
the 1979 Euro-Barometer survey indicated that British Labour Party supporters had a mean
ideological self-placement of 4.48 out of a ten-point scale while supporters of the Conservative
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Party had a mean placement of 6.95. In Italy in the same survey, Communist Party supporters
had a mean score of 2.16 while Italian Social Movement supporters, a neo-fascist party, had a
score of 8.88 (Huber 1989).
While these provide good information regarding how the general populations thinks
about left and right, this method also shares a critical issue with expert surveys. Oftentimes a
survey will not have any information on respondents’ reasoning for giving a score. In addition,
there is an issue of potentially conflicting views held by members of the general public (Jahn
2010). Further complicating matters is that respondent survey data from before the 1970s is not
readily available and conducting comparative research with different types of surveys is difficult
because issues with translations; respondents may also hold very different ideas of what is
considered left and right and these tend to vary widely by region and sometimes even country
(Kim and Fording 1998).
On The Use of Manifestos
Another method used to create left-right scores involves the use of manifestos and similar
party-released documents (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Manifestos
provide the advantage of allowing scholars to examine a party’s left-right positioning over long
periods of time and across many different countries (Gabel and Huber 2000). Using manifestos
allow the parties to speak for themselves (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). In addition, while there
may be a disconnect between a party’s manifestos and actions, manifestos provide clues as to a
party’s underlying stances (Jahn 2010).
While the use of expert surveys and mass surveys has been straightforward, with
respondents generally asked to place a party, or themselves, on a scale, the creation of similar
scores using manifestos has proven to be complicated. Part of this problem is rooted in the
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different directions that scholars have taken in the creation of left-right scores. Principal
component analysis, which analyzes dozens of different policy categories for the most relevant
categories, has also been used (Gabel and Huber 2000). Arguing that using dozens of different
categories is too cumbersome, others have called for creating separate left-right score depending
on the policy (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Others have opted to abandon a unidimensional score
and opted for the creation of a two dimensional one (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Kitschelt 1994).
Considering the large number of different views on the use of manifestos, it is worth
highlighting that the question which has been particularly salient is the list of relevant policy
positions that should be considered a part of any left-right scale. Because so many different
issues are politically salient, many scholars have selected a multidimensional approach (Laver
and Garry 2000). For the creation of such a scale, scholars have considered policy areas as
diverse as of economic-class conflict, centralization of power, authoritarianism vs democracy,
isolation vs internationalism, traditional vs new culture, conservatism vs change, xenophobia,
property rights, constitutional reform, and national defense (Huber and Inglehart 1995).
Some of the earlier attempts at creating a left-right score were additive in nature and
often involved many different policy categories. Laver and Budge (1992) created a left-right
score by using the Manifesto Project; they did this by adding up the percentages of thirteen
different policy categories, or right-leaning categories, and subtracted them from thirteen policy
categories that were more left-leaning in nature. The difference became a “right-left index,” or
RILE,1 which eventually became a separate variable within the Manifesto Project (Jahn 2010).

1

RILE is calculated by adding the percentages the categories in the first parentheses and then subtracting them from
a second group encapsulated in another parentheses: (Positive references to the military + references to freedom and
human rights + positive references to constitutionalism + references to political authority + positive references to the
free market economy, positive references to incentives + negative references to protectionism + economic orthodoxy
+ welfare state limitation + positive references to the national way of life + positive references to traditional morality
+ positive references to law and order + positive references civic mindedness) – (References to anti-imperialism +
negative references to the military + references to peace + positive references to internationalism + positive
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While this attempt at creating a left-right score using different policy positions was a
major step in creating systematic quantitative left-right score, it was challenged by other
scholars. In particular, it was criticized for having diverse areas related to military policy,
constitutionalism, societal morality, and law and order all added together into a single
unidimensional variable took into consideration too many different topics (Keman 2007). RILE
also treats each of the different policy categories with equal weight and does not acknowledge
the salience of a policy at a given time (Jahn 2010). Instead, McDonald et al. (2007) argue that
any method which uses a number of subdimensional components should use a calculated
weighted sum.
Many subsequent attempts at creating a left-right score were indirect or direct attempts at
improving the RILE approach. Kim and Fording (1998) combine the percentage of a manifesto
that advocates left-wing positions and subtract it from the combined percentage of manifestos
which support right-wing positions. The categories include economic policy, foreign policy, and
general governance questions. Afterwards, they then divided the difference by the total
percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right. This approach allows for a final score
ranging from -1 to +1 which can also be transformed into a 0 to 100 range.
While disagreeing with the broader logic behind RILE’s methodology, some scholars
agreed that many policy positions should be considered. In an attempt to find which categories
are most relevant to the creation of a left-right score, scholars have used principal factor analysis
as the primary method for creating a left-right placement. In these attempts, scholars have often
considered dozens of different policy categories for the left-right score. Budge et al. (1987)

references to market regulation + references to economic planning + positive references to protectionism + positive
references to a controlled economy + positive references to nationalization + welfare state expansion + education
expansion + positive references to labor groups + positive references to democracy).
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divided the categories which are most relevant to left-right positioning and placed them into
seven policy domains. Afterwards they extracted from each domain one or two factors. Laver
and Budge (1993) took 54 categories and collapsed them into twenty dimensions where thirteen
are one category and seven are the sum of two or more categories. These categories were placed
into clusters. Afterwards, they calculated left-right scores as the difference between the sums of
references of one cluster, the right, and the second cluster called the left. Gabel and Huber (2000)
also used 54 categories to create their own left-right score. For both Laver and Budge (1993) and
Gabel and Huber (2000), many different policy positions were used to create their scores
including foreign policy, social policy, and economic policy. Klingemann (1995) considered the
use of dozens of categories for the analysis to be too cumbersome and considered only domestic
policy positions for a principal factors analysis to extract the most relevant positions. He then
made a 1–10-point scale which is treated as a left-right dimension.
Echoing Klingemann’s (1995) argument that the left-right placement score should at least
be divided into foreign and domestic spheres, some scholars have argued that aggregating
multiple dimensions creates a left-right placement score that takes into account too many distinct
policy points. Instead, these scholars have argued that left-right should focus on a small number
of contentious and salient issues (Huber and Inglehart 1995). Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) argue
that much of the distinction between left and right is related to economic issues and cultural
issues. In other words, the large numbers of subdimensions used for the left-right by some
scholars should be cut down significantly (Katsanidou and Otjes 2016).
While agreeing that dozens of subdimensions are too cumbersome, other scholars have
instead opted to create a two-dimensional rather than unidimensional left-right score (Bakker et
al. 2012; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Hooghe and Marks (1999) created a two-dimensional
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system in which an economic dimension focused on questions related to regulation while a
second dimension dealt with national sovereignty issues. Kitschelt (1994) also agrees with the
two-dimensional scale but focused on creating a socialist-capitalist dimension which reflects
economic divisions and a libertarian-authoritarian dimension which honed in on contentious
cultural issues.
Some scholars believe that many different issues are salient (Keman 2007), but others
have emphasized the importance of a singular “super issue” as a proxy for left-right placement
(Laver and Budge 1992; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). This is achieved by looking at a manifesto
and finding one dimension using principal factor analysis to best identify which of the
dimensions best accounts for covariation (Laver and Budge 1992). McDonald et al. (2007)
focused to what extent goods and services should be handled by the government. Their argument
was that the left wanted less privatization and the right more privatization.
Manifestos have been used extensively to create left-right scores but on at least one point,
their use has induced pushback. Saliency theory argues that parties prioritize using manifestos to
increase the prominence of any issue that they believe is important rather than using them as a
way to place themselves on the left-right scale. The emphasis of a particular topic by a party may
be done strictly to increase vote shares rather than situate the party on the left-right spectrum
(Gabel and Huber 2000). If a manifesto is only meant to accentuate salient positions, then it may
not be the best option to create left-right placement score (Gabel and Huber 2000; Jahn 2010;
Laver and Garry 2000). In addition, the lack of policy saliency in some countries may result in
parties to leave issues associated with the left-right dimension out of their manifestos. In Finland,
for example, foreign policy is rarely mentioned in manifestos because there is little disagreement
on the matter (Volkens 2007).

83

The Classification Plan for this Project
Manifestos are particularly useful for this project because individual speeches made by
politicians, either on the campaign trail or within the legislature, and actual legislative voting
behavior (Laver and Benoit 2002), may deviate from the wishes of the party’s majority.
Manifestos on the other hand are authoritative and agreed upon by the party elites while also
giving a clear idea of where a party stands at a given time (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011;
Rooduijn et al. 2014). While party members can and sometimes will diverge from a manifesto,
they can theoretically be punished if stray too far from official party stances (Laver and Garry
2000). In addition, such documents are particularly well-suited for cross-national analysis
because most parties will release a manifesto (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al.
2014). In addition, examining the text of parties can allow for historical, temporal examinations
of party positions (Laver and Garry 2000). Ultimately, manifestos allow the parties, as a whole,
to speak for themselves (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006).
While manifestos have their positive points, they have their flaws as an analytical tool.
One major issue is that these documents are perhaps a better tool for measuring the relative
intensity and focus on an issue rather than what a party believes at a given time. Parties might
strategically deemphasize an issue if they believe that doing so will lead to victory (Janda et al.
1995). This indicates that when researchers are taking the percentage of a manifesto which refers
to a specific policy, they are only measuring the relative emphasis a party places and not the
party’s actual position (Laver and Garry 2000).
While this argument is important to note, there appears to be at least some evidence that
parties, when gaining power, at least attempt to abide by these documents. In an examination of
the British Conservative, Labour, and Liberal party manifestos from 1945-1987, Hofferbert and
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Budge (1992) found that when parties call for more spending in their manifestos and gain power,
there is a corresponding spending increase. Examining election pledges from the Netherlands,
Mansergh and Thomson (2007) found in 1986, 1989, and 1994 that if a member of the party
received a ministerial position, the party would partially enact the promises made during the
election cycle. Examining pledges made by the Polish cabinet between 2008 and 2011, Zubek
and Kluver (2015) found that less divisive issues, along with issues that are more salient, are
more likely to be pursued by the government. In the United States, where parties are weaker and
more beholden to the power and influence of individual politicians, an analysis of Republican
and Democratic Party platforms from 1948-1984 indicated that patterns of government spending
appear to, at a minimum, correlate with election manifestos. For example, if a party that
emphasized more government spending won office, there was an analogous increase in federal
expenditures (Budge and Hofferbert 1990). Overall, these findings appear to indicate that
manifestos provide clues as to a party’s underlying stances (Jahn 2010) and are written at a
minimum to signal tacit commitment to carry out a plan if the party happens to win an election
(Budge and Hofferbert 1990).
The Manifesto Project
Arguably the most fitting dataset for this project is the Manifesto Project. The Manifesto
Project was created in the 1970s to record party manifestos from around the world. Since its
creation, those who have worked on the dataset have read party manifestos of post-World War II
democracies released during a campaign year (Volkens et al. 2015). Its goal was to create a
common framework to examine the potential ideologies and strategies of political parties in
order to get a better understanding of their views (Janda et al. 1995). The data is a type of panel
data study in which researchers track changes through time.
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The Manifesto Project is divided into seven different types of variables. Six of these are
only marginally relevant to the research design in this dissertation. Identification variables tell
the researcher data such as country and time period. Coding and data quality variables show the
type of coder worked on the project. Electoral data variables present the performance of parties,
such as the percentage of votes received. Programmatic data variables provide information such
as whether a manifesto belonged to a single party or more. The dataset variables section helps
identify the same observations between different dataset versions (Volkens et al. 2020b).
The final type of variable is the content analytical data section in which there are 56
categories catalogued and divided into seven different domains. The first domain is external
relations. Parts of manifestos which mentions topics such as special relations with other
countries, anti-imperialism, references to the military, peace, and internationalism go under this
domain. The second domain deals with items related to freedom and democracy. This includes
any references to human rights and constitutionalism. The third domain relates to the political
system and includes references to decentralization, centralization, governmental and
administrative efficiency, political authority, and political corruption. The fourth domain focuses
on the economy and includes any references to the free market, incentives, market regulation,
and economic planning. The fifth domain focuses on welfare and quality of life, and records
references to environmental protection, welfare state expansion, and education expansion. The
sixth domain gathers any variables related to the fabric of society such as references to a national
way of life, traditional morality, law and order, and multiculturalism. The seventh domain
assembles references to social groups such as labor groups, farmers, the middle class, and
minority groups (Volkens et la. 2020b).
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The coding process includes several steps: After deciding how to sort a sentence, the
coder chooses a category. The coder then assesses what percent of the sentence fits in the
category. There are 56 standard categories that record many policy areas and when possible, all
sentences within a manifesto are assigned to one of these 56. If a sentence contains more than
one category, then it is broken down into “quasi-sentences” which are parts of a sentence that are
categorized (Janda et al. 1995). Each category is given a score. This score is the percent of the
manifesto the coders believed belong to this category (Volkens et al. 2009). For example, if 2.6
percent of the sentences within a manifesto make negative references to multiculturalism, then
the category of “negative references to multiculturalism” is given a score of 2.6. This means that
all variables that are part of the Manifesto Project are continuous variables. The value of each
variable is between zero and one hundred, depending on what percentage of the manifesto was
dedicated to a specific topic. This also means that it is possible that a party may spend none of its
manifesto space discussing a specific topic. Particularly for smaller niche parties, it is possible
that issues such as economic policy may end up being a small part of the overall dataset.
The Manifesto Project relies on human coders (Laver and Garry 2000; Volkens 2007).
While machine processing has become increasingly popular since the beginning of the 21st
century partly because of its low time cost, it is difficult to code for idiosyncrasies related to
language (Laver and Garry 2000). Although strong advancements in computer technology have
been made, an automated method cannot be a complete and perfect replacement for human
assessment (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).
While the Manifesto Project is extensive and allows scholars to analyze different types of
questions, it has several deficiencies. This specific dataset does not permit researchers to
disaggregate the data and combine responses into new policy categories. In addition, while the
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dataset allows readers to understand what percentage of the document mentions a policy
positively or negatively, it does not record “neutral statements.” If a neutral sentence is
embedded within a paragraph that expresses support or displeasure for a policy, the entirety of
the paragraph is often coded as “positive” or “negative” (Laver and Garry 2000).
Selection Process for Ethnocentric Populism Scores
The Manifesto Project, and other datasets like it, uses trained coders who look for
specific words or paragraphs. In the case of populism, coders would seek words about the people
and elites and calculate what percent of the manifesto space is dedicated to this topic (Bernhard
and Kriesi, 2019; Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018; March 2017; Rooduijn and Pauwels,
2011). This project will follow their lead. For example, if a party spent approximately five
percent of its manifesto railing against political authority, it would mean an extra five points
added to an ethnocentric populism score.
As noted by a number of scholars, such as Jagers and Walgrave (2007) and Meijers and
Zaslove (2020), populism is composed of different features such as anti-establishment sentiment.
The multifaceted nature of populism is important when detailing with ethnocentric populism
because it combines the feeling of disdain towards elites and an ethnonationalist component that
emphasizes suspicion of outsiders. In order to have a score which accurately reflects the concept
of ethnocentric populism, every feature that makes up the concept must be a part of a final score
(Schulz et al. 2018; Wuttke et al. 2020). While many different topics are explored in the
Manifesto Project, there are five which measure disdain for elites as they either reference a
policy position held by elites or are direct criticisms of the existing system: Positive references to
internationalism, positive references to the European Union, Governmental and Administrative
Efficiency Political Corruption, and References to Political Authority.
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This project will also follows Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) who created
welfare policy scores by adding positive references to welfare policy and subtracting them from
negative references to welfare policy. Shown below on table 3.4, the percentage of the manifesto
that makes up three categories (agreement with populism’s disdain for elites, more references to
a lack of governmental and administrative efficiency, political corruption, and references to
political authority) are added together because they constitute positive references to the populist
cause. The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to positive references to internationalism and
positive references to the European Union, which see elite-supported positions in a positive light,
are also added together. This final score for the populist component of ethnocentric populism
involves subtracting the sum of the positive references to the populism minus the sum of
positions which are positive references to elite-supported positions.
The next step is to consider the ethnocentric portion of ethnocentric populism. Shown on
table 3.4, the variables related to positive references to the national way of life, positive
references to traditional morality, positive references to law and order, and negative references to
multiculturalism are added together as they are considered to see ethnocentrism in a more
positive light. Positive references to equality, positive references to underprivileged minority
groups and positive references to refugees ultimately see ethnocentrism in a negative light and
are also added together. The total percentage of positive references to ethnocentrism are
subtracted from the total percentage of negative references to ethnocentrism. The two different
final scores are then added together to make a final ethnocentric populism score. The number can
theoretically range from -100 through +100 or if simplified, -1 through +1.
Table 3.4: Manifesto Project Variables Used for Ethnocentric Populism Scores
Variable
Variable Description
More
More
More
Coding
Mainstream
Mainstream
Ethnocentric
Right or Less?
89

Per 107
Per 108
Per 303
Per 304
Per 305
Per 503
Per 601
Per 603
Per 605
Per 607
Per 705

Per 7062

Left or
Less?
Ethnocentric Populist Variables
“Populist” Variables
Positive References to
N/A
Internationalism
Positive Reference to the
N/A
European Union
Governmental and
N/A
Administrative Efficiency
Political Corruption
N/A
References to Political Authority
N/A
“Ethnocentric” Variables
Equality: Positive
N/A
Positive References to National
N/A
Way of Life
Positive References to
N/A
Traditional Morality
Positive References to Law and
N/A
Order
Negative References to
N/A
Multiculturalism
Positive References to
N/A
Underprivileged Minority
Groups
Positive References to Refugees
N/A

Populist or
Less?

N/A

-

N/A

-

N/A

+

N/A
N/A

+
+

N/A
N/A

+

N/A

+

N/A

+

N/A

+

N/A

-

N/A

-

It is important to address a potential deficiency in this method of coding party
orientations. The raw scores only take into account how much of the manifesto the party
dedicated to a specific topic. In an attempt to address saliency theory, which argues that parties
focus on increasing the prominence of any issue that they believe is important rather than
maximize votes through their left-right position (Gabel and Huber 2000; Harmel et al. 1995;
Jahn 2010; Laver and Garry 2000), the process here will try to decouple the scores from how
invested the party may have been in terms of discussing a topic.
To create an adjusted/decoupled score, the raw score, which are the calculations for the
ethnocentric populism score components addressed in table 3.4, is divided from the percent of
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the manifesto that addressed populist issues. The new score measures how ethnocentric populist
or “unpopulist” the party happens to be at the time of writing the manifesto. For example, if a
party’s raw ethnocentric populism score is 1.62, while 23.54 percent of the manifesto was
dedicated to populist issues, then the following calculation would take place: 1.62 divided by
23.54 which would then lead to an adjusted score of 0.07. The final adjusted scores may be
anywhere between -1, least “unpopulist” to +1, or most populist. This process is in line with Kim
and Fording (1998) who combined the percentage of a manifesto that discussed policy points
related to left-wing ideological spectrum positioning and subtracted it from the combined
percentage of manifestos which support right-wing positions and then divided the difference by
the total percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right.
There are two additional considerations which need to be addressed when creating final
ethnocentric populism scores: The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to ethnocentric populist
issues which would qualify a party to be considered ethnocentric populist and a cutoff for the
final ethnocentric populism score. It is possible that a party might have a very high score without
actually dedicating enough of their manifesto to relevant issues. Echoing March (2017) and
Wuttke et al. (2020)’s concerns that a party or actor cannot be considered populist unless it has
high scores across all relevant components, a way to ensure that a party makes enough relevant
references to be considered populist is necessary. The creation of the score outlined in table 3.4
presented the combination of two components: ethnocentrism and populism. Because there are
two different components, it is possible that a party might score high on, for example, the
populist portion of the score while not scoring high on the ethnocentric portion.
When considering an appropriate percentage of the manifesto dedicated to ethnocentric
populist issues, some scholars have noted the importance of the percentage of paragraphs in
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manifestos dedicated to populist topics (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Schumacher and van
Kersbergen 2016; Wuttke et al. 2020). While the Manifesto Project does not present the actual
manifestos of the parties, in the newest iteration of the dataset there are 57 different topics
covered in total. Of those 57, as shown on table 3.4, eleven topics are used for the ethnocentric
populism score and eleven were used to create an ethnocentric populism score. In the Manifesto
Project, there are 57 categories. Seven categories out of 56 are used to construct the ethnocentric
portion of the score while five out of 56 are used to construct the populist portion of the score.
The idea is that about 7/56 or 12.5 percent and 5/56 or 8.9 percent of the manifestos respectively
are dedicated to these two topics.
There is one final consideration for creating an ethnocentric populism score: The actual
cutoff score. Within the scholarship there were a number of different methods. One uses a cutoff
in which a score higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration question (Lubbers et al. 2002) is
a requirement. Another argues for the use of a three-tier score of low, medium, and high which
correspond to 0, 0.5, and 1 (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). Another uses a 0-11 scale
where a low-level score of populism was less than 5, a moderate level populism score was
between 5 and 7.5, and a high populism score was above 7.5 (Meijers and Zaslove 2020).
Another group of authors argue for the use of a 75 percent threshold for all subdimensions for an
aggregate populism score (Wuttke et al. 2020).
The method used here is inspired by Wuttke et al. (2020) who modified all the indicators
to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This project emulates their decision to use
standard deviation. The implementation of a final cutoff point takes all the adjusted/decoupled
scores of parties that have won at least one seat in the national election. After sorting from least
to greatest, the median party’s score is adjusted to zero and all other parties’ scores are adjusted
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accordingly. In this analysis, the median party was Italy’s Popular Civic List with a
decoupled/adjusted score of 0.22. Because the score was 0.22, all other party scores were
adjusted by subtracting 0.22.
Subsequently, each of the parties were sorted by country of origin, listed from least to
greatest in score, and adjusted again by the median party’s score. After this final in-country
adjustment, any party that is one standard deviation above the mean in ethnocentric populism
score, which also met all other requirements outlined in this section, are considered to be
ethnocentric populist parties. If none of the parties that have a score one standard deviation
above the mean meet the other requirements, the party that has the highest score which meets all
other requirements outlined in this section will be considered that country’s “representative.”
Selection Process for Left-Right Scores
There is a temptation to simply use the Manifesto Project dataset’s “RILE” variable2
which is a left-right placement score. Theoretically, parties can have scores which range from 100, or a perfectly left score, through 100, or a perfectly right score. While this is convenient,
this cannot be used because the RILE aggregation does not match the conceptualization outlined
in chapter two.
Jahn (2010), who examines the historical root sources of left and right, provides a good
place to start. Jahn also noted the work of Bobbio (1996) and the left and the right’s ultimate

2

It is calculated by adding the percentages the categories in the first parentheses and then subtracting them from a
second group encapsulated in another parentheses: (Positive references to the military + references to freedom and
human rights + positive references to constitutionalism + references to political authority + positive references to the
free market economy, positive references to incentives + negative references to protectionism + economic orthodoxy
+ welfare state limitation + positive references to the national way of life + positive references to traditional morality
+ positive references to law and order + positive references civic mindedness) – (References to anti-imperialism +
negative references to the military + references to peace + positive references to internationalism + positive
references to market regulation + references to economic planning + positive references to protectionism + positive
references to a controlled economy + positive references to nationalization + welfare state expansion + education
expansion + positive references to labor groups + positive references to democracy).
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dividing question being rooted in differing ideas regarding equality; the left prefers to use the
government to relieve existing inequalities while the right is far more suspicious of using the
government to do so and would prefer that the government not get involved on this question.
Perhaps because this theme of inequality is so central to left and right, the economic
subdimension has gained salience in left-right placement score creation. Otjes and Katsanidou
(2017) noted the importance of an economic left-right dimension and argue that this dimension
has gained prominence in the twenty-first century due to the rise of economic globalization
(Kriesi et al. 2006; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). For their own project, Otjes and Katsanidou
(2017) focused on variables measuring the importance of a voter’s position on economic
egalitarianism, a voter’s position on the government and intervention in the economy, and
whether a voter favors tax cuts above investments in public services. McDonald et al. (2007)
made a similar argument regarding the centrality of the economic question and referred to the
government’s role in organizing the economy as the key component of left-right scores. Laver
and Garry (2000) created an economic left-right scale by adding up all of the economic-related
policy points which call for reducing government intervention in the manifesto and subtracting
them from the percentage of all points which call for more government intervention.

Variable
Coding

Per 401
Per 402
Per 403
Per 404

Table 3.5: Manifesto Project Variables Used for Left-Right Scores
Variable Description
More
More
More
Mainstream
Mainstream
Ethnocentric
Left or
Right or Less?
Populist or
Less?
Less?
Left-Right Variables
Government Role Variables
Positive Reference to a Free
+
N/A
Market Economy
Incentives: Positive (Supply+
N/A
Side Economics)
Market Regulation
+
N/A
Economic Planning
+
N/A
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Per 406
Per 407
Per 413
Per 504
Per 701

Positive References to
Protectionism
Support for Free Trade/Open
Markets
Nationalization
Welfare State Expansion
Positive References to Labor
Groups

+

-

N/A

-

+

N/A

+
+
+

-

N/A
N/A
N/A

As outlined on table 3.5, positive references to a free market economy, positive
references to supply side economics, and support for free trade/open markets are all variables
which call for less direct government action. Because of this, references to these will increase a
left-right score. On the other hand, references to market regulation, economic planning, positive
references to protectionism, nationalization, welfare state expansion, and positive references to
labor groups will decrease a left-right score.
Any final score which is less than zero makes the party fall on the left while any score
greater zero fall on the right. Theoretically, parties can have scores which range from -100, or a
perfectly left score, through 100 or a perfectly right score (Volkens et al. 2020). This system
echoes the work of a few scholars who have opted to create left-right scores which range from a
negative number, signifying left, and a positive number, signifying right (Harmel et al. 1995;
Jungar and Jupkas 2014; Kim and Fording 1998). The existence of an established cutoff point, in
which negative numbers reflect left and positive numbers right, makes the creation of a left-right
score easier compared to the creation of cutoff points for ethnocentric populism scores.
However, like the process for creating ethnocentric populism scores, the raw score
presents an incomplete picture. Echoing Kim and Fording (1998), this project will combine the
percentage of a manifesto that advocates left-wing positions, subtract it from the combined
percentage of manifestos which support right-wing positions, and then divide the difference by
the total percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right.
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Dependent Variable Creation
The basic research question that binds the entire investigation together involves
answering what might be driving the success of populist actors, more specifically ethnocentric
populist actors, in the post-2014/15 time period. The research question hints that division
between ethnocentric populist actors and non-ethnocentric populist actors is needed.
There are a number of potential ways to construct a dependent variable that measures
support. The variable that records all the parties into different groups can be a dummy variable in
which all parties considered ethnocentric populist are grouped and coded as one while all other
parties are coded as zero. Another option is creating an ordinal variable in which five indicates
“most ethnocentric populist” and one “least ethnocentric populist.” There is also the possibility
of creating a continuous variable in which all parties are given a score of zero through one
hundred.
Each of these potential paths has positives and negatives. The dummy variable is simple
but does not provide much description in terms of the potential differences among the various
ethnocentric populist actors. Not all ethnocentric populist actors are created equally and some of
them might have more “extreme” positions than others. These differing traits are hidden in a
dummy variable.
For the creation of an ordinal or continuous variable of support, how an individual feels
about that party might be an appropriate way to construct a dependent variable. Such a variable
might run from one through five in which one indicates “most favorability” and five “least
favorability.” Barring access to such a variable, the use of a thermometer rating might also prove
useful in the creation of an ordinal variable. For example, the ANES asks respondents to give the
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Democratic Party and the Republican Party a value between 0-100 with 0 indicating coldest
feelings and 100 warmest feelings.
A continuous variable or an ordinal variable can be used to show that there are
differences among ethnocentric populist parties and even show the levels of “ethnocentric
populist-ness” among a range of different parties. This ability to provide nuance is useful.
However, there are still some issues here as well. For example, what is the difference between a
score of 20 and 30? They both seem to infer coldness towards a party, but how can one explain
the substantive difference between the scores?
Many scholars who have analyzed relationships between attitudinal variables and voting
behavior have also used a dichotomous dependent variable. Among scholars who focus on
European populism, Arzheimer and Carter (2009), in an analysis investigating a potential link
between the strength of one’s Christian faith and support for radical right parties, created a
dichotomous dependent variable. Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) also used a dummy variable in
which successful populist radical right parties are coded as one while those that were
unsuccessful were coded as zero. Rydgren (2011) created a dependent variable by coding all who
voted for a radical right-wing populist party as one while all others as zero. Spierings and
Zaslove (2015) also created a dichotomous dependent variable in which those who voted for
radical right-wing populists were coded as one and all others were coded as zero.
Many scholars who researched voting behavior related to Donald Trump, particularly
those who conducted research before 2016 general election data was available, used a
thermometer rating (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Manza and Crowley 2018). While a
thermometer rating can provide insights, positive feelings towards an individual is not the same
as voting (Manza and Crowley 2018). After vote choice data became available, many researchers
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used a dichotomous variable for Trump support (Frasure-Yokley 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018),
with some variation in their coding approaches (Ganzach et al. 2019). Whitehead et al. (2018),
who also excluded non-Democratic and Republican Party voters, made a point that there was no
substantial deviation between an analysis with all voters compared to an analysis with only
Democratic and Republican Party supporters. Following the example of these scholars, the
dependent variable design for the American chapter will include all voters.
Criteria for Party Support Data
This section outlines the data needed to answer the question of why individuals support
populist actors. Unlike the data for party placement, which focused on manifestos written by the
party elites, the data here relies on surveys from the general population. The data will need to
take a randomly selected sample of individuals from the countries noted in the case selection
section of this chapter. There is also an issue of time span. The data must cover the years
preceding the Migrant Crisis and the Immigration Crisis, or before the 2014/2015 time period,
while also having data available in the post-2015 time period. Further complicating matters is
that it would be ideal if the questions asked in each iteration of the data are similar. Finally,
optimal data would include a long-standing panel. A thorough examination of a randomly
selected sample of individuals that spans preferably at least a decade before the beginning of the
crises would highlight the point that the 2014/2015 time period changed people’s thinking.
The European Social Survey (ESS)
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a large-scale social survey funded by a number of
different European agencies including the European Commission, European Science Foundation
and the U.S. National Science Foundation. The initial purpose of the ESS was the creation of a
survey that maps out European attitudes on various social issues (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008).
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The ESS is a cross-sectional dataset, first conducted in 2002, which provides nationally
representative surveys on a two-year cycle. Over two dozen different European countries have
been a part of the survey at one point or another (Bilsky et al. 2011) and most countries have
response rates of 70% or higher (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015).
Aside from basic demographic questions (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), the survey poses
almost two dozen questions related to personal values (Bilsky et al. 2011). There are items
related to attitudinal and group characteristics (Montgomery and Winter 2015) which allows a
researcher to analyze attitudes held by voters (Rydgren 2008). According to the ESS website, the
following topics have been covered at least in one iteration: “media and social trust, politics,
subjective well-being, gender, household, socio demographics, human values, immigration,
citizen involvement, health and care, economic morality, family, work and well-being, timing of
life, personal and social well-being, welfare attitudes, ageism, trust in justice, democracy, health
inequalities, climate change and energy use, justice and fairness, and digital social contacts”
(European Social Survey Website).
While the ESS has its positive points, it also has drawbacks. Ideally, the research
question on whether the Migrant Crisis changed patterns of electoral support can be best
answered through the use of panel data. Unfortunately, the ESS does not make use of panel data.
In addition, a question regarding one’s pride in one’s ethnic group is unfortunately not available
for all iterations of the ESS and so other variables were used as proxy measures.
Nevertheless, the ESS works well for projects related to voting behavior. Arzheimer and
Carter (2009) used the first round of the ESS in their investigation on a potential relationship
between Christian faith and support for radical right parties. Montgomery and Winter (2015)
examined the relationship between religiosity and populism and used data from the fifth iteration
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for their analysis. Dinas and van Spanje (2011) used the first round of the ESS to examine a
potential interaction between an individual’s position on crime and anti-immigration sentiment
on support for anti-immigration parties. Gidron and Hall (2020) used the sixth round of the ESS
to study potential links between support for radical right and left parties and social
marginalization. Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) used multiple iterations of the ESS to look at
voter turnout for populist radical right parties. Rydgren (2011) discussed the effect of social
isolation and social capital on the likelihood of voting for radical right-wing populists. Spierings
and Zaslove (2015) studied the effect of gender and support for populist radical right parties.
Spierings et al. (2017) analyzed whether sexually modern individuals, or those who are accepting
of the LGBT community, who held nativist tendencies supported the populist radical right. Werts
et al. (2012) assessed a potential relationship between Euroskepticism and support for radical
right-wing voting.
The American National Election Study (ANES)
Since 1948, the American National Election Study has conducted a nationwide survey
during presidential election years (Frasure-Yokley 2018). Data is collected through the use of a
multistage, stratified cluster sample of all Americans who are age 18 or older and residing in the
continental United States (Setzler and Yanus 2018). In addition, the probability sampling
procedure for the ANES also includes cluster sampling of geographic areas (Wright and Esses
2019).
Like the ESS, the ANES hosts an extensive number of variables and covers a wide range
of topics (Murray and Scime 2010). In addition, many questions are asked in every iteration to
gauge long term trends, along with specific questions which are generally asked once or twice to
gauge a time-specific issues (Frasure-Yokley 2018). The ANES covers all the sections that the
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ESS covers, such as important questions related to immigration, economics, and sociodemographic characteristics.
The ANES has recorded data on presidential vote choice (Murray and Scime 2010). The
theory portion of the analysis requires a question that measures status threat. The best measure is
a question that asks respondents about threats from immigration. The ANES has questions
related to this issue through a question that asks individuals about immigration rates (Citrin et al.
1997). In addition, there is also the question of whether the data covers the appropriate time
period. There is data available not just in the pre-2015 time period, but after 2015 as well. The
ANES thus meets the requirements to be used in this analysis.
The ANES’s long history provides important snapshots of the American population and
this fact makes it a strong candidate for use in this dissertation. However, there are some
important potential negatives that can come with such a long history. For example, question
wording has changed throughout the years. Small changes to wording could elicit different
reactions from respondents. Other questions, while remaining relatively similar in composition
throughout the years, have had their placement changed through time. This has the potential to
change reactions from respondents depending on what the preceding question entailed. The
coders have also recoded a number of the variables so that question responses would be
consistent through time.
While the ANES has existed in some shape or form since 1948 (Bartels 1999), some of
the questions do not have a particularly long history. While by the beginning of the 21st century,
there were over 900 different questions (Murray and Scime 2010), many of these questions were
added through time. This means that some questions have a short history. For example, questions
about immigration were first asked in newer iterations of the ANES (Citrin et al. 1997).
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However, there is still data since 1992 and this allows for using six datasets that took place
before the rise of Trump and the Migrant Crisis.
As noted by Guth (2019), the ANES also has multiple variables available which allow
scholars to examine populist attitudes. The fact that the ANES includes questions which can be
used to measure how respondents feel about certain aspects of populism makes it a particularly
useful dataset for this analysis. Frasure-Yokley (2018), in an analysis of sexist attitudes and
support for Trump, used the ANES dataset. The ANES also allowed Morgan and Lee (2019) to
analyze both economic attitudes and racial attitudes simultaneously to see which affected Trump
support. Smith and Hanley (2018) were able to use the ANES to gauge whether authoritarian
attitudes played a role in Trump support. Wright and Esses (2019) use the ANES to analyze
whether there a link between immigration and support for Trump.
Just like the ESS, the existence of multiple iterations of the ANES also allowed scholars
to compare time periods. Ganzach et al. (2019) used the 2012 and 2016 ANES to compare the
cognitive abilities of Obama vs. Romney voters and Clinton vs. Trump voters. Morgan and Lee
(2018) analyzed variables that led white working-class voters to defect from the Obama camp to
the Trump camp in 2016. Valentino et al. (2018) examined the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016
ANES and noted that it was only in the 2016 ANES in which sexist attitudes played a significant
factor in support for the Republican Party.
Analysis: European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Study (ANES)
The European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Studies (ANES) will
be used in a similar way. First, the discussion will focus on the general pattern of analysis that
both datasets conform to while afterwards shifting towards a discussion on how they differ. As
noted in an earlier section in this chapter, the dependent variable is a dummy variable of whether
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individual respondents voted for an ethnocentric populist party or not. The ESS does not have a
question that directly asks this. However, such a dependent variable can be created by looking at
ESS questions which ask respondents from every country what party they voted for in the last
election. Respondents who voted for the list of ethnocentric parties, which will be presented in
the party placement chapter, will be coded as one while all other individuals who voted for other
parties will be coded as zero. Like other scholars who have done research on support for populist
actors (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Rydgren 2011; Spierings and Zaslove 2015), a dummy
variable using the ESS data will be used for the analytical chapters.
For the ANES data, the question of interest is which party’s presidential candidate the
respondent voted for in the last election. As the Republican Party’s presidential candidate in
2016, Donald Trump is of interest here. The ANES’s question on which party an individual
voted for the presidential election would be the most appropriate dependent variable. Like a
number of other scholars who have studied support for Trump (Frasure-Yokley 2018; Setzler and
Yanus 2018), the coding will be modified so that those who answered Democratic Party or other
are coded as zero and those who voted for the Republican Party coded as one.
The analytical chapters also account for independent variables that help test the theory.
Variables that measure status threat and ingroup-outgroup preferences are available within both
datasets. Economic anxiety can also be measured through the use of variables that ask about
unemployment and general feelings on where the economy is headed in the respondent’s home
country. Control variables that are outside the scope of the theory, but considered by scholars to
have an influence on populist support, such as gender, will also be added to the regression
model. More details on the variables will be provided in the analytical chapters.
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The analysis is divided depending on the time period as the basic research question
attempts to examine what caused the spike in support for populist actors in the post-Migrant
Crisis/Trump time period. Because of the importance of the 2014/15 time period, the most
important distinction involves comparing the data from before and after this time. Within the
ANES, the iterations that will be used in the American analytical chapter take place during the
United States presidential election cycle. Under most circumstances, data is collected once every
four years. The ESS data is collected, on the other hand, once every two years during even years.
While most of the analysis is similar across both the Western Europe and United States
chapters, the former will also examine the marginal effects of economics playing a role in
supporting right-wing populist parties. For the purposes of the analysis, right-wing populist
parties are defined as parties that espouse right-wing economic and social policy stances.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to lay out case selection, the classification process
behind ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties, create usable dependent variables,
discuss what type of data is needed for the three analytical chapters, and provide an introduction
on how the analysis will be conducted.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States have been chosen to
be part of the analysis. The United States is also a part of the analysis despite being outside of the
Western European region because of the electoral success of a populist in Donald Trump during
the 2016 US Election.
Instead of relying on labels given by other scholars, the decision was made to use
Manifesto Project data on party attributes related to anti-elite sentiment, ethnonationalism,
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xenophobia, and other related traits to construct an ethnocentric populism score. The data from
the Manifesto Project was also used to create a left-right score. The process took inspiration from
previous scholarship while also taking into consideration the unique needs of this project.
The dependent variable is a dummy in which zero signifies support for a nonethnocentric populist party while one support for an ethnocentric populist party. A similar
dependent variable will be used for the American dataset in which zero signifies support for nonRepublican presidential candidates and one support for Republican presidential candidates. The
decision was made to use a dummy variable as the basic research question asks about what is
driving the success of ethnocentric populist parties.
The data comes from three different sources which are separated into three analytical
chapters. The first analytical chapter uses the Manifesto Project. This data will be used to help
place the parties on a two-dimensional spatial analysis in which ethnocentric populism scores
and left-right economic placement scores help determine where ethnocentric populist parties
exist relative to other parties. The same data will be used to help create cutoff points needed to
determine which parties are ethnocentric populist and which are not. The second part of the
analysis will involve adjusting the left-right scores and ethnocentric populism scores and
examining where ethnocentric populist parties are placed within the context of their own
countries.
The second and third analytical chapters use the American National Election Study
(ANES) and the European Social Survey (ESS) to construct a dependent variable measuring
support for ethnocentric populist actors. The independent variables include a number of controls
but the main variables of interest are those that measure status threat. The ESS has a second
regression component in which the dependent variable is again coded as zero and one but this
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time those that are coded as one are right-wing populist parties and those that are coded as zero
are ethnocentric populist parties that did not make the cut to be considered right-wing populist
parties. The next three chapters will provide the actual analysis that will then in turn help guide
the direction of the conclusion.
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Chapter 4: Party Placement Analysis
Introduction
Which parties are populist? Do populist parties match their popular and/or academic
labels? Up to this point, a major component of the investigation is the creation of a list of
ethnocentric populist parties. While this specific type of populist is the major focus of the
analysis, terms such as right-wing radical, fringe right (Pupcenoks and McCabe 2013) or extreme
right (Golder 2003) are often used to highlight the non-mainstream nature of these actors.
Operating outside the mainstream, the general expectation is that this fringe status hinders
electoral performance (Jackman and Volpert 1996).
This statement aligns with findings by Downs (1957) who noted that parties desire to
move towards the center in order to maximize vote shares. If the definition that extreme or fringe
refers to those outside the mainstream (Mulloy 2004), these characteristics constitute an electoral
disadvantage that hinders a party’s chances at winning and maintaining power (Mayhew 1974).
The broader question that ties the entire investigation together involves attempting to
answer what drove support for ethnocentric populist actors in the post-Migrant Crisis time
period. One possibility is that this increased support is rooted in changes made by the parties
themselves. Is it possible that the increased support for populist actors was the result of
moderated policy positions? This chapter examines where parties stand relative to one another.
This chapter also provides a list of ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties.
Chapter two noted that ethnocentric populism refers to a worldview in which regular individuals
are seen as being in conflict with establishment elites while also espousing some combination of
ethnonationalism and xenophobia. Right-wing populism refers to combining the worldview of
ethnocentric populism while also espousing economic stances that oppose government
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intervention in the economy. To build on this, the left-right dimensions first discussed in the
research design chapter will be used to create scores.
Before creating a list of ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties, a look at
the scholarship provides a reference for which parties are commonly referred to as populist.
Because the term ethnocentric populist is specific, an examination of the parties deemed as
radical right, extreme right, extreme radical right, populist right, or right-wing populist in peerreviewed work from the thirteen Western European countries selected to be a part of the analysis
can provide important insights.
Table 4.1: Parties Considered to be Radical Right, Extreme Right or Right-wing Populist
Party
Alliance for the Future
of Austria (Austria)
(4)
Alternative for
Germany (Germany)
(10)
British National Party
(United Kingdom)
(12)

Centre Democrats
(Netherlands) (4)
Centre Party
(Netherlands) (4)
Danish People’s Party
(Denmark) (16)

Democratic Union
Party (United
Kingdom) (2)
Fatherland Party
(Norway) (1)

Author(s) Who Reference the Party
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Dunn (2015); Werts et al. (2012);
Zhirkov (2014)
Arzheimer (2015); Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramini and Manuccci
(2019); Decker (2013); Huber and Yendall (2019); Lammers and
Baldwin (2020); Lees (2018); Louwerse and Otjes (2019); Salmela
and von Scheve (2017)
Abedi and Lundberg (2009); Bowyer (2008); Ford and Goodwin
(2010); Harteveld et al. (2015); Jesuit et al. (2009); Lubbers et al.
(2002); March (2017); Pupcenoks and McCabe (2013); Spies and
Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan
(2005); Werts et al. (2012)
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Lubbers et al. (2002); Spies and
Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Spies and
Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Allern (2012); Bergh (2004); Cutts et al. (2011); Ennser (2012);
Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Jungar and Jupskas (2014);
Keskinen (2012); Mayer (2013); Meijers and Zaslove (2020); Moore
(2010); Mudde (2013); Oesch (2008); Rydgren (2010); SkidmoreHess (2003); Soderlund and Kestila (2009); Yilmaz (2012)
Ingle (2008); Mudde (2007)

van Spanje (2010)
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Federal Democratic
Union (Switzerland)
(2)
Flemish Interest
(Belgium)

Forum for Democracy
(Netherlands) (1)
Forza Italia (Italy) (3)
Fratelli d’Italia (Italy)
(2)
Freedom Party
(Austria) (29)

Freedom Party
(Netherlands) (1)
Freedom Party
(Switzerland) (6)
Geneva Citizen’s
Movement
(Switzerland) (1)
German People’s
Union (Germany) (7)
Golden Dawn
(Greece) (8)
Group Verdonk
(Netherlands) (1)
Independent Greeks
(Greece) (3)
Italian Social
Movement (Italy) (4)

Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)

Billet and de Witte (1995); Burscher et al. (2015); Dandoy (2014);
Dassonneville and Stiers (2018); de Jonge (2020); de Lange and
Mugge (2015); de Winter et al. (2006); Ennser (2012); Erk (2005);
Hooghe and Marks (2008); Janssen et al. (2019); Mudde (2013);
Pauwels (2011); Rydgren (2010); Schmuck and Matthes (2017);
Soderlund and Kestila (2009); van der Brug et al. (2000); van Spanje
(2010); Williams (2011)
Pirro and van Kessel (2018)
Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Rooduijn et
al. (2014)
Bobba and Roncarolo (2018); Caiani and Kroll (2017)
Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993);
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Downes and Loveless (2018); Dunn
(2015); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007);
Halla et al. (2017); Harteveld et al. (2015); Heinisch and Marent
(2018); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Lammers
and Baldwin (2020); Louwerse and Otjes (2019); Lubbers et al.
(2002); Mols and Jetten (2016); Mudde (2007); Oesch (2008);
Rydgren (2007); Salmela and von Scheve (2017); Smith (2010);
Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer
(2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zaslove
(2004); Zhirkov (2014)
Caramani and Manucci (2019)
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Smith
(2010); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Bernhard (2017)

Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012);
Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al.
(2012)
Aslanidis (2016); Bernhard and Kriesi (2019); Ellinas (2013);
Fouskas (2013); Halikiopoulou (2019); Teperoglou et al. (2015);
Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (2013); Vasilopoulou (2018)
Dunn (2015)
Aslanidis (2016); Bernhard and Kriesi (2019); Vasilopoulou (2018)
Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Spies and Franzmann (2011);
Stockemer (2017)
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List Pim Fortuyn
(Netherlands) (12)

Livable Netherlands
(Netherlands) (3)
Lombard League
(Italy) (1)
Movement for France
(France) (2)
National Alliance
(Italy) (8)

Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012);
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Ivarsflaten (2008); Louwerse and
Otjes (2019); Mols and Jetten (2016); Smith (2010); Spierings et al.
(2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov
(2014)
Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and
Koop (2007)
Smith (2010)
Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017)

Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Clarke et al.
(2016); Downes and Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005);
Kessler and Freeman (2005); Spies and Franzmann (2011)
National Democratic
Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012);
Party of Germany
Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Minkenberg (2000); Spies and
(Germany) (12)
Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan
(2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
National Front
Burscher et al. (2015); Ennser (2012); Mudde (2013); van Spanje
(Belgium) (4)
(2010)
National
Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Bonikowski
Front/National Rally
(2017); Bornschier (2012); Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramani and
(France) (33)
Manucci (2019); Clarke et al. (2016); Della Posta (2013); Downes
and Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and
Koop (2007); Harteveld et al. (2015); Ivaldi (2015); Ivarsflaten
(2008); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Lammers
and Baldwin (2020); Lubbers et al. (2002); Minkenberg (2000);
Mudde (2007); Oesch (2008); Rooduijn et al. (2014); Rydgren
(2007); Salmela and von Scheve (2017); Shehaj et al. (2021); Smith
(2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011);
Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al.
(2012); Zhirkov (2014)
National Front (United Jesuit et al. (2009); Pupcenoks and McCabe (2013); Spies and
Kingdom) (4)
Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
National Republican
Werts et al. (2012); Zhikov (2014)
Movement (France)
(2)
New Democracy
Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and
(Sweden) (7)
Koop (2007); Lubbers et al. (2002); Smith (2010); Spies and
Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Northern League
Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993);
(Italy) (23)
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Della Posta (2013); Downes and
Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007);
Harteveld et al. (2015); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman
(2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Mudde (2007); Rooduijn et al.(2014);
Rydgren (2007); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and
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Party for Freedom
(Netherlands) (12)

Popular Orthodox
Rally (Greece) (6)
Progress Party
(Denmark) (3)
Progress Party
(Norway) (12)

Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan
(2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zaslove (2004); Zhirkov (2014)
Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Bos et al. (2018); Clarke et al. (2016);
Della Posta (2013); Downes and Loveless (2018); Hakhverdian and
Koop (2007); Mols and Jetten (2016); Spierings et al. (2017);
Stockemer (2017); van Wijk et al. (2020); Werts et al. (2012);
Zhirkov (2014)
Aslanidis (2016); Burscher et al. (2015); Gemenis (2009);
Halikiopoulou (2019); Mudde (2013); Tsatsanis (2018)
Ennser (2012); van er Brug et al. (2000); van Spanje (2010)

Allern (2012); Bergh (2004); Bjerkem (2016); Burscher et al. (2015);
Ennser (2012); Kestila and Soderlund (2007); Mayer (2013); Moore
(2010); Oesch (2008); Thomas (2020); van Kessel (2015); van
Spanje (2010)
Republicans
Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993); Caramani and Manucci (2019);
(Germany) (15)
Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Jesuit
et al. (2009); Lubbers et al. (2002); Mudde (2007); Smith (2010);
Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and
Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Republican Movement Caramani and Manucci (2019)
(Switzerland) (1)
Sweden Democrats
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Downes and Loveless (2018);
(Sweden) (9)
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Harteveld et al. (2015); Lubbers et al.
(2002); Norocel (2016); Spierings et al. (2017); Stockmer (2017);
Zhirkov (2014)
Swiss Democrats
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ensser (2012); Stockemer (2017);
(Switzerland) (5)
Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Swiss People’s Party
Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Coffe
(Switzerland) (17)
and Voorpostel (2010); Dunn (2015); Ennser (2012); Fitzgerald and
Lawrence (2011); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Ivarsflaten (2008);
Kessler and Freeman (2005); Muis and Immerzeel (2017); Oesch
(2008); Shehaj et al. (2021); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017);
Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Team Stronach
Caramani and Manucci (2019)
(Austria) (1)
Ticino League
Bernhard (2017); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and
(Switzerland) (7)
Koop (2007); Smith (2010); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012);
Zhirkov (2014)
Tricolour Flame
Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Jesuit
(Italy) (7)
et al. (2009); Mudde (2007); Werts et al. (2012) ; Zhirkov (2014)
True Finns (Finland)
Arter (2010); Burscher et al. (2015); Jungar and Jupskas (2014);
(5)
Keskinen (2012); van Kessel (2015)
Union of German
Spies and Franzmann (2011)
People (Germany) (1)
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United Kingdom
Independence Party
(United Kingdom)
(10)
Venetian League
(Italy) (1)

Abedi and Lundberg (2009); Clarke et al. (2016); Hakhverdian and
Koop (2007); Hayton (2016); Lammers and Baldwin (2020); March
(2017); Mierina and Koroleva (2015); Muis and Immerzeel (2017);
Rooduijn et al. (2014); Stockemer (2017)
Smith (2010)

Table 4.1 identifies peer-reviewed publications which classified at least one party as
radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist. Works were chosen to present the names of as
many different authors as possible with some of these articles focusing on examining parties
from specific countries or even just a single country. Because of this approach, the party with the
most mentions, the National Front/National Rally of France, appears in only 33 entries. Many of
these parties no longer operate and some of them had short lifespans. There are also nine parties
only mentioned by one work: The Forum for Democracy (Netherlands), Freedom Party
(Netherlands), Geneva Citizen’s Movement (Switzerland), Group Verdonk (Netherlands),
Lombard League (Italy), Republican Movement (Switzerland), Team Stronach (Austria), Union
of German People (Germany), and the Venetian League (Italy).
Overall, each scholar has his or her own ideas on which party should be considered
radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist. There are even situations where the scholars
disagree in how the parties should be classified. For example, Caiani and Kroll (2017), Caraman
and Manucci (2019), and Rooduijn et al. (2014) all consider the party Forza Italia to be either a
radical right, extreme right, or right-wing populist party. However, Ennser (2012) argues that
Forza Italia should be considered a conservative or Christian Democratic party.
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Creation of Ethnocentric Populist and Right-wing Populist List
The selection process for ethnocentric populist parties and the method for creating the
left-right score is described in detail in the previous chapter. In total, 110 different parties which
secured at least one seat in the national election in the post-Crisis time period are included for
this analysis. Using the table above which combines the ethnocentric populist and left-right score
system from the research design chapter to once again show which variables are used to create a
final list of ethnocentric populist parties.
Table 4.2: Parties and the Ethnocentric Populist Cutoff (By Country of Origin)
Country of Origin
Austria
Belgium
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United Kingdom

Party
Freedom Party
New Flemish Alliance
Flemish Interest
Danish People’s Party
True Finns
National Front
Alternative for Germany
Popular Association-Golden Dawn
Democratic Party
Reformed Political Party
Forum for Democracy
Party for Freedom
Progress Party
Centre Party
Geneva Citizen’s Movement
Swiss People’s Party
Democratic Unionist Party
United Kingdom Independence Party

Decoupled
Country Score
0.13
0.73
0.99
0.69
0.54
0.47
1.17
0.24
0.53
0.54
0.71
0.79
0.43
0.31
0.49
0.61
0.48
0.49

Note: Parties in bold met criteria for right-wing populist classification while italicized did not.

In total, using the standards outlined in chapter three, Table 4.2 shows that eighteen
parties made the cutoff to be considered ethnocentric populist parties. With 110 parties examined
in the post-Migrant Crisis data, about 16 percent of parties are considered to be ethnocentric
populist parties. The parties in bold had in-country left-right scores greater than zero and so
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qualify as right-wing populist parties, while those italicized did not and should not be considered
right-wing populist.
This system leads to some omissions. For example, the Northern League of Italy is left
out of this analysis. This may partly be the result of the party’s dual mission of being an
ethnocentric populist party and a party that advocates for more regional autonomy for Northern
Italy (Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The Sweden Democrats are also omitted despite being
considered by some to be an ethnocentric populist party (Jylhä, Rydgren, and Strimling 2019;
Rydgren 2010). To maintain the consistency of the selection process, these parties will not be
included in the analysis.
Regional and In-Country Party Placement Analysis
Several environmental features need to be examined due to their influence on
ethnocentric populist success. Was there an electoral system in place which facilitated the rise of
populist parties (Golder 2003)? Is there evidence of growing disillusionment with mainstream
parties and/or decreasing partisan attachments (Oesch 2008; Zhikov 2014)? Was there movement
by existing mainstream parties which allowed an ethnocentric populist party to form and/or did
policies put forth by ethnocentric populists gain more acceptance in broader political discourse
(Gruber and Bale 2014; Meguid 2005)? Is there evidence that hardline immigration policies have
gained acceptance in the country (Oesch 2008)? Answering these questions should provide
details on the political environments in the target countries in the years leading up to the crises.
To answer these questions, the in-country analysis is divided into two broad parts. The
first focuses on the country’s political and social environment. The second section describes the
electoral system with a focus on whether the system helps or hinders a challenger. The third
section discusses whether the country has experienced a growth in disillusionment with the status
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quo and/or a decrease in party attachment. The fourth section focuses on whether the parties in
the country have moved closer to the ideological center. The fifth section discusses whether
hardline immigration rhetoric has gained more acceptance by the eve of the exogenous shocks.
The second part of the analysis examines party placement and is divided into two
subsections. The first is a regional party placement analysis. Here, all of the Western European
parties are examined together and placed on a two-dimensional graph using their unadjusted
scores. The x-axis will show their left-right spectrum scores and the y-axis their ethnocentric
populism scores. The general purpose of this exercise is to see whether parties are clustered
together.
The second subsection examines the countries individually. Within the broader political
science scholarship, there is an argument that, assuming the preferences of the electorate are
normally distributed, parties moving towards the center will capture more votes (Downs 1957).
This brings up the question whether the rise in support for ethnocentric populist parties in the
years following the Migrant Crisis/Immigration Crisis is the result of the parties moving closer to
the center. For the purposes of this analysis, the main focus is examining where ethnocentric
populist parties stand relative to their in-country counterparts in the pre- and post-Crisis time
periods.
The creation of party placement data in the pre-2014 time period follows the same
principles. For the thirteen Western European countries, the time span of the pre-Migrant Crisis
data starts with the United Kingdom’s May 2010 Legislative Election through Germany and
Austria’s September 2013 elections. The post-Migrant Crisis data spans the Swiss Federal
Election from October 2015 to the March 2018 Italian Legislative Election. The United States is
analyzed separately with data coming from pre and post-Immigration Crisis. The pre-crisis data
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November 2016’s General Election.
While the Manifesto Project provides data on many different parties across a large
number of countries, there is unfortunately missing data which makes a complete comparison
infeasible. Notably, data on the United Kingdom is missing. For the 2010 Election, there is only
data available for the country’s three largest parties: The Conservative Party, Labour, and the
Liberal Democrats. Data for the United Kingdom Independence Party is unavailable. In order to
create as complete of a left-right and ethnocentric populism score collection as possible, the three
UK parties that had data were included when conducting in-region adjustments. In addition,
while party placement data was not available in the UK, a qualitative description was used to
describe where the United Kingdom Independence Party stands relative to other countries.
Regional Party Placement Analysis
Table 4.3: Decoupled Scores for Western European Parties Before the Migrant Crisis

Aggregate Decoupled Scores for Western European Parties
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Table 4.4: Decoupled Scores for Western European Parties after the Migrant Crisis

Ethnocentric Populist Score
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The aggregate decoupled scores for Western European countries in the pre- and postMigrant Crisis time period presents a number of findings. In both time periods, most countries
have left-right spectrum scores less than zero. In other words, by the metrics employed for this
analysis, most parties are left wing in their economic policies. As the region has a long history of
accepting large-scale welfare spending (Oliver and Matzke 2014) with some traditional
mainstream right parties advocating for such policies (Earles 2011), this is in line with
expectations.
In-country analysis on the left-right spectrum indicates that some of the countries are
clustered closer to the center. In the pre and post-Migrant Crisis data, many Italian parties are
clustered further to the right than the parties of many other countries. This might be the result of
the Eurozone Crisis that occurred in late 2000s and earliest 2010s which pressured the Italian
government, and the governments of a number of other Southern European countries, to cut back
on welfare programs and other forms of government intervention into the economy (Pisany-Ferry
117

2014). On the other hand, the Swiss parties, with the exception of the Swiss People’s Party
which is further to the right than the majority of the parties in both the pre- and post-Crisis time
periods, are further to the left. This observation indicates that parties from the same country are
close to one another.
Shifting to discussing ethnocentric populism scores, there is evidence indicating change
over time. For example, the pre-Crisis data indicates that French parties, relative to their Western
European counterparts, were closer to the middle in terms of ethnocentric populism scores.
However, in the post-Crisis data, French parties appear to have moved higher than zero. In the
2000s and 2010s France experienced a situation in which more mainstream politicians started to
use populist rhetoric. For example, former president Nicolas Sarkozy, while often seen as a rightwing politician, used populist rhetoric (Mayaffre and Scholz 2017) as did the centrist Emmanuel
Macron (Fougere and Barthold 2020). Dutch parties also appear to have behaved similarly. This
may be from the growing momentum enjoyed by ethnocentric populist-style actors such as the
Party for Freedom in the 2010s (Pellikaan et al. 2018).
A breakdown by country of origin also indicates that there are regional differences. In
both time periods, a larger percentage of Italian parties have positive ethnocentric populism
scores. Part of this observation relates to Italy’s distinct political history in the post-World War II
era. After the end of the war, the country was under one-party rule by the Christian Democrats
until the early 1990s. However, populist parties played a role in ending the dominance of the
one-party system. Partly because of their importance in helping bring about the current iteration
of the Italian political system, populist parties have played an important part in Italian politics
since the 1990s and arguably have been the dominant actors (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016). In the
pre-Migrant Crisis time period, most of the Swedish and French parties have negative
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ethnocentric populism scores. For most of the remaining countries with sufficient data, about
half of the parties have positive scores and half have negative scores; among this group of
countries, Italy is the only country where positive ethnocentric populism scores were found more
readily in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period.
In the post-Migrant Crisis time period, there are still country-level differences. Many
Dutch, Swiss, and German parties have negative ethnocentric populism scores. German parties
maintaining lower ethnocentric populism scores is in line with the country’s general disdain for
anything seen to be extreme or fringe (Bornschier 2012). In the Netherlands and Switzerland, a
long-standing desire to maintain consensus may be preventing many parties from adopting more
ethnocentric populist positions (Pennings 2005).
It appears that in Sweden the opposite observation is occurring. Most of the parties are
clustered further to the left. This is within expectations as Sweden has a different welfare state
culture in which economically conservative parties are in favor of the welfare state (Earles
2011). Many of the Dutch, French, and Swiss parties are also further to the left. However, this
does not appear to be universal with some of the parties in these countries being further to the
right. Overall, however, there appears to be at least some evidence of country-level clustering on
the economic scale.
In some of the other countries, party placement does not appear to change much between
time periods. In Finland, about half the parties have scores above zero on the ethnocentric
populist scale in both time periods. Greek parties predominately had ethnocentric populism
scores greater than zero in both time periods. The ethnocentric populism scores for Norwegian
parties in both time periods tend to cluster closer to zero in both time periods. Belgian parties
also do not appear to move much between the two time periods.
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Arguably the biggest takeaway from this regional analysis is that that there has been a
small shift towards greater ethnocentric populism scores in the post-Migrant Crisis time period.
While about 59 percent of parties in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period had a positive decoupled
ethnocentric populism score, about 63 percent of parties had such a score in the years after the
Migrant Crisis. There appeared to be a slight but noticeable movement towards adopting
ethnocentric populist platforms.
United Kingdom
Electoral System
The improving performance of UKIP occurred in spite of electoral institutional
constraints which did not favor the party. When attempting to gain access to the House of
Commons, parties learn quickly that the electoral system is not particularly friendly towards
newcomers. In the United Kingdom, House of Commons seats are won using a first-past-thepost, single member plurality electoral system (Bale and Gruber 2014; John et al. 2014). These
types of systems favor the growth and development of two major parties (Cox 1997; Duverger
1954; Riker 1982).
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
While the electoral system was not friendly to UKIP and others like it, there were other
factors which benefited the party. Political party membership continuously declined in the UK
for many years (Gauja 2012) and disillusionment with party government and parties has
increased since the 1960s. According to the Gallup Political Index, between October 1967 and
December 1992, the percentage of respondents who stated that they had “not very much” or “no
confidence at all” in parliament increased from 59 to 75 percent. The British Election Survey
indicated that while partisan identification dropped by four percent from 93 to 89 between 1964
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and 1992, the percentage of those who felt a very strong identity fell from 48 to 19 percent
(Webb 1996).
This appears to indicate that the British electorate, on average, was growing more
dissatisfied with the status quo. UKIP was particularly effective at attracting individuals who
were disaffected with the existing political system in which mainstream political actors
dominated the conversation (Bale 2018). The United Kingdom had undergone a number of social
and economic changes where working-class voters had lost their jobs (Gest 2016) and rhetoric
railing against those in charge appeared to have found a home in UKIP.
Movement to Center
Further potentially aiding parties such as UKIP was the movement towards the center in
the United Kingdom by both the Conservatives and Labour. By the late 1990s, Labour, the
mainstream left party, argued for mandatory work-related activities and cut back on rhetoric
supporting redistribution without work (Deeming 2015). It became increasingly clear that the
Labour Party opted towards a deference to free markets and adopted greater openness to a
globalized economy (Hindmoor 2004).
When the Conservatives gained power late 2000s, they continued reforms made by
Labour which emphasized reducing welfare spending (Deeming 2015). This combined with the
Conservatives’ favoring of policies that aided big business (Murphy 2019) meant that the
distance between Labour and the Conservatives decreased. On another economic front, however,
the Conservatives moved closer to the center. Following a Conservative and Liberal Democrat
coalition formed after the 2010 Election, the Conservatives supported curbing banking activity
and imposed capital requirements (Howarth and James 2020).
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On the question of convergence, the two major players in British politics, the
Conservatives and Labour have moved closer to the center. While movement makes sense if one
subscribes to the theory that capturing the center means maximizing the number of voters
(Downs 1957), this leaves an opening on the party’s left or right flank depending on where it
originally stood (Gruber and Bale 2014). This movement to the center created a subsequent
opening for a party like UKIP to take away disaffected voters.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
One of the key tenets of ethnocentric populist-style parties is a strong opposition to
immigration. Yet in the earlier days of British politics, there was strong opposition to antiimmigration rhetoric. When Enoch Powell made his “Rivers of Blood” speech in which he
criticized immigration, his comments led to the end of his political career (Caldwell 2009).
For many years following Powell’s comments in 1968, hardline immigration positions
were not profitable for political parties. However, after the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 2005
bombings, in which British-born Muslims committed terror attacks in London, the political
landscape changed (Bowen 2009). Anti-immigrant sentiment became large enough that thenConservative prime minister David Cameron promised to hold a referendum on the UK’s
membership in the European Union after securing election. After several UKIP candidates
during 2013 Council Elections won seats, the Conservatives realized that this challenge was
becoming serious. Despite some opposition within the party to adopting UKIP-style policy
positions that could alienate moderates, the Conservatives introduced legislation calling for
stricter immigration laws, stop and search campaigns to find illegal immigrants, and cutbacks to
social security and child benefits for immigrants (Gruber and Bale 2014).
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These developments suggest that in the United Kingdom, discussing and proposing
hardline immigration policy indicated that in the years leading up to the Migrant Crisis. This
cultural shift provided a strong advantage to any actor seeking to win votes by instituting a
hardline immigration message.
Table 4.5: British Party Placement During the 2015 Elections
British Parties (2015 Elections)

Ethnocentric Populism Score

.5

United Kingdom Independence Party Democratic Unionist Party

Conservative Party

0

Ulster Unionist
Labour Party
Scottish National Party

-.5

Plaid Cymuru
Social Democratic and Labour
Liberal Democrats

-.2

0

Sinn Fein

.2
.4
Left-Right Spectrum

.6

While party placement analysis examines where the parties stand before and after the
Migrant Crisis, the Manifesto Project dataset does not have enough data on UKIP and almost all
third parties which secured seats in the 2010 Election. However, there is data from the 2015
British Legislative Elections and is shown on table 4.5. Instead, qualitatively describing UKIP’s
place relative to its counterparts will take the place of graphical representation.
Between 2010 and 2015, UKIP maintained its image as an outsider party and members of
its leadership, such as Nigel Farage, pressed the attack with hardline immigration rhetoric. For
example, he declared, following terror attacks in Paris, that a “fifth column” was present in
Europe (Cutts et al. 2017). Overall, the party focused on its core messaging of Euroskepticism
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and anti-immigration rhetoric in the 2015 election (Usherwood 2019). The party increased its
vote share to 12 percent (Cutts et al. 2017).
The description of the Conservative Party by scholars indicated that, at least on the
ethnocentric populist scale, there should be movement towards a higher ethnocentric populism
score between 2010 and 2015. After recognizing many Conservative-leaning voters were
thinking of supporting UKIP (Cutts et al. 2017; Gruber and Bale 2014), the Conservatives
adopted a more hardline immigration rhetoric. If this were shown on a graph, the Conservatives
would have had a lower ethnocentric populism score in 2010 but by 2015, the Conservatives
should be much closer to UKIP. In effect, UKIP became a victim of its success. As part of the
effort to curb immigration, the party had, for many years, pushed for the United Kingdom’s
departure from the European Union. After a 2016 referendum, the British electorate voted to
leave. The key reasons to vote for UKIP was no longer important and this hurt the party’s
influence in the British political scene (Hobolt 2018).
France
Electoral System
The two major national-level prizes in the French electoral system directly elected by the
people are the presidency and the National Assembly. Presidents are chosen on the basis of a
two-round system in which the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes go on
to the second round unless one of the candidates receives a majority (Mayer 2003; Murray 2013).
Legislative elections, with the exception of 1986 Elections which were conducted using
proportional representation, follow the similar rules to the presidential elections. Until 2000, the
president held office for seven years while the deputies of the National Assembly had five year
terms. Since a 2000 referendum and other major reforms, presidents hold office for five years
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with legislative elections held a few weeks after the second round of the presidential election.
The logic behind this system is that the winning presidential candidate can actively campaign for
a legislative majority and build off the momentum from his/her victory (Murray 2013).
Like the British system, the French system uses single member districts. While this hurts
a smaller party’s chances to win seats, the French system has a two-round system. This creates a
situation where a smaller party such as the National Front has a chance to win enough votes to
find itself in the second round and subsequently a chance at securing victory.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
While in the earlier years of the Fifth Republic, partisan salience was high with
individual voters often lining up behind either the mainstream left or right parties. However, by
the middle of the 1980s, the political situation had changed (Marthaler 2010). The fortunes of
various parties changed quickly in some cases, with the Communists, for example, seeing large
fluctuations in vote shares (Pierce 1992). Because of the instability of the French system, a
number of scholars have argued that partisan identity matters less than ideological commitments
among the French electorate (Haegel 1990; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Percheron 1977).
The lack of stability also undermined confidence in the parties. Even as far back as the
1960s, IFOP (The French Institute of Public Opinion) polls indicated that over 40 percent of
respondents did not feel the parties could address their needs. Polling from the same period also
indicated that about 50 percent of voters felt strong partisan attachment (Pierce 1992).
The existence of many unattached voters proved to be useful for elites who desired to
create their own parties. The electorate pushed back against incumbents who broke promises and
has swung back and forth between the mainstream right and left (Clift 2013). There has been a
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growth in anger and disillusionment with mainstream parties; in 1978 the abstention rate was
about 15 percent and almost 40 percent by 2007 (Delove 2012).
Movement to Center
The French system saw some changes in the 1980s which indicated that parties were
willing to capture voters in the middle (Downs 1957). The Socialist Party, starting in the 1980s,
started to move away from previous attempts at breaking with France’s capitalist culture,
publicly accepted the continued existence of a market capitalist system, and moved away from
promising large-scale social programs (Bergounioux and Grunberg 1992; Clift 2013).
This was not just rhetoric but was backed by action. Socialist president Francois
Hollande, despite nominally representing a Socialist Party, adopted policies that were not
particularly different from most mainstream center-left parties (Clift 2013). The mainstream right
moved closer to the center and instituted large-scale welfare expansion under both right-wing
presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou (Kus 2006). In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the French government adopted a neoliberal approach that deemphasized state
involvement, but public anger forced it to backtrack in the early 1980s. Welfare spending
subsequently increased through the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s under both left and right-wing
administrations (Kus 2006). Despite attempts at cutting spending, the maintenance of public
services and social welfare remained an important pillar of French society that neither left nor
right could touch (Le Queux and Sainsalieu 2010). Overall, the ideological distance between the
left and right became smaller (Marthaler 2010).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Even before the Migrant Crisis, President Nicolas Sarkozy, despite being a prominent
member of national politics since 1993, adopted aspects of the National Front message such as
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stating an intention of withdrawing from the Schengen Zone and cutting legal immigration by
half (Mondon 2014). Hardline immigration stances slowly gained traction. This movement was
partly due to the salience of immigration and integration following several important events, both
domestic and international, such as the 2004 Madrid Train Bombing, the 2005 7/7 Bombing in
London (Bowen 2009), and the 2005 urban riots (Haddad and Balz 2006). By the time the
Migrant Crisis became an important part of the French political discourse, the political culture
had shifted enough that hardline immigration rhetoric was more palatable.
By the time the Migrant Crisis occurred, the National Front’s hardline immigration
policies, once considered too extreme, became more palatable to the mainstream. For example,
one faction of Socialists, led by Manuel Valls, in the aftermath of the Migrant Crisis, argued
against accepting more migrants. On the far left, Jean-Luc Melenchon stated that accepting more
refugees was not going to solve the broader problems facing the region (Ivaldi 2018).
The mainstream right was more united in moving towards positions held by ethnocentric
populists. There were public statements calling for a French referendum on the European
question and/or a negotiation of France’s role within the EU. For example, former president
Nicolas Sarkozy openly endorsed a French referendum and advocated for a new treaty which
proposed to limit the powers of the EU (Ivaldi 2018).
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Table 4.6: French Party Placement During the 2012 Elections
French Parties (2012 Elections)
1

National Front
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Radical

-.4

-.2

0
.2
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.4

Note: The Left Front and Radical Party of the Left are almost on top of each other.
Table 4.7: French Party Placement During the 2017 Elections
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Data on the French parties come from the 2012 and 2017 elections and are presented on
tables 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. Where the two graphs stand out is in the number of parties which
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have won seats in the French National Assembly. In both years, at least nine parties won seats.
Overall, parties operate across the ideological spectrum in both the 2012 and 2017 elections.
While scholars indicate a convergence to the center by some of the major actors such as the
Socialists (Clift 2013; Kus 2006), the parties appeared to have staked out places all along the
ideological spectrum.
Arguably the most important takeaway from these two graphs for the purposes of this
project is that the National Front, within the context of French politics, has the highest
ethnocentric populism score in both years. Despite maintaining the highest score in both 2013
and 2017, the party increased its vote shares in the National Assembly between these two
elections. This indicates that despite maintaining its hardline stance, the party was still able to
attract more votes.
Germany
Electoral System
The German electoral system is a hybrid that merges a single member district system and
proportional representation (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Hoff and Hough 2014). The single member
district component of the German electoral system hurts access to the Bundestag for smaller
parties. However, the proportional representation system with a five percent threshold (Allen
2009; Art 2007) is more forgiving to smaller parties.
The mixed-member system is arguably more favorable to smaller parties than the British
single member first-past-the-post system and even France’s two-round system. Ultimately, the
mixed-member proportional system allows voters to not only have a personal representative who
represents the district but also allows for parties which did not win any district to win seats in the
Bundestag (Hoff and Hough 2014). Voters also have access to a dual ballot which allows for a
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splitting of the ticket (Kreuzer 2000). These aspects of the system provide smaller parties with an
opening.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Since the end of World War II, Germany has enjoyed party continuity and the major
parties enjoyed high degrees of loyalty from the electorate. Vote shares for the major parties, the
right-leaning Christian Democrats and the left-leaning Social Democrats, shifted less than four
percent in the 1950s and 1960s and about 70 percent of respondents always voted for a certain
party (Norpoth 1978).
However, partisanship started weakening as early as the 1970s (Baker et al. 1975).
Overall, the strength of party identity declined among those born after 1930 (Norpoth 1978). By
the end of the 1980s, evidence emerged that the longstanding party system was beginning to
alienate many voters. The increasing strength of the Greens, which billed itself as an outsider,
and the increased anger directed at the larger mainstream parties, indicated that attitudes towards
the status quo were changing. In 1992, President Richard von Weizsacker, a Christian Democrat,
expressed his sympathy for disillusioned voters and criticized the mainstream parties as being
filled with career politicians who only care about winning (Scarrow 1996). The once dominant
Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats captured a total of about 85 percent of all votes
during the 1960s and 70s and almost 80 percent in the 1990s. However, by 2005 that number had
dropped to 69.4 percent (Allen 2009). By the 2000s, data indicated that Germans no longer had
had strong partisan attachments and the two main parties were at their weakest (Debus 2009).
Movement to Center
The German mainstream was also moving towards the center. Social Democrats, starting
in the late 1970s, deemphasized social welfare programs and moved away from arguing for
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increased market regulation (Paterson and Sloam 2006). The Social Democrats further
moderated their position in the 1990s and moved closer to the center. However, by doing so,
leftist parties such as the Greens filled the gap (Allen 2009). The movement towards the center
was best characterized by Peer Steinbruck, the leader and public face of the Social Democrats
during the 2013 Federal Elections, arguing pro-business positions. Steinbruck was specifically
chosen by the party elites to appeal to the business community and economic moderates (Hoff
and Hough 2014).
The Christian Democrats also increasingly became a catch-all party (Grabow 2001). The
party moved closer to the center (Clemens 2013) and became more moderate by the years of the
Great Recession. For example, the leadership, in the aftermath of a national banking crisis,
attempted to curb the size of banks (Howarth and James 2020). This movement towards the
center by both the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats eventually left a hole in German
politics (Reinl and Heinrich 2018).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Germany’s history with Nazism made it difficult for parties with hardline positions on
social or cultural outsiders, such as immigrants, to succeed. The Republicans, founded by a
Waffen-SS veteran named Franz Schonhuber, emerged in 1983 as an ethnocentric populist-style
actor. In 1989, the party won enough votes to take seats in the Berlin state parliament. The
mainstream left immediately began a process of marginalizing the Republicans. While some in
the conservative Christian Democrats initially thought about an alliance, they realized public
opinion was squarely against the Republicans. Major newspapers and regular citizens actively
called out the Republicans as Nazis. Restaurant owners refused to rent out space to the
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Republicans. The relentless social pressure led to the party losing members and the party
collapsed by the beginning of the 2000s (Art 2007).
However, like in the UK and France, international shocks played a role in changing the
conversation. The 9/11 attacks and the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a man of
Moroccan ancestry in neighboring Netherlands made immigration a more salient topic.
Critically, these events helped loosen existing societal norms on immigration rhetoric
(Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). By the time the Migrant Crisis hit Germany, the
country’s political culture had changed enough that publicly espousing hardline immigration
rhetoric was feasible.
The real change occurred during the Migrant Crisis. Christian Democrat politicians were
particularly active in calling for a cap in the number refugees who are admitted into the country.
They advocated the deportation of those whose asylum claims were denied or if an individual
had committed a serious criminal offense. The Christian Social Union Chairman, Horst Seehofer,
was forceful in his demands and publicly asked for the creation of a wall in order to prevent
migrants who had entered other parts of the European Union from entering Germany. The
mainstream right also advocated the suspension of family reunification to prevent more migrants
from being enticed to come to Germany (Bielawska 2019). The change in the nation’s culture
can be best summarized through a comment made by Frauke Petry. Petry, the leader of the
Alternative for Germany during the Migrant Crisis, called for shooting migrants who attempted
to cross into Germany’s borders during the height of the crisis (Art 2018). The party increased its
vote share two years later in 2017 Federal Elections (Hansen and Olsen 2019).
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Table 4.8: German Party Placement During the 2013 Elections

.6

German Parties (2013 Elections)

.2

.4

Ethnocentric Populism Score

Christian Democratic Union
Alternative for Germany

0

Social Democratic Party
The Greens
The Left

-.2

Free Democratic Party

-.4

-.2

0
.2
Left-Right Spectrum

.4

Table 4.9: German Party Placement During the 2017 Elections
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The data comes from the 2013 and 2017 Federal Elections and is presented on tables 4.8
and 4.9 respectively. On the left-right spectrum, it appears that there is a gap between many of
the smaller parties such as the Greens and Free Democratic Party. However, especially in the
2017 election data, the distance between the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
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Democrats is small (Allen 2009; Hoff and Hough 2014). An examination of ethnocentric
populism scores from the two time periods yields several findings related to the Alternative for
Germany. Reflecting the Alternative for Germany’s early history as an actor which did not
engage in hardline anti-immigrant rhetoric (Art 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019), the
Alternative for Germany and the Christian Democratic Union have similar ethnocentric populism
scores; the Alternative for Germany’s ethnocentric populism score is lower in the 2013 time
period. This is most likely the result of many of its initial core members being former Christian
Democrats (Hoff and Hough 2014).
While slightly below the Christian Democrats in the 2013 election, the Alternative for
Germany adopted a hardline immigration policy and its score increased to the highest score in
Germany. Despite taking a more clearly anti-immigration position, the party still won more
votes. This indicates that at least in the German context in the 2013-2017 time period, taking a
more hardline position did not alienate voters.
The Alternative for Germany has the highest ethnocentric populism score in 2017 and it
recorded the highest number of seats in its history. The party’s strong gains despite being more
ethnocentric populist appears to counter expectations that a strongly ethnocentric populist
manifesto would lead to less electoral success.
Italy
Electoral System
Italy’s electoral system has been reformed several times since the beginning of the
Second Republic and its modern form is the result of a 2005 electoral reform which allowed a
voter to choose both a party and a coalition. The latter vote helps determine which coalition will
have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Donovan and Newell 2008).
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Despite reforms, the country’s mixed-member system has remained. For both the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, three-quarters of seats are decided through single member,
first-past-the-post districts while another quarter are distributed through a national proportional
representation system with a four percent threshold (Katz 1996). Italian Senators are also elected
through the same mixed-member proportional representation system (Vercesi 2017). However,
the Senate is also home to lifelong senators who are not elected (Katz 1996).
Because of this system, Italy’s electoral environment is similar to Germany's. The layout
of this system has strongly benefitted the Northern League. The party has a natural constituency
in Northern Italy and won several single member district seats outright (Donovan and Newell
2008). In addition, it has also secured enough of the national vote share to obtain more seats
through the national proportional representation system.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Parties like the Northern League have also been further aided by sentiments held within
the broader Italian population. While party identification during the First Republic was stable
and high, with the percentage of Italians who felt that they were close to a party at nearly eighty
percent in 1968 (Garzia and Viotti 2012), cracks in the system started to develop. While Italians
were starting to become disillusioned starting in the 1960s, by the early 1990s such feelings
became widespread (Bardi 1996). The Clean Hands Affair elicited strong anger from the
population and led to the de-legitimization of the entire system (Massetti and Toubeau 2013;
Scarrow 1996).
The parties that competed in the new Second Republic recognized anti-establishment
feelings in the public and among the parties that performed well in the 1994 election, Let’s Go
Italy, the Northern League, and National Alliance, all took anti-establishment positions. Among
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the thirteen main parties running in the 1994 election, none had participated in the 1987 election;
they were either new parties or had changed their names (Bardi 1996). The early 1990s also saw
large numbers of new parliamentarians entering national politics for the first time; for example,
69.5 percent of Northern League parliamentarians and 90.4 percent of Let’s Go Italy
parliamentarians had never won office at the national level. In addition, about 80 percent of Let’s
Go Italy representatives in the Chamber of Deputies had never held a political office (Katz
1996).
Movement to Center
However, where the Italian party system differs from what is seen in the UK, France, and
Germany is that there is no concentrated movement towards the center. While the fragmented
party system allows for the existence of centrist parties and these actors have even take part of
coalition building (Allen 2009), Italy’s recent history has made centrism unpopular. The
Christian Democrats, which had long dominated Italian politics, operated as a centrist party. Its
implication in scandals made the idea of moving towards the center and becoming a catch-allparty a difficult proposition for most parties. In other words, because of the centrist nature of the
Christian Democrats, taking the middle ground on the spectrum is seen as holding something in
common with a party tainted by widespread political corruption (Donovan and Newell 2008).
Rather, members of the Italian electorate appear to value authenticity (Garzia and Viotti 2012).
This has led to a situation where parties have staked their place in the ideological spectrum rather
than attempting to expand their appeal.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
While immigrants were often considered to be objects of fascination in Italy in the early
Cold War years, the Italian mainstream press has portrayed migrants as a social ill since at least
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the 1970s. This portrayal became more negative in the 1990s as more migrants entered the
country (Sciortino and Colombo 2004). This political environment helped parties such as the
Northern League. While Let’s Go Italy mostly operates as a mainstream right party with its
emphasis on individual freedoms, suspicion of big government, pro-business policies, it and
other right parties have openly taken up anti-immigration stances since the 1990s (Betz 1994).
This includes proposing the use of the Italian Navy to curb the arrival of undocumented migrants
and the use of biometric information to identify migrants. Even the manifestos of mainstream left
parties, such as the Democratic Party, adopted language stating that criminal acts committed by
immigrants should be dealt with harshly (Massetti 2015).
Table 4.10: Italian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections
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The Union of the Center is somewhat to the left of these two parties.
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Table 4.11: Italian Party Placement During the 2018 Elections
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The Italian data comes from the 2013 and 2018 Italian election with placement data
shown on tables 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. Overall, parties are all over the ideological spectrum,
although many of them are on the right. The spatial analysis indicates that the Northern League
does not have the highest ethnocentric populism score in either the 2013 or 2018 time period.
Unlike the National Front and the Alternative for Germany, the Northern League operates in an
environment where it is arguably not the most ethnocentric populist option in the country.
Yet the Northern League, like the National Front and Alternative for Germany, also
enjoyed increased electoral support in 2018. These three parties, which enjoyed increased
support between two elections, have different recent histories. The National Front had the
highest ethnocentric populism score in both elections examined here. The Alternative for
Germany went from having a score lower than the Christian Democratic Union in 2013 to having
one higher than that party in 2017. The Northern League did not have the highest score in either
the 2013 or 2018 election. So far, the evidence indicates that a party’s ethnocentric populism
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score, relative to other parties in the country, does not appear to provide strong evidence for
supporting ethnocentric populist parties.
Netherlands
Electoral System
The Dutch electoral system favors small parties. The lower house of the Dutch
parliament, the Tweede Kamer, is elected through a single national constituency and a semi-open
list with a low threshold of 0.67 percent for winning seats in the legislature (Aarts et al. 1999).
These rules permit a party to gain seats by winning a small percent of the vote share (Louwerse
and Otjes 2016). Like in France and Germany, the members of the Dutch Senate, or Eerste
Kamer, are chosen indirectly by provincial councils. While these council members are chosen
through elections, which also use proportional representation, the Dutch electorate does not have
a direct say in the choosing of their country’s upper house (Broeksteeg 2010).
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Aiding any newcomer is that among industrialized nations, the Netherlands has the
lowest parent-offspring partisanship transmission rate (Nieuwberta and Witterbrood 1995). In
addition, partisan attachment is not particular strong in the country with many members of the
electorate choosing to support a different party in the following election (Mair 2008). In other
words, the country also has a culture of low stable party identification (Thomassen 1976;
Westholm and Niemi 1992). Support for the three oldest mainstream parties, the Christian
Democratic Appeal, Labour Party, and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, dropped
from about 84 percent in 1981 to 55 percent by 2010 (Pellikaan et al. 2016). The support enjoyed
by List Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 Election indicated some members of the electorate were willing
to give a newcomer a chance.
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Movement to Center
Part of the reason behind the lack of enthusiasm for the Dutch party system is that many
of the major parties have moved closer to the center. In the 1990s, a “purple” coalition between
the Labour Party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, and Democrats 66 formed.
While parties nominally on the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum joining forces is an
anomaly, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Democrats 66 had become
centrist parties by 1994 (Green-Pedersen 2004). The Christian Union also made similar moves
and moved closer to the center (Pellikaan et al. 2016). Labour opted to back cuts to welfare
which jeopardized the party’s relationship with unions. It also sought to promote market
solutions and deemphasized transfer spending (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen 2002).
Labour had moderated its position and became closer to a centrist party (Green-Pedersen 2004).
Part of the reasoning behind moving towards the center is the consensus-rooted nature of
Dutch politics and the fragmented nature of the party system. Moving further away from the
center makes it more difficult to become a part of a coalition as other parties see a large gap in
ideological distance as a liability. However, while moving towards the center makes a party a
more attractive coalition partner, the convergence makes each party less distinguishable and
opens up opportunities for smaller parties to distinguish themselves (Pennings 2005).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
On the question of immigration, there was strong opposition to hardline immigration
rhetoric for much of the twentieth century. While the question of immigration and integrating
newcomers became increasingly important in the 1990s (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Van
Heerden et al. 2014), there was a line. An attempt by Centre Democrat politician Hans Janmaat
to espouse hardline rhetoric on migration led to his shunning and eventual ousting from national
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politics (Judis 2016). However, the 9/11 attacks were a powerful exogenous shock that changed
the political culture in the Netherlands. Afterwards, more Dutch people began openly
questioning the country’s immigration policy (Pellikaan et al. 2007).
While the rise of Fortuyn initially led to a similar reaction with mainstream parties
attempting to shame and shun members of the List Pim Fortuyn, Fortuyn’s success at the polls
led to several mainstream parties, such as Labour, the Christian Democratic Appeal, and the
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, to reconsider their actions. Instead of continuing a
policy of shaming and shunning, they instead followed Fortuyn’s lead and adopted more hardline
immigration stances such as demanding that immigrants adapt and integrate to Dutch society
(Pellikaan et al. 2007). In particular, the Christian Democrats moved further right during the
2000s (Pellikaan et al. 2016). This movement occurred concurrently with the assassination of
Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 which further led to more public debate
on the question of immigration (Penninx 2006). By the eve of the Migrant Crisis, Dutch culture
had changed to an extent that hardline anti-immigration rhetoric became acceptable to a segment
of the electorate.
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Table 4.12: Dutch Party Placement During the 2012 Elections
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Table 4.13: Dutch Party Placement During the 2017 Elections
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Election results come from the 2012 and 2017 elections and are presented in tables 4.12
and 4.13 respectively. What immediately stands out regarding party placement in between the
two elections is that the parties are more closely clustered together on the left-right spectrum in
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the 2017 election. This is in line with the scholarship which notes that the parties have moved
closer to the center (Green-Pedersen 2004; Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen 2002; Pellikaan
et al. 2016).
In both the 2012 and 2017 Elections, the ethnocentric populism scores indicate that the
Party for Freedom was beyond all other parties. Its party placement is similar to the National
Front as both parties had the highest ethnocentric populism score in both election cycles. Yet the
party secured more votes in the 2017 election than in the 2012 election. As in France, evidence
indicates that taking a hardline ethnocentric approach may not lead to a loss in votes.
Sweden
Electoral System
Unlike the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, Sweden does not use a single member
district system. Instead, the country uses proportional representation with a four percent electoral
threshold (Allen 2009). Unlike the Netherlands which uses a single national district, the Swedish
system uses 29 different multi-member constituencies that range in size from two to thirty-nine
(Karlsson 2018). This indicates that the Swedish electoral system is relatively friendly to smaller
parties. If the party is able to meet the electoral threshold of four percent of the vote in one of
these constituency districts, it can win at least one seat.
Overall, one can argue that the Swedish system is more favorable than the British and
French systems which only utilize single member districts. It is also friendlier than the German
and Italian systems which also utilize a national proportional representation system with a four
percent threshold and single member plurality districts. Nevertheless, the Swedish system is
more difficult for smaller parties than the Dutch system which has a 0.67 percent threshold.

143

Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Like the other Western European countries highlighted here, party attachment in Sweden
had been decreasing for many years (Hagevi 2015). The percentage of Swedes who stated that
they felt a strong affinity towards a party declined from 53 percent in 1960 to 15 percent by 2006
(Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008). By 2002, a majority of Swedish respondents stated that they
had little or no confidence in political parties (Holmberg and Weibull 2003; Rydgren 2010).
From the 1950s to 2010, party identification decreased by as much as two-thirds and strong
identification with a party went from 45 percent in 1956 to 17 percent by 2010 (Oscarsson and
Holmberg 2013).
Particularly in the case of Sweden, it is important to look at how those affiliated with
unions have trended because unions figure prominently in Swedish politics; membership in a
union is higher than in any other EU member state (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). As recently as
1998, 75 percent of industrial workers picked the Social Democrats or the Left Party in elections.
However, this percentage dropped to 63 percent by 2006 (Rydgren 2010).
Movement to Center
In Sweden, the left-leaning Social Democrats moved closer to the center and overall, the
distance between the left and right has decreased substantially (Oskarson and Demkar 2015). In
particular, the gap between left and right parties on economic issues has become smaller (Jansen
et al. 2013). Starting in the late 1970s, Social Democrats deemphasized social welfare and
moved away from arguing for increased market regulation (Paterson and Sloam 2006). The
Swedish Social Democrats further moderated their positions in the 1990s and moved closer to
the center. However, by doing so, mirroring the experience of the Conservative Party in the UK,
parties further left on the spectrum such as the Greens filled the available space (Allen 2009).
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The Swedish Left Party, sensing an opportunity, fully embraced leftism and increased its vote
share to 12 percent (Allen 2009).
However, the left-leaning Social Democrats were not alone in moving to the center. The
Moderate Party, an ostensibly center-right party, also attempted to moderate its policies. It
proposed tax cuts while also maintaining existing labor market regulations. The Christian
Democrats supported abolishing a national property tax while also advocating for a new policy
that made it easier for parents to leave children in a kindergarten (Aylott and Bolin 2007). By the
2002-2006 time period, it had become clear that there was strong ideological convergence
between many of the mainstream left and right parties (Widfeldt 2008).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Through the early post-Cold War years, the topic of immigration was not salient in
Sweden. Rather, potential cuts to the welfare state, healthcare spending, and education spending
dominated the political conversation (Rydgren 2010). When the ethnocentric populist-style New
Democracy advocated for hardline immigration policies, such as a 1992 proposal that made the
ability to speak Swedish mandatory for those who wished to naturalize, mainstream left and right
strongly disagreed and pushed back against this line of thinking (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm
2008).
Despite initially being against this proposal, the Moderate Party inserted similar language
to New Democracy’s proposals in its manifesto by the end of 1997 (Green-Pedersen and
Odmalm 2008). In addition, just like in the Netherlands, the 9/11 attacks were an important
turning point: After that event, it became more socially acceptable to publicly question Muslim
immigration to Western Europe (Arzheimer 2018). The Swedish political climate had changed
enough so that more hardline immigration policy proposals became palatable to the public
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(Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Noting the changing tides in Swedish society, both sides of
the political spectrum, especially right-wing parties, adopted hardline immigration rhetoric
(Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Sensing that their right flank was open (Gruber and Bale
2014), these parties wanted to prevent the Swedish Democrats from becoming the main arbiters
of the immigration question (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008).
Table 4.14: Swedish Party Placement During the 2010 Elections
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Table 4.15: Swedish Party Placement During the 2014 Elections
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Data comes from the 2010 and 2014 elections and is presented in tables 4.14 and 4.15
respectively. In left-right placement, the data indicates that a change occurred in Swedish politics
in between those years. In the 2010 data, the parties were clustered towards the middle. This is in
line with scholars who stated that many of the major parties were moving closer to the center
(Allen 2009; Jansen et al. 2013; Oskarson and Demker 2015). However, in the 2014 election, it
appears that the parties started to move away from one another. Instead of clustering around the
center, they appear to be moving towards the left or the right. In other words, there has been a
reversal of the trend towards the middle.
Regarding ethnocentric populism scores, the Sweden Democrats in 2010 had the highest
ethnocentric populism score. However, in the 2014 election, other parties increased their
ethnocentric populism scores. Following the Sweden Democrat’s platform, several right-leaning
parties such as the Christian Democrats and Moderates appear to have adopted more extreme
positions. Yet despite having a party placement like that of more mainstream parties, the Sweden
Democrats still improved on their 2010 performance. This indicates that having other larger
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more mainstream parties adopt ethnocentric populist stances may not lead to a smaller
ethnocentric populist party’s electoral failure.
Austria
Electoral System
The electoral system used for the lower house in Austria is similar to what is found in
Sweden: proportional representation (Art 2007; Erk 2004) with a four percent threshold
(Ferwerda 2014). Such a system can help a smaller party gain a foothold.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Austria witnessed decreasing party attachment and increasing disillusionment with the de
facto two-party system. The People’s Party and Social Democrats in the early years following
the Second World War enjoyed high rates of partisan loyalty. However, this loyalty has
decreased over time (Aichholzer and Willmann 2014). In addition, the two parties also suffered
from a decrease in party membership (Selle and Svasand 1991).
Anger against the two mainstream options started to grow in the late twentieth century
and many voters started to switch over the Freedom Party as a protest against the long-standing
two-party system (Rose 2000). Despite the Freedom Party having a strong Neo-Nazi contingent,
particularly during the Jorg Haider years, it was one of the few options that had a chance at
breaking the two-party system which had existed for so long.
Movement to Center
What aided disillusionment and anger with the existing system is the relatively small
ideological gap between the People’s Party and Social Democrats. The gap was small enough for
most of Austria’s post-World War II history that the two parties have even formed coalitions
with one another; notably from 1947 to 1966 (Erk 2004) and once again from 1986 to 1999 (Art
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2007). In the 53 years from 1947 to the dawn of the new millennium, the mainstream left and
right option in Austria were in a coalition together for more than half of those years.
While the close ideological convergence between the Social Democrats and the People’s
Party made coalition governance more viable, it also left the parties open to attack from their
flanks (Gruber and Bale 2014). These concerns became reality in the later years of the Cold War
era where the Greens and the Freedom Party moved to cover the left and right flanks respectively
(Gruber and Bale 2014; Rose 2000).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
The Social Democrats' leadership instituted a policy of shunning and shaming after the
Freedom Party’s turn towards hardline anti-immigration rhetoric. However, this was not
universal. Prominent figures within the Social Democratic leadership, including a governor, Karl
Stix, and the mayor of Vienna, Michael Haupl, actively engaged in dialogue with the Freedom
Party (Art 2007; Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 1997). The People’s Party was even more open
to negotiations. At times the People’s Party adopted the more hardline policies, such as limiting
immigration and restricting the number of asylum seekers. The Freedom Party and the People’s
Party even entered into coalitions together and maintained a six-year coalition at one point
(Gruber and Bale 2014).
Outside of the political realm, the Freedom Party had the support of Austria’s largest
newspaper, Kronen Zeitung. The paper defended Haider after he was removed from his post as
governor following pro-Nazi comments. Protests against Haider were concentrated in the Vienna
metropolitan area and did not have the same level of vitriol directed at the German Republicans;
because of these reasons, many young Austrians willingly joined the FPO and constituted a
continuous pipeline of young talent which the German Republicans did not enjoy (Art 2007).
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Part of the reasoning behind why neither the Social Democrats nor the Freedom Party
fully committed to a policy of shunning and shaming was due to the electoral landscape in the
country. The country operated in a two-party system. Depending on how well the Freedom Party
did in elections, it could serve as a kingmaker. The People’s Party was aware of this and openly
threatened to leave coalitions with the Social Democrats and join the Freedom Party in order to
extract concessions (Art 2007).
Table 4.16: Austrian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections
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Table 4.17: Austrian Party Placement During the 2017 Elections
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Data comes from the 2013 and 2017 elections and is presented on tables 4.16 and 4.17
respectively. While the discussion on the Social Democrats and the People’s Party noted that, at
least at one point, the two parties had moved close to the center (Rose 2000), the data from these
two elections shows that the two parties are the furthest away from one another. Overall, despite
only having five parties win seats in the Nationalrat in both the 2013 and 2017 elections, on the
left-right ideological spectrum the five parties are spread out.
The ethnocentric populism score in the 2013 data shows that the Freedom Party had the
highest score. However, it is in second place in the 2017 election. This was the result of the PILZ
List placing a strong emphasis on the anti-establishment portion of the ethnocentric populism
score and not so much emphasis on the ethnocentric portion. The Freedom Party remained as the
most prominent actor that emphasized both the ethnocentric and populist aspects of ethnocentric
populism. Despite maintaining a strong ethnocentric populism score in both time periods, the
Freedom Party increased its vote share between 2013 and 2017.
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Switzerland
Electoral System
Instead of the national-level constituency used in the Netherlands, or the purely single
member district preferred in the UK or France, seats are divided depending on the size of the
Canton. Because of the inequities in the size of populations, some Cantons are only given one
seat in the National Council. These seats function as single member plurality elections. Most
cantons, however, have a large enough population to be multi-member districts. The district
magnitude varies, but includes a maximum of 34 seats. In these multi-member districts, the seats
for the National Council are chosen using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota (Buhlmann et al. 2006).
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Not unlike the other Western European countries highlighted here, a major legacy of the
longstanding Grand Coalition system is a general apathy many Swiss felt towards the political
system (Rose 2000). The average Swiss citizen had become indifferent to the political process;
low rates of participation have become an extremely common in federal legislative elections and
the growth of single-issue protest parties such as the Automobile Party indicated that the patience
of Swiss electorate was wearing thin even as early as the 1980s. Apathy towards the existing
political class was strong in a 1992 referendum on entering the European Economic Area, with .
the Swiss electorate overwhelmingly rejecting the proposal (Lehmbruch 1993).
Like in Sweden, it is difficult to make a definitive statement regarding party attachment.
While the evidence from Sweden indicated that partisan attachments were being replaced by bloc
attachments (Hagevi 2015), the situation in Switzerland differs depending on the region. In the
French speaking part of the country, partisan attachment has remained high (Fatke 2014) and
closer ties with the European Union are seen more positively (Lehmbruch 1993). However, in
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the German speaking parts of the country, the situation is more in line with most of the other
Western European countries outlined here; there is overall lower partisan attachment (Fatke
2014).
Movement to Center
From the beginning of the Grand Coalition years through the 1970s, three of the four
grand coalition members, the Swiss People’s Party, the Free Democratic Party, and the Christian
Democratic People’s Party, had moved closer to the middle (Hug and Schulz 2007). While it
became easier for these parties to work together due to the shrinking of the ideological gap, the
lack of differentiation between the three major parties was a major point of contention among
members of the Swiss electorate. The gap on the right side of the flank (Gruber and Bale 2014)
allowed the Swiss People’s Party the opening to provide something different; the anti-immigrant
and anti-establishment message paid off in subsequent elections (Rose 2000).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Due to the country’s longstanding history of neutrality and isolation, hardline
immigration rhetoric found a home in many parts of Switzerland. However, there is a strong
divide between the two largest ethno-linguistic communities. French speakers, on average, are
more open towards the idea of immigration and European integration while German speakers are
more suspicious of both concepts. The 1992 referendum proposed Swiss entry into the European
Economic Area but was rejected because of opposition from the majority of ethnic Swiss
Germans (Lehmbruch 1993). A 2004 referendum called for granting citizenship to the children
of immigrants born in Switzerland and any grandchildren of immigrants to be granted citizenship
if they were born in the country. However, after fierce campaigning by the Swiss People’s Party,
the measure failed (Skenderovic 2007).
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The Grand Coalition understood the general suspicion towards immigration, especially in
the Swiss German parts of the country, and attempted to pass legislation that reflected this. In the
early 1990s, the Grand Coalition attempted to create a three-tiered immigration policy. For the
most part, migrants from EU member states would have been allowed to enter easily while there
were more restrictions in place for those hailing from “culturally near” and “other” countries.
This proposal, however, was closely defeated in a referendum (Afonso 2005). In 2006
amendments related to further immigration and asylum restrictions championed by the Swiss
People’s Party were also largely supported by the mainstream right Liberals and Christian
Democrats (Cranmer 2011). Overall, even in the pre-Migrant Crisis era, many segments of Swiss
society were strongly suspicious of immigration.
Table 4.18: Swiss Party Placement During the 2011 Elections
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Table 4.19: Swiss Party Placement During the 2015 Elections
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The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections and is presented in tables 4.18 and
4.19. What the 2011 and 2015 data show is that most of the parties, not just the members of the
Grand Coalition, are clustered around the center (Hug and Schulz 2007). In both years, one
party, the Swiss People’s Party, was further to the right on the left-right spectrum. The Swiss
People’s Party’s distinctly rightist stance on the left-right spectrum is the result of changes in the
party which occurred under the Blocher years. In the late 1990s and the 2000s, the Swiss
People’s Party led the charge against welfare expansion and did not favor more government
spending (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Due to the party’s strong desire to cut state
involvement in welfare programs and general aversion to government intervention, its left-right
economic placement further to the right is expected.
The ethnocentric populist placement of the Swiss People’s Party, among the most
prominent ethnocentric populist-style parties, is the highest in 2011 and just behind Geneva’s
Citizen Movement in 2015. Yet despite the Swiss People’s Party maintenance of a relatively
high ethnocentric populism score, it did not suffer in elections and instead increased its vote
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share. Just like in countries such as France, maintaining a comparatively high ethnocentric
populism score does not lead to less success at the polls.
Denmark
Electoral System
Denmark's parliament has 179 members, with the Faroe Islands and Greenland having
two seats each. Of the 175 who represent the Danish mainland, 135 of these individuals are
elected in 17 multi-member districts through proportional representation (Elklit 1993; Lundell
2008). The remaining 40 seats depend on how many votes each of the parties won at the national
level (Lundell 2008). The country uses a low two percent threshold for seats in the parliament
(Harmel and Svasand 1997; Lundell 2008) which helps smaller parties.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Two events may have played a role in the disillusionment of the Danish electorate. Anger
directed at the establishment started to grow as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s when
successive Danish governments increased the tax rate to expand the welfare state. Some voters
did not approve of the old guard implementing these changes and voted for the Progress Party in
1973 (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990). The distrust of those in power continued in the years that
followed (Bergh 2004). Anger directed at the system did not end with issues related to the
welfare state and taxation; with the rise in the number of immigrants at end of the twentieth
century, some members of the electorate felt that the existing asylum-seeking system was being
abused by the newcomers (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003).
The upheaval of the party system in the 1960s in which new parties were introduced to
the system may have also played a role in the lower party identification of the Danish electorate
in comparison to most of their Western European counterparts (Borre and Katz 1973). By the last
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years of the twentieth century, the country witnessed a general weakening of party attachment,
but this effect was particularly strong among the young (Andersen 1986; Christiansen and
Togeby 2006). Those years also saw a decline in party membership along with actual
participation in party events/meetings (Togeby 1992).
Movement to Center
While the Danish system in the earlier years of the twentieth century was home to a large
Socialist contingent alongside bourgeois-backed parties, by the 1970s, the left moved closer to
the center. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the leftist Social Democratic-Liberal Party coalition
instituted welfare cuts, advocated for privatization, and overall moved closer to the right on
economic issues (Andersen 1986; Harmel and Svasand 1997). This is a pattern seen in many of
the other countries examined previously; left-wing parties, particularly during the 1970s and
1980s, started to move towards the center leaving a vacuum on the left.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
In the early 1980s, the question of immigration was a topic more frequently debated in
the public sphere. However, after the passage of a law restricting migration in the mid-1980s, it
disappeared from public discourse for a few years (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). In the
1990s, with growing numbers of immigrants entering the country, the topic of immigration
reappeared and would remain as a point of contention over the long term. By 2001, it was
arguably the most important issue in the country (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008) due to
the 9/11 attacks (Hellstrom and Hervik 2013). The Danish People’s Party had already made antiimmigration rhetoric a central part of the platform, but with the changing political climate, the
Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Democrats advocated further restrictions on immigrants (Bay
et al. 2013; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). The question of immigration’s place in Danish
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society was an important focal point; open debate characterizing Islam and Muslims as a danger
had become a prominent part of Danish society (Hellstrom and Hervik 2014). Taking advantage
of an environment where hardline immigration policies became more accepted, the Danish
People’s Party negotiated stronger border controls in exchange for supporting an early retirement
plan in the early 2010s (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012).
Table 4.20: Danish Party Placement During the 2011 Elections
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Table 4.21: Danish Party Placement During the 2015 Elections
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Note: The Conservatives and Socialist People’s Party are almost on top of one another.
The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections with placement positioning shown on
tables 4.19 and 4.20 respectively. Between 2011 and 2015, the relative placement of parties
changes due to their ethnocentric populism scores. The Danish People’s Party, the country’s
prime ethnocentric populism party, remains near the top in terms of ethnocentric populism.
There is no evidence of the party moderating its stance between 2011 and 2015, yet the party
increased its vote shares in 2015. In both time periods, it appears that several parties, such as
Venstre in 2015, have scores close to the Danish People’s Party. The hardline stances of the
Danish People’s Party were not unique in either 2011 and 2015.
The Four Countries Where Support Declined
The previous nine countries saw a rise in support for ethnocentric populist actors. For the
next four Western European countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway, ethnocentric
populist actors witnessed a decline in electoral support. Before moving towards discussing the
United States, this subsection examines whether there are any important differences between
these four countries and the nine that saw an increase in support.
Belgium
Electoral System
Belgium has a proportional representation system with a five percent threshold in which
voters can choose individual candidates or a list running in multi-member districts (De Vet et al.
2019; Hooghe 2012) Belgium’s system, at least in regards to its electoral threshold, is less
forgiving to smaller parties than other countries in this study. However, Belgian elections are
divided into three different elections: One election takes place in Flanders, one in Wallonia, and
one in the capital Brussels (Hooghe 2012). If a small party focuses its resources and gains
enough votes in one of the regions, it could win seats.
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Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Anger at the mainstream increased in the 1990s when Belgium suffered from several
corruption cases involving policing and food quality control (Swenden et al. 2006).
Disillusionment also increased following the inability of the Christian Democrats, Liberals, and
Socialists to negotiate a coalitional government in 2007 (Hooghe 2012). This event caused
Belgians, especially, those in the Flemish portion of the country, to abandon the existing parties
and throw support behind outsiders such as Populist List Dedecker, Flemish Interest, and
Flemish Alliance (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018).
Like many other Western European countries, Belgium’s political parties during the midcentury enjoyed strong support and loyalty from the general population (Selle and Svasand
1991). Following a wider trend across Western Europe, party attachment has fallen
(Dassonneville and Stiers 2018). However, Belgium maintains one of the highest levels of party
attachment in the region. The reason behind this may be that the country is home to parties, for
example, both a Flemish and French Christian Democratic Party, that cut cross different
cleavages. For example, the French-speaking Christian Democratic Party can satisfy a
supporter’s ideological needs while also helping the voter feel that his/her ethno-linguistic
identity is being represented. The ability of parties to form intimate links between individual
voters and the party on many different levels may have helped preserve partisanship in the
country (Huber et al. 2005).
Movement to Center
A major point of contention regarding welfare policy in Belgium is the income inequality
between wealthier Flanders and poorer Wallonia. Because of this economic disparity, financial
transfers between Flanders and Wallonia are a point of contention (Cantillon et al. 2006). On the
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question of social security, cuts have been instituted, just like in other Western European
countries (Hemerijck and Unger 2000). While the more right-leaning Christian Democrats and
Liberals advocated for cuts to the welfare system in response to economic issues in the 1980s
(Kuipers 2006), the Socialist Party did not call for the wholesale welfare cuts seen in other parts
of Western Europe. While the party has recognized that increasing the size of the welfare state
was not a tenable prospect, it also fully attempted to defend existing benefits (Delwitt 1999) and
did not move towards the center as many left-leaning parties have in other parts of Western
Europe. In other words, Belgium did not have a situation where the main left-wing options
abandoned its traditional economic position; there was no wholesale movement to the center.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
While the Belgian government first instituted changes in immigration policy in the 1970s
when it took steps to curb immigration, the topic did not become a sustained point of contention
until later (Martiniello 2003). Ethnonationalist appeals, predominately to the Flemish half of the
country, have been the norm in the Belgium system before the Migrant Crisis (Hooghe 2012),
but hardline immigration rhetoric led to shunning and shaming in the pre-Migrant Crisis time
period (Pauwels 2011). In the 1990s, for example, the Flemish Interest's calls for a separate
social security system for immigrants and forced repatriation led to it being shut out of any
potential governing coalition (Adam and Deschouwer 2016; Erk 2005).
Perhaps with the realization that maintaining an extreme position was untenable, internal
changes occurred within the ethnocentric populist-style parties. The Flemish Interest wanted to
restrict naturalization and opposed accepting asylum seekers. However, while the Flemish
Interest has focused on nationalist appeals, portrayed itself as a defender of Flanders, and
maintained a hardline stance on immigration, it has also avoided making racially/culturally
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antagonistic comments (Adam and Deschouwer 2016). The Flemish Alliance would follow the
Flemish Interest and tone down its rhetoric for 2014 elections (Baudewyns et al. 2015).
Table 4.22: Belgian Party Placement During the 2010 Elections*
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Table 4.23: Belgian Party Placement During the 2014 Elections*
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Note: The Flemish Socialist Party and Socialist Party are almost on top of each other.
The party placement results come from the 2010 and the 2014 elections with data
presented in tables 4.21 and 4.22 respectively. Regarding the left-right spectrum, the Flemish
Interest is placed a bit left of center, but several parties that explicitly cater to the Flemish
population, such as the Flemish Alliance and Christian Democratic and Flemish, are placed to
the right of center. As the French speaking part of the country has traditionally benefitted from
welfare transfers and has fought to maintain existing welfare policies (de Jonge 2020), the
Flemish parties being placed closer to the right is in line with expectations. In addition,
compared to results from 2010, a major difference between the two time periods is that the
parties are a bit more spread out in 2014 with the Flemish parties further to the right. This result
may indicate that the distance between parties that explicitly cater to Flemish Belgians and
parties that do not has grown wider.
Vlaams Belang, or Flemish Interest, has the highest ethnocentric populism score. It is
followed by the New Flemish Alliance which also adopted ethnonationalist language used by
Flemish Interest. As many of the parties that cater to Flemish Belgians are more likely to make
ethnocentric appeals (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018), they should be expected to have higher
ethnocentric populism scores. Despite the observations by scholars that the Flemish Interest and
Flemish Alliance has toned down their anti-immigration rhetoric (Adam and Deschouwer 2015;
Baudewyns et al. 2015), the two parties still maintain the highest ethnocentric populism scores.
While one could argue that their higher ethnocentric populism scores are a detriment to
potential electoral success, placement analysis in other countries, such as the results from France,
indicated that higher scores do not always dampen electoral support; the National Front in France
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had the highest score in both the pre and post-Migrant Crisis time period yet enjoyed stronger
electoral support in the post-Migrant Crisis election.
Finland
Electoral System
Finland started to use a proportional representation system in 1906 and was the second to
adopt such a system after Belgium. The Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) has 200 members who
are elected in 15 multi-member districts. Seats are allocated using the d’Hondt method with no
electoral threshold (Lundell 2008; Raunio 2005). This system appears to be more forgiving to a
smaller party attempting to gain seats.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
The collapse of the Finnish telecommunication giant Nokia was a source of great shock
to many Finns. The inability of the elites to prevent societal-level changes such as Nokia’s
collapse did not go unnoticed by many Finns who looked for an alternative in a party like the
True Finns (Arter 2015). This event, along with growing anger and resentment towards rapid
changes to Finnish society through increased immigration (Patana 2020), created an environment
that could be helpful to an ethnocentric populist challenger like the True Finns.
Consistent with changes in other parts of the region, party loyalty has declined in the
country; in the 1970s about 80 percent of respondents stated that they voted for the same party in
the previous election, but this decreased to about 65 percent in the 1990s (Paloheimo 2003). Just
like growing disillusionment, decreases in party attachment also helps create an environment that
is more friendly to a smaller ethnocentric populist challenger.
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Movement to Center
While the movement towards the center by left parties was a trend in many Western
European countries, the movement towards the center in Finland was at least partly the result of
the longstanding three-party system. The three parties, the Conservatives, Agrarians, and the
Socialists, all attempted to capture the middle and the ideological differences between the main
parties have become smaller over time. This trend has also led to a more personalized system
(Paloheimo 2003). By the early days of the new millennium, all three major parties had become
center parties (Green-Pedersen 2004).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
True Finns are a newer party founded in 1995 and did not adopt hardline immigration
rhetoric until the twenty-first century. The party’s lack of hardline immigration rhetoric,
combined with operating in a consensus-centered political culture where shunning and shaming
were not implemented, created an environment in which immigration was not salient in national
level politics during the early twenty-first century. As late as the 2011 election, the Social
Democrats did not mention immigration and mainstream right parties only noted the need for
immigrants to maintain the economy. Even as recently as the 2011 elections, the True Finns did
not put out an “explicitly anti-immigration position.” While the party noted its stance against
asylum seekers and family reunifications, it also noted that the state should offer immigrants help
to integrate into society (Kuisma and Nygard 2017).
The political environment changed by the beginning of the 2015 election. At that time,
the True Finns decided to make immigration a more central part of their manifesto (Kuisma and
Nygard 2017). Jussi Halla-aho, a True Finns MP, argued that Muslims were invading Europe and
were a danger to the West. Yet despite a slight drop in vote shares during the 2015 election, the
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anti-immigration wing of the party consolidated its hold on the party with MP Olli Immonen, in
June 2015, attending a meeting with neo-Nazis (Wahlbeck 2016).
Table 4.24: Finnish Party Placement During the 2011 Elections*
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Table 4.25: Finnish Party Placement During the 2015 Elections
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The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections with positioning in tables 4.23 and
4.24, respectively. The ethnocentric populism scores indicate that the True Finns have the
highest score as anticipated. The Christian Democrats are in second place in both elections. The
Christian Democrat’s placement follows a trend seen in other countries where mainstream right
parties tend to have high ethnocentric populism scores. In addition, like in most of the other
countries highlighted here, left-leaning parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Finland
and the Left Alliance have the lowest ethnocentric populism scores.
On the left-right spectrum, the True Finns are situated to the left of center and cannot be
considered a right-wing populist party. Other parties also appear to have moved rightward
between 2011 and 2015. While most of the parties were silent regarding the question of
immigration (Kuisma and Nygard 2017), they may have moved towards the right on questions
regarding welfare and redistribution with the increase in numbers of migrants before and during
the 2015 election.
Greece
Electoral System
The country uses a proportional representation system with a three percent threshold
(Gemenis 2009; Karamichas 2008). While the majority of the unicameral legislature’s deputies,
282 out of 300, are elected using multi-member electoral districts with party lists, 12 seats are
decided by the number of votes a party wins nationally. An additional six seats are elected using
first-past-the post (Kazamias and Papadimitrious 2002). Overall, the Greek electoral system is
somewhat forgiving to smaller parties due to its three percent threshold and multi-member
districts.
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Disillusionment and Party Attachment
Anger and disillusionment, like in Finland, increased following an economic shock to the
system. At the outset of the Eurozone Crisis, the implementation of austerity measures greatly
angered segments of the Greek population (Markou 2017). While membership and attachment to
both PASOK and ND increased between the fall of the dictatorship and the beginning of the
crisis, (Afonso et al. 2015), the Eurozone Crisis broke these links. In the 1980s, about two-thirds
of Greeks aged 18-30 stated that they felt attached to a party; this number plummeted to 21.8
percent by 2010. The percentage of older Greeks who felt attachment also decreased from over
70 percent in the 1980s to under 40 percent by 2010 (Lisi 2015). Overall, with lowering levels of
partisanship combined with anger on the rise due to austerity measures (Markou 2017), an
environment very favorable to outsider populist actors was created.
Movement to Center
When Greek politics was dominated by a nominally left and right party before the
Eurozone Crisis, the two maintained similar economic practices; both relied heavily on clientelist
practices and maintained strong relations with unions (Afonso et al. 2015). Economically, prior
to the Great Recession, Greece had enjoyed decades of consistent economic growth (Afonso et
al. 2015) and never implemented serious privatization policies through the end of the twentieth
century (Featherstone and Papdimitriou 2008). While in most other Western European countries
left-leaning parties moved closer to the center by adopting neoliberal economic policies, both
PASOK and ND decided to spend more money by increasing welfare payouts and expanding the
civil service (Fouskas 2013). The actions of the two parties indicate that both were on the left
side of the ideological spectrum.
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The Eurozone crisis forced the left-wing PASOK to implement wide-ranging changes
that cut social welfare programs. This gave newcomers and smaller parties such as the left-wing
populist SYRIZA a chance to fill a power vacuum (Aslanidis 2016). Under PASOK prime
minister George Papandreou, welfare spending was cut, and taxes increased, to help make up for
shortfalls (Afonso et al. 2015; Zartaloudis 2014). New Democracy, despite being billed as a
conventional right party, opposed austerity and fiercely criticized the PASOK-led government’s
time in leadership (Afonso et al. 2015). The two parties effectively switched sides, with the
nominally right ND taking up leftist talking points and PASOK implementing right-leaning
policies. Unlike some of the other changes that occurred in Greece, the conventional parties in
Greece did not move towards the center.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Soon after immigration increased in the early 1990s, public discourse was marked by
hostility. A Law for Aliens passed in 1991 with the justification that migrants could be
dangerous to the country’s welfare. Minister of Public Order Stelios Papathemelis in 1993 called
out Albanians as criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010; Karydis 1996) with his successor in
1995, Sifis Valirakis, also calling out aliens for criminality (Karydis 1996). The Greek media
followed a similar tone and covered migrants as criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). Despite
attempts at backtracking some of the harsher rhetoric (Dimitras 1999; Karyotis and Patrikios
2010), the tone had already been set in 1990s that it was acceptable to portray migrants as
criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010).
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Table 4.26: Greek Party Placement During the 2012 Elections
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Table 4.27: Greek Party Placement During the 2015 Elections
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The results of the 2012 and January 2015 elections are presented above in tables 4.25 and
4.26. The most notable finding is that the Communist Party is ahead of Golden Dawn, as shown
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in 2012 elections, or just below the Golden Dawn in the 2015 elections. This is primarily the
result of the Communist Party investing much of their manifesto in anti-establishment rhetoric
but not dedicating the manifesto to ethnocentrism. Golden Dawn, however, has the highest score
in the 2015 election. New Democracy, one of the old guard parties, appears to have moved closer
to adopting ethnocentric populist-style language between 2012 and 2015; considering the success
of such rhetoric following the Eurozone Crisis, it may have been an act of self-preservation.
PASOK appears to remain steadfast in avoiding ethnocentric populist language.
On the left-right scale, Golden Dawn remains closer to the left side of the spectrum and
does not merit inclusion as a right-wing populist. The Independent Greeks, however, are on the
right side of the spectrum. Most of the parties are clustered together on the left-right scale with
the occasional party much further to the right. Considering the unpopularity of austerity
measures during this time period, the parties clustering together closer to the left is within
expectations.
Norway
Electoral System
Norway uses a proportional representation system in which the parliament’s 169
members are selected through two different methods. Most of the legislators (150) are chosen in
19 multi-member districts and the rest are selected in a national at-large system that divides the
seats depending on the percentage of the national vote received by a given party. The electoral
threshold is four percent (Lundell 2008). Representatives are selected for four-year fixed terms,
forcing parties to cooperate as there is no way to call early elections (Harmel and Svasand 1997).
The existence of multi-member districts is helpful to smaller parties, but the somewhat higher
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electoral threshold compared to other countries such as the Netherlands may be detrimental to
smaller challengers.
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Norwegian government raised the tax rate to
increase the size of the welfare state. Voters were not happy with this decision (Andersen and
Bjorklund 1990). Further spurring alienation among the general population was a major
recession in the 1980s that increased the country’s unemployment rate to Great Depression
levels. During this time period, confidence in the government dropped by over 20 percent
(Bjorklund 1992). Particularly among those who supported the Socialist Left and the Progress
Party, there was a growing disdain of elites during this time period (Bergh 2004).
Sample data from 1957 indicated that Norway, like the United States and other Western
democracies, was home to high partisan attachment. Part of the reason behind strong attachments
was the strong class identification with parties; for example, working class Norwegians felt
strong attachment to left-leaning parties such as Labour (Campbell and Valen 1961). However,
even as early as the 1970s, party attachments started to decrease as the traditional class-based
cleavages started to decline in importance (Hansen 1982). While party attachment and
membership was still higher than most other Western European countries (Heidar and Saglie
2003; Mair and Biezen 2001), aggregate membership and identification dropped at the beginning
of the twenty-first century (Heidar and Saglie 2003; Jenssen 1999). The decrease in partisan
attachment was particularly noticeable among those who supported the Agrarians (Selle and
Svasand 1991). Overall, it appears that Norway also witnessed the growth in disillusionment and
a decrease in party attachment seen elsewhere in Western Europe.
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Movement to Center
The Socialist Left, which espoused Marxist ideas of class struggle early in its history,
abandoned it in favor of more moderate economic policies by the 1970s and 1980s (Allern and
Aylott 2009). Like many of its Western European counterparts the Labour Party moved
rightward on a number of different issues such as taxation, regulation, and state ownership
(Harmel and Svasand 1997). Labour also talked about the need for individual responsibility in
tackling poverty. Notably, the Socialist Left Party did not offer any public opposition to this
statement (Allern et al. 2013). Echoing the movement in many Western European countries,
other parties such as the Liberals, Centre Party, Christian People’s Party, New Liberal Party
(Bjorklund 1992), and the Progress Party (Bjerkem 2016; De Lange 2007) started to make their
way to the center of the ideological spectrum.
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
Overall, Norway differs from many other Western European countries as the immigration
question has not become as salient as in other countries (Bay et al. 2013). Restrictions on
immigration occurred quickly and was even initially implemented by a leftist government; in
1975, the Labour-led government passed legislation that limited immigration to the country (Bay
et al. 2013; Fangen and Vaage 2018). This event created a culture where discussing immigration
caps was acceptable (Brochmann 2008).
The Progress Party has also not faced a cordon sanitaire (Gudbrandsen 2010). This
decision may have convinced the Progress Party to maintain a more moderate platform (Bjerkem
2016; Hagelund 2002); the party even voluntarily opted to tone down rhetoric targeting Muslims
(Fangen and Vaage 2018).
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Table 4.28: Norwegian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections
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Table 4.29: Norwegian Party Placement During the 2017 Elections*
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Note: The Green Party and Christian Democratic Party labels are almost on top of one another.
The party placement data comes from 2013 and 2017 elections and is shown on tables
4.27 and 4.28, respectively. The Progress Party in both the 2013 and 2017 elections has the
highest ethnocentric populism score and is followed by the Conservative Party. This is a trend
that has been seen in other Western European countries; the ethnocentric populist party is
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followed by a mainstream right party. In addition, just like in most other countries examined
here, more left-leaning parties such as the Socialist Left Party are near the bottom of the list.
On the left-right spectrum, the Progress Party is much further to the right than most other
parties shown here. Considering the party’s origins as an anti-tax protest party (Allern 2012;
Fangen and Vaage 2018), its placement far away from most of the other parties is not surprising.
The Progress Party’s comparatively more conservative placement on the left-right scale puts it
closer to other ethnocentric populist parties such as the Swiss People’s Party. Overall, the
placement of ethnocentric populists across the left-right spectrum indicates that there is very
little relationship between left-right spectrum placement and a party’s ethnocentric populism
score.
United States
Electoral System
For the House of Representatives and the Senate, the United States predominantly uses a
first-past-the-post system (Aldrich and Lee 2016) and single member districts (Welch and
Studlar 1990). Such a system often leads to a two-party system and is overall not friendly to
smaller parties (Cox 1997; Duverger 1964; Lijphart 1984; Riker 1982). However, there are a few
places in the country, mostly Southern states, which employ a runoff system for the top two
candidates if no individual is able to earn a majority of the votes (Engstrom and Engstrom 2008).
Disillusionment and Party Attachment
The issue of declining party attachment and identification has been a prominent feature of
American politics. Attachments to the major parties continuously eroded since the end at least
the 1960s (Abramson 1976). This has occurred concurrently with a decline in trust for political
parties (Wattenberg 1981).
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Overall, by the eve of the Trump Presidency, the United States witnessed a trend in
which respondents, on average, had become increasingly mistrustful of the government and
mainstream politicians (Judis 2016). One of the first major shocks to public perceptions was the
Watergate Scandal in which investigators found that President Richard Nixon spied on the
Democratic Party. While there were increases in trust, such as during the first Ronald Reagan
administration in the early 1980s (Miller and Listhaug 1990), overall trust in government, and
especially Congress, has trended downward (Dennis and Owen 2001). In addition, more
Americans have come to the conclusion that special interests have a disproportionate say in the
government (Hetherington 1998).
Movement to Center
While George Wallace’s statement that there is “not a dime’s worth of difference”
between the Democratic and Republican Parties was uttered in the Civil Rights era (Shipan and
Lowry 2001), there is evidence that polarization emerged soon after Wallace’s statement. Instead
of moving closer to one another to capture the center, the two parties began to move away from
one another (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). For example, the Republican and Democratic parties
have moved away from one another in environmental policy; Democrats have become friendlier
towards the idea of passing stricter laws meant to protect the environment while Republicans
have more likely to be suspicious of the idea (Shipan and Lowry 2001). In other words,
polarization, especially among political elites, has become more salient in American politics
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance
While Trump’s hardline statements regarding immigration, including calls for a ban on
Muslim immigration, came as a shock to many Americans (Judis 2016; Montgomery 2017), his
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hardline immigration rhetoric was not new in the context of American politics. Rather, just like
in the Western European countries detailed in this section, American political culture had already
started to shift in a direction which allowed hardline immigration rhetoric to be more readily
accepted.
Decades before the rise of Trump, during a 1994 race to win re-election as governor, Pete
Wilson championed a proposal, Proposition 1987, designed to deny social services to
undocumented migrants (Diamond 1996). While running for the Republican nomination for
president in both 1992 and 1996, Patrick Buchanan made opposition to illegal migration a
cornerstone of his campaign (Diamond 1996) and argued for the creation of a fence along the
border with Mexico to curb migration (Dowd 1992; Judis 2016).
While Buchanan failed to win the nomination, the issue of illegal migration continued to
increase in salience. In the 2006 and 2008 primary campaigns, Republican candidates used the
term “illegal” while the Democratic candidates preferred the word “undocumented.”
Congressman Tom Tancredo, who briefly ran for president on the Republican side in 2008,
focused his campaign on arguing that illegal migration was a danger to the country. Democratic
candidates attempted to skirt the issue or advocated something akin to a pathway to legalization
(Knoll et al. 2011).
The rise of Donald Trump in the United States in many ways mirrors Jorg Haider in
Austria and Christoph Blocher in Switzerland. The Republican Party, Freedom Party, and Swiss
People’s Party were large parties that already had a built-in base of electoral support thanks to
many years of operation. These parties were not ethnocentric populist in their early years and did
not utilize hardline immigration rhetoric before their takeovers. The ability of one person and a
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group of supporters to take over a party is amplified in the United States because of the primary
system which allows outsiders to challenge and potentially win presidential primaries.
Table 4.30: American Party Placement During the 2012 Elections
American Parties (2012 Elections)

-.4

-.2

0

.2

.4

Ethnocentric Populism Scores

.6

Republican Party

Democratic Party

-.5

-.4

-.3

-.2
-.1
Left-Right Spectrum

0

Table 4.31: American Party Placement During the 2016 Elections
American Parties (2016 Elections)

0
-.2
-.4

Democratic Party

-.6

Ethnocentric Populism Score

.2

Republican Party

-.8

-.6

-.4

-.2
0
Left-Right Spectrum

.2

The data for the two American parties comes from the 2012 and 2016 presidential
elections. Because the United States is outside of Western Europe, the two major parties, the
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Democratic and Republican Party, were not part of the in-region adjustment. Instead, the
unadjusted ethnocentric populism scores are used. In the 2012 election, the Republican Party has
a left-right score is slightly to the left. This placement goes against conventional wisdom which
considers the Republican Party to be a mainstream right party (Hawley 2017). However, during
the 2012 Election cycle, the Republican Party’s nominee was former Massachusetts governor
Mitt Romney. Romney was criticized as a moderate during the Republican primary cycle due to
his pro-gay and pro-choice stances and was particularly hit hard for his role in creating a
universal health care system for the state of Massachusetts (Jacobson 2013). As the Republican
nominee was moderate, the party’s placement slightly to the left reflects Romney political
alignment.
The Republican Party’s ethnocentric populism score, however, has changed markedly
between the 2012 and 2016 election. In the 2012 election, the ethnocentric populism score was a
little over 0.6. Considering the more moderate stances of candidate Mitt Romney (Jacobson
2013), a corresponding action that matches the party’s leader is deemphasizing stances that
increase an ethnocentric populism score. However, the data demonstrates that during the 2016
election, the party deemphasized ethnocentric populist-style ideas. Nevertheless, during both the
2012 and 2016 elections, the Republican Party had a higher ethnocentric populism score. The
comparatively high ethnocentric populism score compared to the Democratic Party did not harm
the party in key swing states in the 2016 election.
Conclusion
This chapter had two major objectives: Creating list of ethnocentric populist and rightwing populist parties while also providing party placement analysis. To do this, the Manifesto
Project, mentioned in the research design, was used to create both ethnocentric populist and left-

179

right scores. This was used to create a list of ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist
parties
One of the larger takeaways from the party placement analysis was that having high
ethnocentric populism scores did not prevent a party from doing well in elections. For example,
the French National Front maintained the highest ethnocentric populism score in both the 2012
and 2017 elections and increased its vote share. However, this analysis does not answer whether
these parties will be able to maintain their increased vote shares. More research is needed to
answer this question.
One of the findings from chapter four was the large swings in the ethnocentric populism
scores of a few parties. For example, the Centre Party in Sweden had a much higher ethnocentric
populism score in the 2014 election cycle. A similar effect can be seen with the Conservatives in
Denmark between 2011 and 2015. These swings may be supported by research indicating that
large shifts are not uncommon; rather, some mainstream conservative right parties, having felt
pressure from ethnocentric populists, adapted their strategies and policies (Bale 2003).
At times, ethnocentric populist parties managed to put strong pressure on mainstream
conservative parties to adopt ethnocentric populist positions. In the 2000s, the Conservative
Party in the United Kingdom opted to no longer treat Euroskepticism as a priority. This action
meant that questions about the UK's membership in the European Union were placed on hold.
This decision allowed the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) to adopt Euroskeptic
positions and UKIP successfully forced the Conservative Party to restart discussions on leaving
the European Union (Bale 2018). Ultimately, some members of the Conservative Party even
opted to leave and join UKIP (Webb and Bale 2014). Eventually, pressure became great enough
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that the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron promised a referendum on the question of
whether the United Kingdom should remain a part of the European Union (Bale 2018).
Decisions to adopt some of the policies and positions of ethnocentric populists are not
necessarily permanent. The Austrian People’s Party had been competing against the Freedom
Party since the 1980s. Struggling to defeat the Freedom Party, the People’s Party has at times
completely ignored its electoral counterpart while at other times it has adopted some of its
policies and positions such as restricting immigration (Gruber and Bale 2014). Ultimately, the
People’s Party’s decisions were rooted in whatever happened to be most electorally
advantageous in each time period.
Overall, there is some evidence indicating that some mainstream right parties have
become “contaminated” by ethnocentric populist thought and policies (Eatwell 2000). Like a
virus spreading itself across different hosts, the proximity of the mainstream right to these actors,
especially among those who have decided to form coalitions with ethnocentric populists (Bale
2003; Eatwell 2000; Gruber and Bale 2014), has put pressure on the mainstream right to move
closer to parties that they once considered to be pariahs (Gruber and Bale 2014). While it
remains to be seen whether there will be a permanent shift in which mainstream right parties
effectively meld with ethnocentric populists, examples of large shifts have occurred in the 2000s
and 2010s.
This chapter also serves as a major building block for the next two analytical chapters.
Using Manifesto Project data, a list of parties that met the criteria to be considered ethnocentric
populist was created in this chapter. This list will be useful for the analytical chapters as it allows
for the coding of an ethnocentric populist dependent variable.
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Chapter 5: Western Europe Analysis
Introduction
The main purpose of chapter five is to answer what explains support for ethnocentric
populists among those who voted for these parties in countries that saw a downturn in support
and among those in countries that saw an increase in support. It also addresses a second question:
What factors differentiate support for right-wing populists and more general ethnocentric
populists? Conceptually, right-wing populists differ from more general ethnocentric populists
because of their economic stances. Does this mean that there is a link between an individual’s
economic stances and their desire to vote for a right-wing populist party? If so, does a
relationship exist for both the adjusted and unadjusted list of right-wing populist parties? An
implicit assumption of these questions is that supporters of one type of party should differ from
supporters of another and that differences between supporters may not be constant over time.
To help better understand what might be driving support, the analysis is divided between
two components: Difference of means tests and logistic regression analysis. Difference of means
tests compare two different subsets: Ethnocentric populist supporters and non-ethnocentric
populist supporters along with right-wing populists and general ethnocentric populists. The
purpose of these tests is to see if there are differences in average scores given by supporters and
if changes occurred in the Migrant Crisis time period. Logistic regression analyses in which
support for ethnocentric populist parties and support for right-wing populists (adjusted data)
serve as the dependent variables complete the analysis.
Preliminary Examination of Populist Data in Western Europe
The process starts by finalizing a list of ethnocentric populist parties from the countries
under study. Chapter four generated a list of parties from the eight Western European countries
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selected to be a part of the analysis called radical right, extreme right, extreme radical right,
populist right, or right-wing populist.
The next task is to calculate electoral performance and determine the time period that
should be covered. The previous chapter argued the importance of the lower house in these
countries and in this preliminary analysis, the most important variable is the percentage of votes
earned in each national legislative election. Instead of examining the vote shares of each party
separately, the analysis presented here adds the vote share of all ethnocentric populist-style
parties that competed in a given election within a country.
While the 2014-2015 time period is the most critical part of this analysis and needs to be
included, the question of when to start the analysis remains. The analysis could go back many
decades as some ethnocentric populist parties such as the National Front/Rally have existed since
the 1970s (Judis 2016). However, most of the research examined in the last chapter were written
in the twenty-first century and list parties that have become active since the 1990s. Because of
this, the analysis begins in 2000 because the list of peer-reviewed works comes from the twentyfirst century.
In addition, there are also several national electoral differences that affect the
calculations. While voting in places such as the United Kingdom is straightforward, with a voter
selecting a party-affiliated candidate in a constituency, other electoral systems create challenges.
France uses a two-round voting system in which the top two candidates that receive the most
votes advance to a runoff. If a party received votes in both rounds, the vote shares of both the
first round and second round are combined and then divided by two. Germany gives each citizen
two votes. Each voter is allowed to cast a vote for district race and one vote for a party list.
Because this analysis is more interested in party vote shares, the percentage of the party list vote
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share earned is recorded as the German vote share. Greece had situations in both 2012 and 2015
where two elections took place. If a party received votes in both elections, the percentage of
votes received was added and divided by two.
Table 5.1: Ethnocentric Populist Vote Percentage, 2001-2019
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Table 5.1 is a line graph which represents the percentage of votes won by the list of
previously mentioned parties considered to be radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist
in table 4.1. It covers 2001-2019 with a reference line put in the year 2014 as it is the start of the
Migrant Crisis in Europe. Examining all thirteen Western European countries in tandem, a
complicated picture emerges. Starting in the early 2000s and through the beginning of the
Migrant Crisis, ethnocentric populist-style parties enjoyed varied success. Austrian, Belgian,
Italian, Norwegian, Swiss ethnocentric populist-style parties surged in support in the years before
the Migrant Crisis. In most of the other countries, ethnocentric populist-style parties struggled in
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these elections, with vote shares less than ten percent for much of the pre-Migrant Crisis time
period. German, French, and British ethnocentric populists failed to capture even ten percent of
the vote for most of the pre-Migrant Crisis time period. Italian ethnocentric populist parties,
while enjoying success earlier in the new century, struggled with a vote share dip in the late
2000s.
Examining the trends before and after 2014, nine of the countries, Belgium, Finland,
Greece, and Norway witnessed a dip in support taking place in the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis.
In the other nine, ethnocentric populists increased support after the beginning of the Crisis, with
the exception of Austria. Austria’s overall decrease in support may be attributed to the dissolving
of a second ethnocentric populist party called Team Stronach just before the beginning of the
2017 election. However, the other major ethnocentric populist in the country, the Freedom Party,
increased its vote share (Bodlos and Plescia 2018). Overall, the data indicates that while some
countries experienced a surge during and shortly after the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, the
data suggests that this rise in support was not a permanent feature of the electoral system.
While most of these countries saw a rise in support for ethnocentric populists in the first
election taking place after the start of the Migrant Crisis, there is variation among countries that
held multiple elections following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. The United Kingdom had
two elections after 2015 and each time, the collective vote shares of ethnocentric populists went
down.
While the UK experienced a significant downturn in support following the end of the
Migrant Crisis, Swiss ethnocentric populists did not endure as disastrous of a result. While they
lost a part of their 2015 vote share, they held on to 28 percent of the overall vote. The Sweden
Democrats, on the other hand, avoided this trend. Between the 2014 election, which took place in
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the earliest days of the Migrant Crisis, and the 2018 election, vote shares for the Sweden
Democrats increased.
The existence of a spike merits investigation. Vote share data that indicates a rise in
support begs the question of what was driving support for these actors? Were the reasons behind
support in the post-2014 time period markedly different from reasons behind voting for these
same actors before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis? Attempting to answer potential
differences in temporal variation is a major task of this analytical chapter.
Connecting the Theoretical Framework to the ESS Variables
While ideally variables would be chosen strictly based on their ability to serve as good
indicators, an additional consideration is having as many of the respondents be a part of the
analysis as possible. Unfortunately, respondents skip questions. Sometimes, when two variables
both served as good indicators, the one that had more respondents is used. In addition, because
the ESS has had nine different iterations through 2018, several questions have only been used a
few times instead of all nine iterations. To increase the number of respondents for the analysis
while also seeking to examine temporal variations, only questions that were available for all nine
different iterations were used in the final analysis.
Status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias are the three most important
components of the theory. Status threat’s main argument is that individuals who hail from a
dominant group will start to feel displaced in a situation where large numbers of newcomers
enter. The large number of newcomers could threaten the social and political power of the once
dominant group (Morgan 2018). In the ESS, a question on whether a country’s cultural life is
undermined or enriched by immigrants, with the possible answers ranging from cultural life
undermined (0) through cultural life enriched (10), could serve as a good indicator for status
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threat. The question directly discusses the potential of a dominant group’s nexus of power,
cultural life, being undermined by newcomers.
For a variable on ingroup salience, one question asks respondents whether it is important
to follow traditions and customs. The potential responses include Very much like me (1), Like
me (2), Somewhat like me (3), A little like me (4), Not like me (5), and Not like me at all (6).
The logic behind ingroup salience is that an individual feels solidarity with those who are
similar. As traditions and customs are shared by individuals of an ingroup, those who feel higher
ingroup salience should answer that traditions and customs are of importance to them.
To measure outgroup salience, the ESS has a question which asks individuals whether
they would allow many or few immigrants of a different race or ethnic group from the majority
to enter the country. The potential responses are Allow many to come and live here (1), Allow
some (2), Allow a few (3), and Allow none (4). While this question is related to the status threat
variable as they both fundamentally ask about immigration, this question measures how
individuals feel about outsiders. The logic is that those who are more suspicious of outsiders
would want fewer immigrants of a different ethnic or racial group to come live in their countries.
Moving towards alternative explanations that serve as control variables, one of the major
explanations for ethnocentric populist support is Euroskepticism. It can be defined in several
ways but generally the concept identifies disdain or mistrust of the European Union’s mission
regarding further political, economic, and social integration of the various European nation-states
(Hooghe and Marks 2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007; Serricchio et al. 2013; Taggart 1998).
Fundamentally, Euroskepticism identifies a feeling of mistrust towards European Union’s
mission regarding further integration. A trust in the European Parliament variable, which runs
from No trust at all (0) through Complete trust (10), is used to identify this sentiment. While the
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ESS asks a more direct question on European integration, unfortunately this question is not
available in all iterations. As an alternative, the question on the European Parliament works well
as a proxy.
Populism encompasses the view that elites and non-elites are competing against one
another and that elites do not care about the people (Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017).
This anti-establishment feeling is often directed at politicians who control policy. The ESS has a
question asking respondents about their trust in politicians which runs from No trust at all (0)
through Complete trust (10). Those who feel stronger anti-establishment sentiment should give
much lower scores as they would have less trust in politicians.
The feeling of alienation regarding whether an individual feels that he or she is a genuine
part of the system has been seen as a potential catalyst for supporting populism. The logic behind
choosing this variable is that alienated individuals feel a degree of congruity with the outsider
image that populism brings (Oesch 2008; Sankiaho 1971; Scoones et al. 2018). Identifying this
sense of alienation is a question asking the individual how satisfied he or she is with life as a
whole, scaled from Extremely dissatisfied (0) to Extremely satisfied (10). The expectation is that
those who feel more alienated would most likely feel more dissatisfied with life.
Many ethnocentric populist actors have espoused a desire for more government
intervention in the economy through the use of protectionist measures and the elimination of free
trade agreements (Judis 2016). Considering the possible importance of economic policy
positions, particularly in terms of support for right-wing populists, a question that identifies
economic policy can also be useful for the analysis. Previous discussion noted that the main
difference in economic policy boils down to a desire for more government intervention vs. less
intervention. The ESS has a question on whether the government should reduce differences in
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income levels. The potential answers are on a Likert scale ranging from Agree strongly (1) to
Disagree strongly (5). The expectation is that those who want more government intervention in
economic matters would agree or strongly agree with the government reducing differences in
income levels.
Economic anxiety, particularly among those who have been hurt by globalization, may be
playing a role in increased support for populism (Hatton 2016). Anxieties brought by an unstable
economic market could be making some individuals consider an outsider option like ethnocentric
populists. A good variable would be able to measure a fear of uncertainty. A question from the
ESS that may serve as an appropriate proxy asks how satisfied the respondent is with the present
state of the economy in the country. The responses range from Extremely dissatisfied (0) to
Extremely satisfied (10). Those who feel less economically anxious should feel more satisfaction
with the economy as a strong economy would assuage most fears an individual would feel.
Past research appeared to indicate that lower levels of education correlated with more
support for populist actors (Matthes and Schmuck 2017; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). For education,
the ESS records a respondent’s educational background using the International Standard
Classification of Education, or ISCED. Within the context of the ESS, individuals were placed
into a five level system in which Less than secondary education (ISCED 0-1), Lower secondary
education completed (ISCED 2), Lower tier upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3b),
Upper tier upper secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 3b), and Advanced
vocational, sub-degree and beyond (ISCED 4).
On gender, some evidence indicated that women are, on average, less likely to support
ethnocentric populist-style actors possibly because of their support for traditional gender norms
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(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). The ESS has a very simple gender variable, recoded for the
analysis.
Research also indicates that more religious individuals tend to, on average, oppose
populist actors. This could be related to the calls for tolerance and compassionate for those who
are different found in many different religions (Huber and Yendall 2019). The ESS has a
straightforward way to assess religiosity by asking individuals how religious they are with a
scale ranging from Not at all religious (0) to Very religious (10).
Authoritarian values, which can be defined as the desire for more law and order and
stability (Hetherington 2009; Muis and Immerzeel 2017), have been found to play a role in
increased support for right-wing populist parties’ desire to prevent change (Eke and Kuzio 2000;
McCarthy 2019). To measure this desire for more stability, the ESS’s question asking
respondents whether it is important that government is strong ensures safety is on a Likert scale
from Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6).
Ideological placement, and especially placement further to the right, has been used as an
argument for supporting ethnocentric and right-wing populist parties (Donovan and Redlawsk
2018). The ESS asks individuals about their placement on the left-right scale with 0 indicating
furthest left and 10 furthest right.
The last variable is the year. While the ESS officially does not record the year in which a
dataset was created but instead records data by ESS Round, each of the rounds correspond to a
specific year. For example, most of the survey interviews for Round 1 took place in the
September through December 2002 time period with some of the interviews taking place in early
2003 (ESS Grant Report 2002). Overall, each of the rounds correspond to a specific year. Round
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1 is mostly analogous to the year 2002 and each subsequent ESS Round has taken place in
intervals of two years.
The theoretical concerns outlined previously highlight the importance of the beginning of
the Migrant Crisis as an exogenous shock which may have caused large numbers of individuals
to vote for ethnocentric populists. As the Migrant Crisis started to become a major issue in 2014,
the data will be divided into three analyses. The first examines all the data together. Here, the
model includes a dummy variable in which pre-Crisis data are coded as zero and post-Crisis data
are coded as one. The second analysis only examines ESS data that was collected before the
beginning of the Migrant Crisis and does not include the dummy variable. The third analysis will
only examine ESS data collected during and after the Migrant Crisis and does not include the
dummy variable.
Determining which rounds of the data should be coded as zero and one was dependent on
the time period the surveys took place. As the first through sixth ESS Rounds took place between
2002 and 2012, these should be coded as pre-Crisis. Data for the seventh round was gathered in
the Fall of 2014 (ESS Round Seven Field Procedure Report) at a time when the Crisis had begun.
While the total number of migrants entering through the Mediterranean Sea never exceeded
70,295 annually in the 1998-2013 time period, the number of migrants reached 209,553 by the
end of 2014 (Fargues 2016). The large influx that was already occurring was noticed by
members of the general public; by the middle of the Fall of 2014, some Germans were protesting
the large number of migrants weekly in the city of Dresden (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017).
As members of the general public were aware of the migration issue by the time the survey data
for the Seventh ESS Round was being collected, it appears that Western Europeans had already
been exposed to the “treatment” of the Migrant Crisis. This interpretation argues that the “post-
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Migrant Crisis” period is any time in which the people of Western Europe have experienced the
large influx of migrants. By this measure, the 2014 data should be part of the post-Crisis data.
This variable will be called “Post 2012” in the analysis as all data from after the 2012 round of
the ESS is coded as one and all other data coded as zero. For some of the variables, the coding
was flipped in order to convey that greater values indicated stronger feelings. For example, the
original coding for the status threat variable was reversed. These changes were made for the
status threat, ingroup salience, economic policy, and authoritarianism variables. The complete
list of variables is below on table 5.2.
Table 5.2: ESS Variables Used
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ESS Variable and Short Description
(Euroskepticism) Trust in the European Parliament: 0 No Trust at All, 10-Complete
Trust
(Anti-Establishment) Trust in Politicians: 0-No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust
(Alienation) How Satisfied with Life as a Whole: 0-Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely
Dissatisfied
(Economic Policy) Government Should Reduce Differences in Income Levels: 1Disagree strongly, 5-Agree strongly
(Economic Satisfaction) How Satisfied with Present State of Economy in Country: 0Extremely Dissatisfied, 10-Extremely Satisfied
(Education) Highest level of education: 1-ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary, 5ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-d
(Female) Gender: 0-Male, 1-Female
(Religiosity) How religious are you: 0-Not at all religious, 10-very religious
(Left-Right Scale) Placement on left right scale: 0-left, 10-right
(Authoritarianism) Important that government is strong and ensures safety: 1- Not like
me at all, 6- Very much like me
(Left-Right Scale) Placement on Left-Right Scale (0-Left, 10-Right)
(Ethnocentric Populist Partisanship) Which party does the respondent feel closer to? 0Feel Closer to Non-Ethnocentric Populist Parties, 1-Feel Closer to Ethnocentric
Populist Parties
(Right-Wing Populist Partisanship) Which party does the respondent feel closer to? 0Feel Closer to Non-Right-Wing Populist Parties, 1-Feel Closer to Ethnocentric Populist
Parties
(Status Threat) Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants: 0Cultural life enriched, 10-Cultural life undermined
(Outgroup Bias) Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as
majority: 1-Allow many to come and live here, 4-Allow none
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•
•

(Ingroup Salience) Important to Follow Traditions and Customs: 1- Not like me at all,
6-Very much like me
(Year, Called “Post 2012”) Dummy variable in which all data which take place before
2014 are coded as zero and all other data coded as one.

The last set of variables, the two dependent variables, are critical in answering the two
main research questions for this chapter: What is driving support for ethnocentric populist
actors? Are economic considerations an important driving force for supporting right-wing
populists? To answer these, a dependent variable would need to make a clear distinction between
ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists along with right-wing populists and nonright-wing populists.
The ESS does not have variables which separate respondents depending on whether they
voted for specific types of parties. However, the ESS asks individuals from each country which
party they voted for in the last election. Two new variables, ethnocentric populist support and
right-wing populist support were created. For the ethnocentric populist support variable,
respondents who voted for the parties that are classified as ethnocentric populists in chapter four
were coded as one while respondents who supported all other parties were coded as zero. For the
right-wing populist variable, all individuals who voted for the sixteen right-wing populist parties
were coded as one while all other supporters of the remaining three ethnocentric populist parties
were coded as zero. These distinctions will be very important for the difference of means tests
and in the logistic regression.

Analysis
The analysis section seeks to answer whether exogenous events affect populist support
using difference of means tests and logistic regression. The two types of analysis have different
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objectives. The difference of means tests seek to examine whether there are different average
scores given by respondents who support certain types of parties. They also provide preliminary
evidence of time variations in the averages. Because of the importance of the Migrant Crisis as a
potential exogenous shock, the analysis examines whether there are any noticeable changes in
scores after 2014. Each of the two sets of difference of means tests compare and contrast
different groups: The first looks at non-ethnocentric populist supporters and supporters of any
type of ethnocentric populist party. The second looks at general ethnocentric populist supporters
and supporters of right-wing populists.
The logistic regression analysis is also divided into two different subsections. The first
examines what might be driving support for ethnocentric populist parties. It is further divided
between one set of logistic regressions that examines countries that saw an uptick in support for
populists and another that witnessed a downturn during/after the Migrant Crisis. Each subset is
divided into three analyses: One that looks at the entire time period, one that examines the preMigrant Crisis time period, and another that examines the post-Migrant Crisis. The second limits
the respondents to those who supported the ethnocentric populist parties and is interested in
understanding what sort of variables might be driving support for right-wing populists.
Difference of Means Tests
The section presents two sets of difference of means tests and analyzes whether there are
differences between the groups of supporters and whether there is significant time variation in
average scores. The next step involves discussing which variables might be most relevant to an
analysis seeking to understand reasons behind support for ethnocentric populists.
An earlier section outlined which ESS variables would be used. While these variables are
an important component of the logistic regression analysis, not all of them may be relevant to the
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difference of means tests. These tests trace whether attitudes related to ethnocentric populism
differ across critical categories. Because of this, only variables which are relevant to ethnocentric
populism are part of the analysis.
Ethnocentric populism is composed of two different concepts. The populism portion is
strongly related to anti-establishment feelings, while the ethnocentric portion is more focused on
xenophobia and ingroup biases. For the populism component, the trust in the European
Parliament and trust in politician variables best serve as indicators of how individuals feel about
the establishment.
For the ethnocentric portion, measuring xenophobia and ingroup biases is necessary. The
questions on immigrants potentially undermining culture, the importance of customs and
traditions, and whether individuals who are of a different ethnic/racial group being allowed into a
country measure the ethnocentric component. The general theme of all three questions
emphasizes the importance of insiders and outsiders. A final variable is part of the analysis
because of its potential usefulness in setting up the analysis for the second research question on
economic policy. The question on whether an individual agreed or disagreed with the
government intervening to reduce gaps in income levels was added for this purpose.
Difference of Means Tests (Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Non-Ethnocentric Populist Parties)
The most important objective in conducting these tests is to see whether supporters of
both types of parties, on average, differ from one another. If they do, is it only through a specific
point in time or is it consistent throughout the entire time period under examination? The hope is
to see whether, on average, supporters of ethnocentric populist parties are closer to ethnocentric
populism in their views. If this is not the case, it would open interesting questions about why
they are supporting such actors.
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This section also examines whether there is a change in average scores among the two
groups of voters around 2014. As the Migrant Crisis started to ramp up around 2014 and into
2015 (Pachocka 2016), it is possible that Western Europeans could have experienced enough of a
shock to their worldviews that they started to shift their feelings about status threat, ingroup
salience, and outgroup bias. The expectation would be that ethnocentric populist supporters
would feel more status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, but it is possible that others
could feel the same as well. The following subgroup of difference of means tests attempt to
answer whether the two groups differ from one another, whether differences are constant through
time, and whether differences start to grow in the years since the Migrant Crisis.
Table 5.3: Euroskepticism
Year
NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2002
5.326
(22,969)

NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
6.131
(787)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.805
t(23754)= -9.547
P>|t|=0.000*

2004

5.501
(20,981)

6.184
(895)

-0.684
t(21874)= -8.595
P>|t|=0.000*

2006

5.555
(19,338)

5.992
(869)

-0.437
t(20205)= -5.500
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

5.359
(19,027)

5.695
(1,113)

-0.337
t(20138)= -4.754
P>|t|=0.000*

2010

5.747
(18,517)

5.796
(1,152)

-0.05
t(19667)= -0.673
P>|t|=0.501

2012

5.407
(17,908)

5.875
(1,311)

-0.468
t(19217)= -7.080
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P>|t|=0.000*
2014

5.686
(18,321)

6.614
(1,584)

-0.928
t(19903)= -14.622
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

5.605
(18,630)

6.386
(1,830)

-0.782
t(20458)= -13.197
P>|t|=0.000*

2018

5.301
(19,964)

6.073
(1,730)

-0.772
t(21692)= -12.676
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
For table 5.3, a variable on trust in the European Parliament, which runs from Complete
trust (0) to No trust at all (10), serves as an indicator for Euroskepticism. As ethnocentric
populists are skeptical of the European Union, the expectation is that they would on average give
higher scores than their non-ethnocentric populist counterparts. The analysis indicates that on
average those who supported ethnocentric populist gave a high score than their counterparts,
indicating more Euroskepticism.
In the middle of and in the immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis, respondents who
support ethnocentric populist parties, on average, became more skeptical of the European
Parliament. The gap between the two groups also peaks in 2014 but decreases somewhat in 2016
and 2018. However, the gap even in the 2016 and 2018 remains higher than most of the preMigrant Crisis years. There is unfortunately no evidence to indicate whether the gap between the
two groups will continue to decrease in the years to come.
Table 5.4: Anti-Establishment Sentiment
Year NEPP Median
NEPP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
2002
5.812
5.842

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.029
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(25,147)

(859)

t(26004)= -0.376
P>|t|=0.707

2004

5.933
(22,928)

6.012
(980)

-0.079
t(23906)= -1.073
P>|t|=0.283

2006

5.858
(20,970)

5.891
(969)

-0.033
t(21937)= -0.449
P>|t|=0.653

2008

5.855
(20,383)

5.655
(1,188)

-0.200
t(21569)= 3.002
P>|t|=0.003*

2010

6.175
(19,909)

5.757
(1,244)

+0.418
t(21151)= 5.961
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

5.671
(19,083)

6.283
(1,371)

-0.612
t(20452)= -9.765
P>|t|=0.000*

2014

5.721
(19,233)

6.352
(1,641)

-0.631
t(20872)= -10.636
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

5.881
(19,421)

6.495
(1,871)

-0.613
t(21290)= -10.743
P>|t|=0.000*

2018

5.658
(20,923)

5.974
(1,797)

-0.317
t(22718)= -5.561
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.4, the trust in politicians variable meant to measure anti-establishment
sentiment, which runs from No trust at all (0) to Complete trust (10), serves as the antiestablishment variable. Considering the anti-establishment nature of all strains of populisms, the
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expectation is that ethnocentric populist supporters would, on average, give higher scores than
their counterparts. Overall, this appears to be the case with the exception of the 2010 time period.
There is also some strong variation in the gap between the two groups depending on the
time period. In the earlier time periods of 2002-2006, the gap between the two groups is smaller
than 0.1. However, the gap widens in the 2010s with non-ethnocentric populist supporters
expressing more anti-establishment sentiment in 2010. This changes in 2012 with a gap of
approximately 0.6 which is maintained through 2016. The gap drops to about 0.3 in 2018. In
other words, anti-establishment sentiment appears to increase in prominence on both sides
starting around 2012, before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, and remains strong through
2016. However, it appears to die down a bit by 2018; perhaps indicating anti-establishment
sentiment loses some of its resonance as time passes.
Table 5.5: Status Threat
Year
NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2002
5.150
(24,585)

NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
6.291
(850)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-1.141
t(25433)= -13.273
P>|t|=0.000*

2004

5.294
(22,671)

6.486
(975)

-1.192
t(23644)= -14.471
P>|t|=0.000*

2006

5.165
(20,831)

6.285
(956)

-1.120
t(21785)= -13.749
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

5.142
(20,308)

5.931
(1,182)

-0.789
t(21488)= -10.490
P>|t|=0.000*

2010

5.432
(19,824)

6.129
(1,237)

-0.697
t(21059)= -9.402
199

P>|t|=0.000*
2012

5.866
(19,039)

4.866
(1,354)

+1.000
t(20391)= -14.830
P>|t|=0.000*

2014

4.969
(19,166)

6.470
(1,628)

-1.501
t(20792)= -23.740
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

5.160
(19,327)

6.480
(1,860)

-1.320
t(21185)= -21.318
P>|t|=0.000*

2018

5.020
(20,876)

6.375
(1,789)

-1.355
t(22663)= -21.875
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
For table 5.5, a question on whether a country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by
immigrants, which ranges from Cultural life enriched (1) to Cultural life undermined (10), serves
as a measure for status threat. The expectation is that ethnocentric populists, because of their
general xenophobic stance (Rydgren 2005), should, on average, give lower scores throughout the
entire time period. While this is true for most of the time period examined, it is not the case in
2012 where non-ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, feel more status threat.
Nevertheless, unlike the previous variables, the results indicate that there is a statistically
significant difference between the groups for the entire time span.
The gap between the two groups first starts out to be great, but fluctuates with time.
While the gap between the two groups was a bit over 1.0 from 2002-2006, it decreases in 2008
and 2010. While there is an uptick in 2012, starting in 2014, the difference becomes wider and
topped out at 1.5 in 2014. The averages seen among ethnocentric populists grew while the

200

averages for non-ethnocentric populist supporters are on average lower in the post-Migrant Crisis
era. However, it remains to be seen whether this gap will continue to decrease moving forward.
Table 5.6: Ingroup Salience
Year
NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2002
4.168
(22,879)

NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
4.240
(830)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.072
t(23707)= -1.449
P>|t|=0.147

2004

4.192
(22,245)

4.366
(945)

-0.174
t(23188)= -3.753
P>|t|=0.000*

2006

4.052
(20,367)

4.322
(927)

-0.270
t(21292)= -5.816
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

4.132
(19,704)

4.411
(1,152)

-0.279
t(20854)= -6.686
P>|t|=0.000*

2010

4.215
(10,737)

4.338
(1,234)

-0.123
t(20969)= -3.024
P>|t|=0.003*

2012

4.142
(19,132)

4.258
(1,356)

-0.116
t(20486)= -2.973
P>|t|=0.003*

2014

4.051
(19,121)

4.307
(1,629)

-0.256
t(20748)= -7.175
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

4.100
(19,430)

4.369
(1,863)

-0.269
t(21291)= -7.975
P>|t|=0.000*

2018

4.150
(21,012)

4.445
(21,012)

-0.295
t(22808)= -8.628
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P>|t|=0.000*
*Significant at 95% Level
For table 5.6, a question asking respondents whether it is important to follow traditions
and customs, which runs from not like me at all (1) to very much like me (6), serves as a measure
of ingroup salience. The expectation here is that ethnocentric populist supporters would feel
much more ingroup salience than their counterparts. The results match up well with expectations.
For all years examined, in both the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis era, ethnocentric populist
supporters, on average, gave lower scores although this difference is not significant in 2002.
Overall, the data indicates that, on average, ethnocentric populist supporters felt more ingroup
salience.
There is a degree of fluctuation in the average scores over time. Averages for
ethnocentric populist party supporters increased from the beginning to the end of the 2000s.
There was a drop in the early 2010s, but the averages increased consistently from 2014 to 2018.
A drop followed by an increase can also be seen among non-ethnocentric populist supporters.
Overall, there is evidence that in the post-Migrant Crisis time period that ingroup salience has
grown among both the ethnocentric populist and non-ethnocentric populist supporting groups. It
is possible that the continued presence of migrants in these countries could make Europeans feel
more ingroup salience for many years to come.

Table 5.7: Outgroup Bias
Year
NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2002
2.483
(24,573)

NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2.771
(844)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.288
t(25415)= -10.172
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P>|t|=0.000*
2004

2.495
(22,782)

2.791
(970)

-0.296
t(23750)= -10.559
P>|t|=0.000*

2006

2.443
(20,869)

2.746
(959)

-0.303
t(21826)= -11.040
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

2.400
(20,246)

2.592
(1,185)

-0.192
t(21429)= -7.673
P>|t|=0.000*

2010

2.469
(19,776)

2.696
(1,237)

-0.227
t(21011)= -8.879
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

2.290
(18,995)

2.627
(1,359)

-0.337
t(20352)= -14.747
P>|t|=0.000*

2014

2.224
(19,110)

2.723
(1,635)

-0.499
t(20743)= -23.751
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

2.257
(19,237)

2.667
(1,854)

-0.410
t(21089)= -20.056
P>|t|=0.000*

2018

2.234
(20,771)

2.604
(1,785)

-0.370
t(22554)= -18.035
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.7, a question on whether to allow immigrants of different race/ethnic groups,
included responses ranging from allow many to come and live here (1) and allow none (4),
serves as a way to measure outgroup bias. The expectation is that those who support ethnocentric
populists would, on average, give higher scores as such individuals likely would be suspicious of
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allowing outsiders into their countries. Overall, there is a consistent pattern through the entire
time period in which ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, gave higher scores and are
closer to stating that no immigrants of different racial/ethnic groups should enter European
countries.
While the gap between the two groups remains for the whole time period, the rebound
effect again appears for ethnocentric populist supporters. While in 2014 the average was above
2.7, it dropped in both 2016 and 2018. The averages drop from 2016 to 2018 for nonethnocentric populist supporters. In other words, there appears to be some evidence indicating
that supporters of ethnocentric populist parties are softening up on allowing immigrants of
different racial/ethnic groups into their respective countries; this could be the result of the
Migrant Crisis potentially losing salience as the years pass.
Table 5.8: Gov. Econ. Intervention
Year
NEPP Median
EPP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
2002
3.709
3.473
(24,900)
(848)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
+0.236
t(25746)= 6.324
P>|t|=0.000*

2004

3.727
(22,780)

3.560
(979)

+0.167
t(23757)= 4.763
P>|t|=0.000*

2006

3.684
(20,933)

3.487
(966)

+0.197
t(21897)= 5.592
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

3.741
(20,368)

3.600
(1,187)

+0.141
t(21553)= 4.470
P>|t|=0.000*

2010

3.739
(19,883)

3.534
(1,248)

+0.205
t(21129)= 6.525
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P>|t|=0.000*
2012

3.717
(19,060)

3.726
(1,365)

-0.009
t(20423)= -0.297
P>|t|=0.767

2014

3.699
(19,192)

3.682
(1,635)

+0.017
t(20825)= 0.602
P>|t|=0.547

2016

3.803
(19,389)

3.800
(1,855)

+0.003
t(21242)= 0.123
P>|t|=0.902

2018

3.819
(20,974)

3.717
(1,790)

+0.102
t(22762)= 4.142
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.8, a question on whether government should reduce differences in income
levels, which ran from Disagree strongly (1) to Agree strongly (5), serves as an indicator for how
respondents felt about government policy. The expectation is more difficult to state outright as
ethnocentric populists have different views on government intervention in economic matters.
While there is some evidence indicating that such actors are generally interested in extending
welfare programs as much of their constituency is working class (Afonso and Rennwald 2018),
during times of crisis, such as during economic recessions or rise in immigration, ethnocentric
populist parties tend to prefer cutting these same welfare program (Otjes et al. 2018). Because of
this phenomenon, one could argue that ethnocentric populists might not differ from the rest of
the population in the pre-Migrant Crisis era, but might move toward preferring less intervention
following the Migrant Crisis. Overall, it appears that ethnocentric respondents, on average, give
lower scores with the exception of 2012. In other words, for the most part, they are closer to
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disagreeing that the government should reduce differences in income level. Supporters of
ethnocentric populist parties, on average, appear to be more suspicious of government
intervention in economic matters, on average.
As with other variables, there are fluctuations in the averages for each group. While there
is a statistically significant difference from 2002 through 2010, the data from 2012 through 2016
indicated that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups; this could be
possible because government intervention in economic matters may have lost salience as a
question during the Migrant Crisis. There is also no indication that either group is consistently
interested in increasing or decreasing government intervention in economic matters. This is
somewhat unexpected as the Migrant Crisis saw many potential new welfare recipients entering
Europe.
Does the analysis show a statistically significant difference between the two groups? If
so, is it through the entire time period? What of the post-Migrant Crisis time period? Overall, it
seems that supporters for the two different groups of parties differ from one another in many
ways. For the most part, the data is in line with expectations. There is a statistically significant
difference between supporters of ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists and in
most of the ESS Rounds, the expectations are met.
However, there were a number of areas where the results differed from assumptions. If
there is a general takeaway from this subsection, it is that while there appears to be reasonably
strong gap between ethnocentric populist supporters and non-ethnocentric populist supporters, it
is unknown whether the Migrant Crisis will cause a permanent change in either camp. For
ethnocentric populist supporters, there appears to be a change in averages generally in 2014 and
2016 but a rebound effect in 2018.
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Difference of Means Tests (General Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Right-wing Populist)
This subsection uses a modified list of general ethnocentric populist parties (GEPP) and
right-wing populists (RWP) to evaluate if the two groups differ on economic matters. The
section also assesses if there are differences between the two groups on other questions, and
whether a change occurred in the years during and after the Migrant Crisis.
Table 5.9: Gov. Econ. Intervention
Year
NEPP Median
NEPP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
2002
3.528
3.445
(288)
(560)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
+0.083
t(846)= 1.023
P>|t|=0.307

2004

3.637
(366)

3.514
(613)

+0.123
t(977)= 1.655
P>|t|=0.098

2006

3.538
(368)

3.455
(598)

+0.083
t(964)= 1.076
P>|t|=0.282

2008

3.620
(308)

3.593
(879)

+0.027
t(1185)= 0.384
P>|t|=0.701

2010

3.666
(308)

3.490
(940)

+0.176
t(1246)= 2.435
P>|t|=0.015*

2012

3.941
(690)

3.507
(675)

+0.434
t(1363)= 7.238
P>|t|=0.000*

2014

3.847
(635)

3.577
(1,000)

+0.270
t(1633)= 4.721
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

3.998

3.596

+0.502
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2018

(941)

(914)

t(1853)= 8.319
P>|t|=0.000*

3.845
(1,019)

3.547
(771)

+0.298
t(1788)= 6.076
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

Overall, those who support right-wing populist parties, on average, tend to give lower
scores which indicates more disagreement with government playing a role in reducing
differences in income levels. Such results indicate that right-wing populist party supporters are
more in line with their own party’s stronger aversion to government intervention in economic
matters. However, in the 2002-2008 time period, the difference between the two groups was not
big enough to state that there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
However, the gap grew enough in the years after to indicate significance at the 95 percent level.
In 2014 and 2016, both general ethnocentric populist supporters and right-wing populist
supporters appeared to move closer to agreeing with more government intervention. Overall, the
data indicates that right-wing populist supporters are more suspicious of government intervention
in the economy.
Logistic Regression
The regression analyses presented in this section attempt to answer the research questions
presented in earlier sections of this broader investigation. This section is interested in answering
how exogenous events can affect support for populists. As a secondary project, it also examines
if there are differences between supporters in the nine countries that saw a rise in support in the
immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis and the countries that did not see a rise in support.
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The final section of the analysis also examines whether there is a major difference between rightwing populists and more general ethnocentric populists.
The rest of the European analysis focuses on the results from logistic regressions to
answer the question of what is driving support for ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing
populists. Temporal variation in average scores from the difference of means tests leaves open
the possibility that exogenous shocks could affect support for populists. As the Migrant Crisis
started in 2014, the expectation is that individuals living in Europe would feel a heightened sense
of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias after the beginning of the Crisis.
Logistic regression is used because the dependent variables are dichotomous. Of the
variables discussed in an earlier section, most can be put into a regression model without making
any modifications except for the year dummy. Time is a major component of the analysis as the
theory argues that within the context of Western Europe, the Migrant Crisis of 2014-2015 was a
powerful exogenous shock that affected support for ethnocentric populist actors. The implication
is that in the post-Migrant Crisis time period, there should be stronger ingroup and outgroup
biases along with stronger suspicion of immigration. As there could be differences between the
pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods, a year dummy, in which surveys which take place
through 2012 are coded as zero and the rest as one, is a part of the analysis.
Overall, the argument is that an exogenous event can affect support for ethnocentric
populist parties. The same could be said about support for right-wing populist parties; during and
after the Migrant Crisis, the coefficient of economic policy for supporting right-wing populist
actors could decrease due to the increased salience of immigration and outsiders during and after
the Migrant Crisis. These expectations yield four hypotheses.
H1: On average, the coefficient of status threat on support for ethnocentric populist parties
should increase after the Migrant Crisis.
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H2: On average, the coefficient of ingroup salience on support for ethnocentric populist parties
should increase after the Migrant Crisis.
H3: On average, the coefficient of outgroup bias on support for ethnocentric populist parties
should increase after the Migrant Crisis.
H4: On average, the coefficient of economic policy on support for right-wing populist parties
should decrease during and after the Migrant Crisis.
The analysis for this chapter is divided into a few sections starting with the nine-country
models. This section examines countries that saw an increase in support for ethnocentric populist
actors following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. The nine-country section is also divided
into two sections. First, the analysis focuses on the findings related to non-theory variables. The
second part of this analysis focuses on examining the predicted probabilities for the three theory
variables: Status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias. Here, the focus is on reporting the
predicted probabilities of support for ethnocentric populist parties or right-wing populist parties.
The four countries are analyzed separately from the nine countries as ethnocentric
populists experienced a decrease in support following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. In this
section, the modeling is also divided into two sections presented in the same exact manner as
outlined in the previous paragraph.
A final subsection examines a different question. Instead of focusing of what variables
are driving ethnocentric populists as a whole, the question here is whether right-wing populist
supporters are driven by different variables than their more general ethnocentric populist
counterparts. There is strong interest in whether economic considerations are playing a role in
driving right-wing populist supporters.
It is also important to note that the ESS also has population and design weights which are
also a part of the logistic regression analysis. The population weights are to be used in situations
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where data from multiple countries are combined as at times, the sample sizes from a country are
not commensurate to the size of the country’s population. The ESS’s design weights were
created as in some of the countries, not every adult in the population had an equal chance of
selection; some individuals who belong to certain groups or those who live in some regions had
lower or higher probabilities of being chosen. To help rectify these issues, the ESS researchers
recommend using both the population and design weights by multiplying the two, or
pweight*dweight. This new weight is used as the weight for the logistic regression.
Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Rise in Support
This subsection focuses on examining the results for a logistic regression analysis in
which support for ethnocentric populist parties is the dependent variable and only examines the
nine countries that saw a rise in support. This analysis provides evidence indicating whether
there is strong temporal variation in the coefficients of certain variables related to status threat,
ingroup salience, and outgroup bias but will first start off by discussing each significant variable
individually. Afterwards, the rest of the discussion will discuss variables not significant at the 95
percent level.
Table 5.10 Logistic Regression for Countries that
Experienced Populist Vote Share Increase
Independent
Vote for Ethnocentric Populist Actor (Dependent)
Variables
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
Post 2012
0.833*
(0.041)
Status Threat

0.109*
(0.009)

0.105*
(0.015)

0.109*
(0.012)

Ingroup Salience

0.071*
(0.017)

0.054*
(0.027)

0.083*
(0.022)

Outgroup Bias

0.158*
(0.029)

0.017
(0.046)

0.282*
(0.037)
211

Euroskepticism

-0.019
(0.011)

-0.076*
(0.018)

0.023
(0.013)

Anti-Establishment
Sentiment

0.067*
(0.012)

0.082*
(0.020)

0.052*
(0.015)

Alienation

-0.029*
(0.010)

-0.027
(0.015)

-0.030*
(0.014)

0.087*
(0.021)

0.182*
(0.033)

0.004
(0.027)

Economic Anxiety

-0.056*
(0.010)

-0.058*
(0.015)

-0.057*
(0.013)

Education

-0.060*
(0.015)

-0.088*
(0.023)

-0.040
(0.020)

Female

-0.269*
(0.041)

-0.334*
(0.064)

-0.224*
(0.052)

Religiosity

0.031*
(0.007)

0.071*
(0.012)

0.002
(0.009)

Left-Right Scale

0.062*
(0.012)

0.090*
(0.020)

0.032*
(0.014)

Authoritarianism

0.081*
(0.019)

0.055
(0.030)

0.100*
(0.025)

Constant

-5.499*
(0.189)

-5.278*
(0.292)

-4.779*
(0.246)

N
*Significant at 95%

113,437

72,359

41,078

Gov. Econ.
Intervention

The results from Table 5.10 indicate that there was a positive relationship between many
of the control variables and the dependent variable. The positive direction of the time dummy
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indicates that ethnocentric populist parties enjoyed greater support in the post-Migrant Crisis
time period. There is also evidence that a stronger desire for more government in the economy,
religiosity, being closer to the right, and more authoritarian sentiment all increased populist
support. Economic anxiety and religiosity are no longer significant in the post-Migrant Crisis
time period. However, authoritarianism became significant; this result indicates that some
previously salient issues became less important to respondents in the post-Migrant Crisis time
period.
For some variables, there was a negative relationship between increases in that variable
and populist support. The direction of the anti-establishment sentiment variable indicated that
increases in this sentiment decreased populist support. This also held true for alienation,
economic anxiety, education, and being female. Among these variables, education lost
significance while alienation gained it. Again, there appears to be some variations in the
relationship between variables depending on the time period.
While the direction of most of the variables remain the same throughout the entire time
period, the direction for the Euroskepticism variable changes. The results for the Euroskepticism
variable showed a positive and significant relationship between the variable and support for
ethnocentric populist parties. However, the relation is now negative and not significant in the
post-Migrant Crisis time period; this perhaps indicates that Euroskepticism lost salience in the
post-Crisis time period.
While the directions of the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables
were within expectations, the results of the outgroup bias variable are arguably most in line with
the theory. While there is a growth in the size of the coefficients for status threat and ingroup
salience between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods, there was a significant
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relationship in both time periods. However, the outgroup bias variable is significant only in the
post-Migrant Crisis time period; this indicates that such feelings were only activated in the time
period following the 2012 ESS.
Table 5.11 Probability of Supporting an Ethnocentric Populist Party
among Countries that Saw an Increase in Support (Variables Held at Means)
Predicted Probability
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
Status Threat (Lowest
Value)
2.888%*
2.491%*
3.870%*
Status Threat (Highest
Value)
6.707%*
5.965%*
8.897%
Ingroup Salience (Lowest
Value)
3.397%*
2.665%*
5.002%*
Ingroup Salience (Highest
Value)
4.263%*
3.292%*
6.301%*
Outgroup Bias (Lowest
Value)
3.889%*
3.978%*
4.702%*
Outgroup Bias (Highest
Value)
4.773%*
3.331%*
8.156%*
*Significant at 95%

The results from Table 5.11 indicate that the predicted probability of support increases
with higher values for all three theory variables. The results for the predicted probabilities of
supporting ethnocentric populist actors indicate that there is a clear difference between the preand post-Migrant Crisis time periods. Overall, among respondents in the lowest values of status
threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, the increases seen between the pre- and post-Migrant
Crisis time periods are much smaller than the results seen among those who responded in the
highest values. The difference among respondents who responded with the lowest value of status
threat between the two time periods is about 1.4%. However, it increases to over 3 percent for
those who responded with the highest value of status threat. For ingroup salience, the increase
among those who responded in the lowest value was a little less than 2.5%. However, the
increase for those responding in the highest category was slightly over 3%. For both the status
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threat and ingroup salience, there is evidence that increasing feelings for both will increase the
probability of support for ethnocentric populists.
The results for outgroup bias are where there is a significant difference among those who
responded with the lowest value and the highest value. The difference in the predicted
probability for support between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods among those who
responded in the lowest value is less than 1%. However, among those who responded in the
highest category, the difference is over 4% and close to 5%. This large difference, relative to the
status threat and ingroup salience variables, indicates that increases in outgroup bias had the
largest marginal effect among the three variables.
Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Decline in Support
This subsection examines the four different countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and
Norway, that saw a decline in support for an ethnocentric populist party in the elections between
the beginning of the Migrant Crisis and after its start. This subsection also compares the results
between the previous group of regressions that focused on countries that saw an increase in
support and this group of regressions below. Just like in the previous subsection, the discussion
on each logistic regression will focus on those variables which are significant at the 95 percent
level and then shift to discussing non-significant variables.
Table 5.12 Logistic Regression for Countries that
Experienced Populist Vote Share Decrease
Independent
Vote for Ethnocentric Populist Actor (Dependent)
Variables
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
Post 2012
0.509*
(0.039)
Status Threat

0.129*
(0.008)

0.120*
(0.011)

0.164*
(0.014)

Ingroup Salience

0.065*

0.054*

0.091*
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(0.015)

(0.019)

(0.025)

Outgroup Bias

0.126*
(0.027)

0.056
(0.035)

0.228*
(0.043)

Euroskepticism

0.099*
(0.009)

0.078*
(0.012)

0.113*
(0.017)

Anti-Establishment
Sentiment

-0.005
(0.011)

0.008
(0.013)

-0.021
(0.019)

Alienation

-0.075*
(0.011)

-0.099*
(0.014)

-0.019
(0.019)

Gov. Econ. Intervention

-0.060*
(0.018)

-0.083*
(0.023)

0.013
(0.031)

Economic Anxiety

0.044*
(0.009)

0.041*
(0.011)

0.026
(0.015)

Education

0.034*
(0.014)

0.035*
(0.017)

0.028
(0.023)

Female

-0.217*
(0.038)

-0.211*
(0.048)

-0.227*
(0.063)

Religiosity

-0.101*
(0.007)

-0.121*
(0.009)

-0.061*
(0.011)

Left-Right Scale

0.227*
(0.009)

0.215*
(0.011)

0.257*
(0.015)

Authoritarianism

-0.080*
(0.015)

-0.125*
(0.019)

0.015
(0.025)

Constant

-4.413*
(0.178)

-3.572*
(0.219)

-5.438*
(0.0297)

N
*Significant at 95%

47,238

33,535

13,703
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Just like the results from the previous section, the results on Table 5.12 indicate that there
was a positive relationship between many of the control variables and the dependent variable.
Like the previous group of models, the positive direction of the time dummy indicates that
ethnocentric populist parties enjoyed greater support in the post-Migrant Crisis time period.
There is also evidence that more Euroskepticism, economic anxiety, education, the left-right
scale, and authoritarianism all increased populist support. However, economic anxiety,
education, and authoritarianism are no longer significant in the post-Migrant Crisis time period.
Just like in the nine-country model, the results indicate that some previously salient variables
were no longer as relevant in a different time period.
For some variables, there was a negative relationship between increases in that variable
and populist support. The direction of the alienation, gender (female), and the religiosity
variables indicated that increases in this sentiment decreased populist support. All of these,
however, remained significant in all three time periods examined.
There were more variables that changed direction in the four-country model than in the
nine-country model. The anti-establishment sentiment variable never reaches significance. A
similar result is seen with the government economic intervention variable as this variable also
sees a shift albeit from negative to positive; in addition, this variable loses significance in the
post-Migrant Crisis time period.
There are some important differences in the relationship between the control variables
and the dependent variable between the two groups of countries. In the nine-country model,
stronger desire for more government in the economy, religiosity, being closer to the right, and
more authoritarian sentiment all increased populist support. The opposite was the case for the
alienation, economic anxiety, education, and female variables. The Euroskepticism variable
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flipped direction from positive to negative. In the four-country model, there is a positive relation
between economic anxiety, education, and the left-right scale. The opposite was the case for
Euroskepticism, alienation, being female, and religiosity, while anti-establishment sentiment,
government in economy, and authoritarianism flip direction between the time periods.
Ultimately, only the variables for alienation, female, and left-right scale are share the same
direction across both models. In addition, during the post-Crisis time period, six of the control
variables are significant in the nine-country model while only four are for the four-country
model. It could be possible that in the four countries, ethnocentric populist parties failed to
attract a more diverse coalition to their cause; this may have caused them to not do as well in
elections. Ultimately, the results from the nine-country model and the four-country model
indicate that the supporters in both areas are driven by different variables.
While the results for the control variables indicate that there are many differences in
terms of what drives ethnocentric populist supporters, the results for the status threat, ingroup
salience, and outgroup bias variables mirror those of the nine-country model. The directions are
the same and the size of the coefficients increase between the two time periods. Perhaps most
importantly, the outgroup bias variable is once again significant only in the post-Migrant Crisis
time period; this indicates that such feelings were activated in the time period following the 2012
ESS. Ultimately, it is on status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias where the two groups
of ethnocentric populist supporters hold the most in common.

Table 5.13 Probability of Supporting an Ethnocentric Populist Party
among Countries that Saw a Decrease in Support (Variables Held at Means)
Predicted Probability
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
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Status Threat (Lowest
Value)
Status Threat (Highest
Value)
Ingroup Salience (Lowest
Value)
Ingroup Salience (Highest
Value)
Outgroup Bias (Lowest
Value)
Outgroup Bias (Highest
Value)
*Significant at 95%

3.076%*

2.555%*

4.655%*

8.774%*

6.377%*

18.755%*

4.517%*

4.048%*

5.772%*

6.419%*

5.250%*

10.166%*

4.189%*

3.654%*

6.183%*

7.968%*

6.550%*

12.449%*

While the results from Table 5.13 indicate that the general pattern of increases holds
when compared to the results from the nine-country model, the increase in probability is much
greater. For example, among those who responded with the lowest value of status threat, there is
about a 2% increase in the probability of support. However, when examining those who
responded with the highest value of status threat, the probability increases by over 12%. A
similar difference can be seen with ingroup salience. While the predicted probability among
those who responded with the lowest value increased by a bit less than 2% between the two time
periods, the increase was almost 5% among those who responded with the highest value.
Just like in the nine-country model, there is also evidence indicating a strong difference
across time periods for the outgroup bias variable. Among those who responded in the lowest
value, the increase between the two time periods was about 2.5%. However, among those who
responded with the highest value of outgroup bias, the increase was nearly 6%. Just like in the
nine-country model, the increases between time periods among those who responded with the
highest value for outgroup bias was highest.
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Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Dependent Variable: Right-wing Populist
This subsection examines whether economic policy positions are a driving force for rightwing populist supporters compared to more general ethnocentric populist supporters. While the
previous sections examined all of the variables, this section provides analysis only for the main
variable of interest: The economic policy variable.
Table 5.14 Logistic Regression for Right-Wing
Populist Support
Independent
Vote for RWP Parties
Variables
(Dependent)
Status Threat
-0.041*
(0.016)
Ingroup Salience

0.099*
(0.029)

Outgroup Bias

-0.169*
(0.049)

Euroskepticism

0.291*
(0.019)

Anti-Establishment
Sentiment

-0.220*
(0.021)

Alienation

-0.018
(0.020)

Gov. Econ. Intervention

-0.119*
(0.033)

Economic Anxiety

0.362*
(0.018)

Education

0.138*
(0.030)

Female

0.340*
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(0.070)
Religiosity

-0.089*
(0.012)

Left-Right Scale

0.161*
(0.016)

Authoritarianism

-0.029
(0.029)

Constant

-2.457*
(0.320)

N
*Significant at 95%

10,432

Comparing the results from the theory variables used for the nine-country, four-country
models, and the model from Table 5.14, status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias,
indicate that there are some important differences between right-wing populist supporters and
more general ethnocentric populist supporters. Of particular interest are the theory variables; the
direction of the coefficients indicates that, for example, more support for status threat and
outgroup bias decreases the chances of supporting right-wing populist parties while there is an
opposite relationship with ingroup salience. In other words, it appears that supporters of rightwing populist parties are driven by the theory variables in a different way compared to their more
general ethnocentric populist counterparts.
There are also other differences between the two groups. More anti-establishment
sentiment, more religiosity and more authoritarian sentiment decrease the likelihood of
supporting right-wing populist parties. Conversely, more feelings of Euroskepticism, alienation,
economic anxiety, education, and being female all increased the likelihood of supporting right-
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wing populists. However, the alienation variable is not significant. Overall, the results indicate
that beyond differences related to country-level differences, there are also differences between
supporters of right-wing populist parties and more general ethnocentric populist parties.
The direction and significance of the variable measuring a respondent’s feelings
regarding government intervention in economic matters indicates that right-wing populist
supporters are suspicious of more government intervention. The result indicates that supporters
of right-wing populist parties are not just interested in the ethnocentric rhetoric of these parties;
rather, they also line-up with right-wing populist parties on economic preferences too.
Table 5.15 Probability of Supporting a RWP
(Variables Held at Means)
Predicted Probability
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Lowest Value)
Gov. Econ. Intervention (2nd Lowest)
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Median)
Gov. Econ. Intervention (2nd Highest)
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Highest Value)
*Significant at 95%

27.248%*
47.615%*
49.655%*
43.440%*
32.585%*

The results from the predicted probability analysis on Table 5.15 differed from what was
seen in other sections. While previous predicted probabilities would consistently move in one
direction, increasing consistently, this was not the case with the government economic
intervention variable. Instead, the predicted probability increases until reaching the median but
then decreases. Because of this distinct relationship, the predicted probabilities of all five values
are presented for this variable. Overall, the results differ from what might have been expected
given the negative relationship shown in the previous table. The direction of the government
intervention in the economy variable indicates support for the idea that right-wing populist
supporters may, on average, also be right-wing in their economic stances. However, the results
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for the predicted probability indicates that there is an increase of about five percent between the
lowest value and the highest value.
Conclusion
The biggest takeaway from the chapter is that there is statistically significant evidence, in
both the nine-country model and the four-country model, that outgroup bias was a salient
variable only in the post-2012 time period. The results from the four-country model also
indicated that there were differences among supporters of the four countries versus the
supporters of the nine countries in the post-2012 time period. There is evidence indicating that
anti-establishment sentiment, alienation, economic policy, economic satisfaction, education, and
authoritarian sentiment, which were significant in the post-2012 time period in the nine-country
model, were not significant in the four-country model. This result indicates that the factors
driving support in the four countries that saw a decrease in support were less diverse.
For the secondary research question presented for this analysis, there is also some
evidence indicating that economic policy was a systematic driving force behind supporting rightwing populist parties. In other words, among supporters of right-wing populist parties, economic
principles were an important consideration.
Overall, there is evidence supporting the argument that exogenous shocks can affect
support for ethnocentric populists. The next step is to see if the findings in the American case are
relatively similar. While there are several differences between the American and Western
European cases, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ethnocentric populism has gained a stronger
foothold in the late 2010s. To see where the two cases overlap and where they differ, the next
chapter focuses on conducting analysis on the American case.

223

Chapter 6: United States Analysis
Introduction
What drove support for an ethnocentric populist candidate in the United States? Are the
reasons for voting for the Trump-led GOP different from previous generations of GOP voters?
To help answer these questions, this chapter describes populism in the United States, Trump’s
connection to ethnocentric populism and his rhetoric, and scholarship explaining why Americans
voted for Trump. After identifying appropriate variables, the chapter replicates the analysis in the
previous chapter.
Populism in the United States
The existence of only two viable parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party,
has undermined the creation and maintenance of a dedicated populist party in the United States.
From an electoral standpoint, the first-past-the-post system for most legislative elections in the
country makes challenging the two existing parties difficult (Cox 1997). Early populist
challengers such as William Jennings Bryan failed to win the presidency (Judis 2016) and while
there have been occasions in which a populist challenger ran under a third party’s label in the
post-Cold War time frame, such as Ross Perot in 1992 (Tonn and Endress 2001), these attempts
ended in losses. Most populist challengers have, instead of creating a populist party, contested
the primaries of one of the two major parties. For example, in 1992, Pat Buchanan attempted to
challenge incumbent George H.W. Bush during the Republican Party primary season (Judis
2016). The populist presidential candidate Bernie Sanders attempted to win the Democratic
Party’s presidential nomination in the 2016 election cycle (Groshek and Koc-Michalska 2017).
Speaking specifically to the issue of ethnocentric populism, Trump’s adoption of
ethnocentrism is not the first instance of such an event in American politics. Elements of
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ethnocentric populism can be traced back to the 1800s. In the 1850s, the American Party, also
known as the Know-Nothing Party, espoused a nativist platform that specifically targeted
“Catholics, immigrants, and unresponsive politicians” (Levine 2001). The party was also the
result of work by “the people, not professional politicians” and included many individuals among
its support base who were “men outside of politics” (Levine 2001). These descriptions indicate
that the Know-Nothing Party was similar to modern day ethnocentric populist parties.
While the Know-Nothing Party would eventually lose relevance (Levine 2001), it was
not the last time an ethnocentric populist-style actor became prominent in the United States
during the 1800s. In the 1880s, the American Protective Association, like the Know-Nothing
Party, espoused anti-Catholicism and anti-Irish sentimenst; members often argued that Catholic
immigrants served as economic competition (Fanning 1999). However, the American Protective
Association would also fade away from American political life.
The twentieth century also saw tenets of ethnocentric populism being used as a political
tool. In the 1930s, Father Charles Coughlin, a priest best known for being a radio host, espoused
populist views that targeted establishment actors. His base was composed primarily of workingclass Midwesterners who felt like outsiders. Coughlin criticized the increasing role that nationallevel politicians and bureaucrats were playing in American life. He also saw the banks as an
enemy of regular people and was interested in curbing their power through banking and financial
reforms (Brinkley 1984).
In addition to targeting the national government and the banks, Coughlin espoused an
ethnocentric streak that targeted Jews. Coughlin took pages from the Know-Nothing Party and
the American Protective Association playbooks by focusing on a scapegoat. While initially
targeting banks, he started to ramp up criticism of Jews and even openly built alliances with
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fascists such as Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (Cannistraro and Kovaleff 1971). By the late
1930s, he made targeting Jews a critical component of his radio show and accused Jewish
bankers of being war-hungry (Jeansonne 2012).
While Coughlin would quietly retire from the radio business after America went to war
against fascists, the “Dixiecrats” continued many of the same ethnocentric traditions espoused by
previous actors. Shortly following the end of World War II, upset at policies such as integration,
several Southern Democrats opted to break away from the Democratic Party and ran candidates
who opposed desegregating blacks and whites (Norrell 1991). While not explicitly against the
establishment, as many of its core members were mainstream politicians, one could argue that
the Dixiecrats’ rhetoric arguing that the Federal government were interlopers interfering in
Southern affairs (Rayback 1954) was an attack on a segment of the establishment.
A few years after the Dixiecrats disappeared from the political scene in 1948, George
Wallace adopted anti-establishment sentiment and ethnocentrism in the 1960s. Reflecting the
"people vs. elite" narrative of populism, Wallace, running as a candidate for the United States
presidency, spoke glowingly of the average working class American and railed against the
federal government and big business. Wallace also made clear that he believed in maintaining
southern heritage, or the ingroup, and protecting the Southerner’s rights from the encroachment
of the federal government (Lee 2006).
One of the last major ethnocentric populist figures before the rise of Trump in 2015 was
Pat Buchanan, who employed both ethnocentrism and anti-establishment sentiment. Running as
a presidential candidate, Buchanan criticized the government for being indifferent and no longer
listening to “the forgotten men and women…of this country” (Weakleim 2001). He, like many of
his predecessors, found a target that would stoke ethnocentric sentiment: Immigrants. Buchanan
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was particularly interested in cutting immigration levels and even expressed interest in building a
fence along the Mexican border to keep out migrants (Judis 2016).
While the names of these actors differed, their core messaging of anti-establishment
sentiment and ethnocentrism was very similar. They were suspicious of mainstream politicians
whom they believe did not care about the interests of regular Americans. In addition, while their
target populations differed, ranging from Irish Catholics, Jews, Blacks, and migrants from south
of the U.S. border, they focused their ire on an outsider group while espousing the importance of
an insider group.
Ultimately, the rise of Trump was not new but rather the next iteration of a long history
of ethnocentric populism. Trump’s comments on "draining the swamp" (Quinlan and Tinney
2019) and his calls for shutting down Muslim migration (Judis 2016) are in line with the general
anti-establishment rhetoric and ethnocentric views espoused by his predecessors. However,
unlike his predecessors, Trump won.
The losing streak endured by populist actors came to an end with the rise of Donald
Trump. Although Trump considers himself an “American-First” actor (Judis 2016), his victory
should not be seen in isolation from the success of populist actors outside of the United States.
Trump’s victory occurred in the middle of a rise in ethnocentric populist support in Western
Europe; in the 2014-2015 time period when this region experienced a massive exogenous shock
due to the large numbers of migrants (Judis 2016). For some Europeans, this was a potentially
life-altering event as they feared the possibility of a rise in societal tensions (Karolewski and
Benedikter 2017).
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On Trump’s Rhetoric and Ethnocentric Populism
Is Trump’s campaign rhetoric ethnocentric populist? Trump’s style differed from
previous iterations of Republican political actors. His willingness to call out specific groups such
as Mexicans and Muslims veered away from previous Republican candidates who rarely made
blatantly racialized appeals in the post-Civil Rights era (Mendleberg 2001). In addition, the
Republican Party before Trump was made from career politicians who generally stuck to a
rhetorical style emphasizing policy points including free market economics and the importance
of the traditional family structure (Hawley 2018). Trump, by contrast, was not afraid to employ
rhetoric that emphasized xenophobia and ingroup biases while also criticizing elites.
He criticized politicians as incompetent and insinuated that they should not be called
leaders (Montgomery 2017). He gave nicknames to a number of high-profile rivals, who had
been considered mainstream politicians, such as "Lyin’ Ted" for Senator Ted Cruz, "Low Energy
Jeb" for Governor Jeb Bush, and "Crooked Hillary" for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(Winberg 2017). One of his signature rhetorical points made on the campaign trail involved a
phrase in which he invoked the need to "drain the swamp" (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018).
This line was a direct attack at longtime Washington DC-based politicians and bureaucrats who
were described as uncaring and corrupt. His attacks on the elites were supplemented by
commentary regarding the hardships faced by working class individuals whom he considered the
forgotten people of the United States (Montgomery 2017).
These comments showed the disdain that Trump felt towards mainstream politicians. He
was able to make these attacks because he successfully portrayed himself as an outsider.
Previous Republican presidential candidates had a political background; Mitt Romney served as
governor of Massachusetts, John McCain as US Senator, and George W. Bush as governor of
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Texas. Trump, before running, had spent his professional life in the business and entertainment
world. As a genuine outsider to the political world, his anti-establishment rhetoric held weight.
Trump also utilized rhetoric that could be construed as xenophobic while also ingroupfocused. While Trump made several direct appeals to working class Americans, who constituted
his base, and asserted that curbing immigration and globalization were keys to improving the
lives of the working class (Montgomery 2017). He also directly attacked specific groups; he
stated that illegal migrants of Mexican heritage were “criminals” and “rapists” and called for a
complete shutdown of Muslim migration into the United States (Winberg 2017).
It is particularly Trump’s rhetoric targeting specific social groups in which he most
strongly resembles ethnocentric populists. The leader of France’s National Front/Rally, Marine
Le Pen, made comments that France is fighting a war against Islamism and asserted her desire to
close Islamist mosques (Maksic and Ahmic 2020). Geert Wilders of the Freedom Party in the
Netherlands also made similar comments targeting Islam as a totalitarian ideology (Vossen
2011). Trump, by specifically calling out Muslims as a group to be banned from the United
States, places himself in the tradition of Western European ethnocentric populists.
In addition, Trump has also shown disdain for free trade and invested time on the
campaign trail attacking trade policy. In speeches, he attacked international organizations and
multilateralism. At various points he called out the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Organization).
He also called for protectionist policies and large tariffs to be implemented on economic rivals
such as China (Judis 2016; Judis 2018). This indicates that Trump did not support a purely free
market system. Instead, he wanted a greater degree of government intervention than traditional
Republicans.
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Scholarship on Support for Trump
Many scholars have argued that Trump’s ability to attract working class Americans was a
major key to his electoral success. Specifically examining members of the white working class,
Morgan and Lee (2018), using American National Election Studies (ANES) and American
Community Surveys, found that a substantial number of white working-class individuals flipped
from Obama to Trump in the six states in which Trump managed to win from the Democrats.
Examining 73 formal speeches Trump made on the campaign trail, Lamont, Park, and AyalaHurtado (2017) noted that he consistently made several different appeals to members of the
white working class. He called them victims of globalization and convinced many subgroups
within the working class, such as unemployed or underemployed factory workers,
waiters/waitresses, and small business owners, that they had no place in the Democratic Party
(Berezin 2017).
Closely related to the working-class argument is one of economic anxiety. Mutz (2018)
found that after including a number of different controls such as partisanship, most of the
economic variables were not significant. However, the trade anxiety variable proved to be the
exception and was significant. Morgan (2018) includes several variables such as an economic
indicator that asks for a respondent’s view on their nation’s economy and notes that economic
anxiety was a significant predictor. The salience of the economic anxiety argument is also found
in research on European populism (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Rydgren
and Ruth 2011).
Others have noted that Trump’s willingness to use simple language played a role in his
ability to garner support. Ganzach et al. (2019) found a relationship between verbal ability and
voting for Trump. Using data from the ANES, they noted that higher verbal ability was a
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negative predictor for supporting Trump, but not for Romney. Kayam (2018) noted that Trump’s
word choice on the campaign trail allowed those who had a fourth or fifth grade education to
comprehend him while most of his rivals preferred using ninth-grade level language and longer
and more complex sentences. This language argument has some parallels with the education
argument seen in discussions on support for European populists (Werts et al. 2013).
Trump’s ability to draw support among religious individuals, particularly evangelicals,
has also attracted attention. Gorski (2017) noted that Trump’s willingness to take a pro-life
position during the electoral campaign helped assuage fears held by evangelicals about
supporting him. The author also noted that Hillary Clinton’s support of abortion rights and
Planned Parenthood made it difficult for evangelicals to vote for her. Further aiding Trump’s
case with the evangelical community was his active attempts to present himself as a defender of
Christian heritage. He openly discussed his own Protestant heritage, quoted the Bible while on
the campaign trail, and gave speeches at Christian higher education institutions such as Liberty
University and Oral Roberts University (Whitehead et al. 2018). The willingness of evangelicals
to support Trump represents a major difference between religious individuals in Western Europe
and those in the United States as religiosity tends to dampen support for ethnocentric populists.
Instead, the American Evangelical community’s willingness to support Trump is more in line
with Eastern European religious individuals who have shown no hesitation in supporting such
actors (Allen 2017).
Another camp emphasized a racial threat/status threat argument which outlined Trump’s
ability to attract those who felt uncomfortable with immigration and minorities. These include
several related arguments which use a racial resentment line of reasoning and/or status threat as
an explanation for support. The racial resentment argument, which uses questions related to how
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individuals feel about Blacks, has been used as an explanation for Trump's success. Those who
feel more racial resentment were also driven to support Trump and this result is reflected among
both white men and women (Tien 2017).
Also drawing strong attention from the scholarship was the argument related to status
threat. This feeling of status threat is believed to particularly affect white Americans, the
dominant ethnic/racial group in the United States, due to the coming demographic change in the
United States where white Americans are projected to be a minority (Mutz 2018). Suspicion
towards outsiders was a critical factor behind Trump support with 2016 ANES Pilot Study
indicating that Trump supporters during the primaries were three times more likely than those
who favored Marco Rubio or Jeb Bush to prefer cutting immigration (Donovan and Redlawsk
2018). Major et al. (2018) also noted that higher feelings of status threat led to an increased
probability of support for Trump.
Special focus has been given towards explaining a relationship between negative feelings
towards Muslims and support for Trump. Braunstein (2017) noted that Trump’s casting of
Muslims as outsiders was an important part of his campaign strategy; for example, Trump
recounted a story where he claimed that he saw thousands of Muslims in the U.S. celebrating
9/11 and blamed the Muslim community for not doing enough to prevent domestic terror attacks
such as the June 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting. Lajevardi and Oskooii (2018) and Lajevardi
and Abrajano (2019) also found evidence that negative feelings towards Muslims were an
important predictor of support for Trump. Overall, this argument focusing on racialized anxieties
and status threat are reflected among scholars who argued that fears over immigration was a
major driver of support for populist actors in Europe (Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Ford and
Goodwin 2010; Hangartner et al. 2019).
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Some scholars discussed a strong link between authoritarian tendencies and support for
Trump. MacWilliam (2016) noted that authoritarian tendencies, measured by using questions on
child-rearing meant to estimate a desire for more stability (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), also
proved to be a significant predictor for preferring Trump; this result was not seen among those
who preferred Republican presidential candidate supporters in the 1992-2012 time period
(MacWilliam 2016). In an analysis using the 2016 American National Election Study, Smith and
Hanley (2018) found that authority variables are significant. Ultimately, Trump supporters
wanted a dominant leader who would be willing to defeat those considered to be the enemy, such
as feminists and liberals (Smith 2019). Similar links between authoritarian values and populists
have been found in Europe as well (Eke and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart
2019).
Sexist attitudes, measured through indirect questions such as how much discrimination
was faced by women (Kuklinski et al. 1997) also appear to have played a role in support for
Trump; those who held more sexist attitudes appeared to be more willing to support Trump
(Frasure-Yokley 2018; Ratliff et al. 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018). These results appear to hold
even after controlling for competing explanations such as authoritarian values and partisanship
(Valentino et al. 2018). However, Georgeac et al. (2019) find mixed results in their analysis.
They note that while there is evidence of greater sexist attitudes among Trump supporters in
post-election survey data, there is no statistically significant evidence in pre-election data. There
is also similar work done in the European context where scholars have noted women, on average,
have been less willing to support populists (Harteveld et al. 2015; Rashkova and Zankina 2017;
Spierings and Zaslove 2015).
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Finding Variables: Congruous ESS Variables in the ANES
Finding analogous variables to replicate the European study was difficult. Where a nonanalogous variable is used, the most important priority is finding a question that still measures
the general sentiment of the concept. In addition to these considerations, just like with the ESS,
the frequency in which a question appears is also an important determinant on whether it is
chosen to be a part of the analysis. Ideally, a question should appear over the entire course of the
ANES, but this is not always the case with many of the dataset’s questions being added over
time. There is also the consideration regarding the number of respondents who answered a
question. Ideally the final analysis should have a relatively large number of respondents. There
are 59,944 total respondents in the cumulative 1948-2016 ANES data file and the hope is that a
large number of them will be available for the final analysis.
One of the key control variables in the European analysis, Euroskepticism, represented by
a question on trust in the European Parliament, is not relevant to the American analysis. Because
of its lack of salience on the American side, and also because the ANES does not ask a question
related to the European project, a Euroskepticism variable is not used for the American analysis.
The variable used for anti-establishment sentiment in the American model differed from
the one used in the European models because of data issues. One of populism’s central tenets is
anti-establishment sentiment or a feeling that politicians are uncaring and/or corrupt; in this point
of view, the longtime establishment and regular individuals are in conflict with one another
(Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In the ESS, there is a ten-point "trust in politicians"
question. In the cumulative ANES, there is no equivalent question. However, there was a
question about whether the government is crooked. Unfortunately, this question was
discontinued following the 2012 ANES. A potentially analogous question is one on government
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responsiveness. The question is on a 100-point scale from Least responsive (0) to Most
responsive (100). This variable was reversed so that higher numbers would indicate more antiestablishment sentiment. This question serves as a proxy indicator for anti-establishment
sentiment as a key tenet of populism is that those in charge are uncaring and/or incompetent
(Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In addition, the question has a relatively long history
in the ANES with it being first asked in 1964. Because of these factors, this question was
included.
The variable for alienation in the American model differed from the one used in the
European models because of data issues. There was some evidence indicating that those who felt
alienated from society, or felt that they were not an integral part of society, were more willing to
support outsiders like populists (Oesch 2008). To capture this alienation aspect of populism, the
ESS analysis used a ten-point scale question on how satisfied an individual was with life as a
whole. In the ANES, an analogous question asks whether respondents are satisfied with their life
on a five-point scale, with responses ranging from Extremely satisfied (1) through Not satisfied
at all (5). Unfortunately, this question is only available from 2008 onward.
Instead, a question on whether people like the respondent have any say in what the
government does is used to measure alienation. This is an ordinal variable that has the potential
responses of agree (1), disagree (2) and neither agree nor disagree (3). In the analysis, it has been
recoded so that the responses range from 1-agree, 2-neither agree nor disagree (which was first
used in 1988), and 3-disagree. While it differs from the ESS question, this item still measures a
general feeling of detachment from the mainstream; those who feel like that they have no say are
probably more likely to feel isolated. In addition, this question also has a relatively long history
of usage with first appearance occurring in 1952.
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The variable used for economic policy in the American model is similar to the one used
in the European models. To measure where respondents stood on economic policy, the ESS
analysis uses a question about the respondent's beliefs that the government should reduce
differences in income levels with the responses (with responses ranging from 1-Agree strongly
through 5-Disagree strongly). An analogous question in the ANES asks respondents what they
think about guaranteed jobs and income. It is an ordinal variable in which 1 represents a belief
that the government should see to jobs and a good standard of living while 7 indicates that the
government should let each person get ahead on his or her own. This variable, like the one used
in the ESS, attempts to measure how a respondent feels about the government intervening in
economic matters. It has also been asked continuously in the ANES since 1972.
The variable used for economic satisfaction (anxiety) in the American model is similar to
the one used in in the European models. Like this ordinal variable in the ESS, the ANES has a
similar question that asks respondents how much better or worse the economy has been in the
past year. The potential responses are much better (1), somewhat better (2), stayed same (3),
somewhat worse (4), and much worse (5). Just like its ESS counterpart, the ANES question
measures how individuals feel about the economy and in particular measures whether they feel
hopeful or not. In addition, the question also has a long history as it was first asked in the 1980
ANES.
The variable used for education in the American model is also similar in principle to the
one used in the European models. For education, the ESS used international standards of
education. In the cumulative ANES, there are several different education variables with four, six,
and seven category variables available. The seven-category ordinal variable, which has the
potential responses of: 1-8th grade or less; 9-12th grade, no diploma; 12th grade, diploma or
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equivalency; 12th grade diploma or equivalency plus non-academic; some college, no degree;
junior/community college; BA level degrees; and Advanced degrees including LLB. This sevencategory variable was chosen because it provided more descriptive power then its counterparts.
In addition, it is a longstanding variable available since 1952.
The female variable is identical in both data sets. Starting in the 2016 ANES respondents
were able to answer Other. While there is an argument for incorporating gender fluidity and
seeing gender as a spectrum in a gender variable, for simplicity’s sake the analysis is limited to
respondents who answered male and female. This question has also been variable since the very
start of the ANES.
The variable used to capture religiosity in the American model is similar to the one used
in the European models. In the ANES, there is an ordinal variable on how much guidance one
receives from religion. Respondents are given the choice of: Some guidance (1), Quite a bit (2),
A great deal (3), and Religion not important. For the actual analysis, the coding was reworked so
that there is more order to it. Religion not important was moved to be coded as zero while Some,
Quite a bit, and A great deal stayed the same. This question also has a relatively long history
with it being first asked in the ANES in 1980.
The variable used for self-placement in the American model differed from the one used in
the European models because of data issues. The left-right scale in the ESS is a respondent
placement on a ten-point scale. In the ANES, the same variable exists but it was discontinued
before the 2016 ANES. However, a similar variable exists on the liberal-conservative scale. The
potential responses an individual could give are 1-Extremely liberal, 2-Liberal, 3-Slightly liberal,
4-Moderate, middle of the road, 5-Slightly conservative, 6-Conservative, and 7-Extremely
conservative. While the terms liberal and conservative differ from left and right, they present a
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spectrum in which those on the left favor more government intervention to bring about changes
(Devos et al. 2002) while those on the right generally oppose more intervention to bring about
change (Jost et al. 2003; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). The variable is also available from 1972 and so
has a long history in the ANES.
The variable used for authoritarianism in the American model differed from the one used
in the European models because a similar question did not exist. Authoritarianism within the
context of the American political system does not necessarily refer to an all-powerful dictator.
Rather, it refers to personality traits that seek order and stability (Oliver and Rahn 2016) along
with a desire for a strongman leader who can bring about that stability (Mather and Jefferson
2016). While child-rearing questions have been used to measure authoritarianism (Smith and
Hanley 2018), for the purposes of this project, questions that measures a desire for stability are
used because they better approximate the research done in Europe (Eke and Kuzio 2000;
McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Within the ANES, respondents are asked whether
they believe that federal spending for dealing with crime should be 1-increased, 2-same, or 3decreased (which was, before 2012, an alternative choice of “cut out”). This question is also
available for a long span of the ANES’s lifespan with it first being asked in 1984.
Aside from finding analogous variables, there also needs to be some consideration for the
distinctness of the American case. When Trump took over the Republican Party in 2016, he
gained control over an organization that had maintained a long history with a distinct identity. In
this regard, the success of ethnocentric populism in the American context differed from that of
Western Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, dedicated ethnocentric populist parties had
existed for decades. However, in the United States, an ethnocentric populist outsider took control
over an existing party. This leads to the potential question of whether there was a complete
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turnover in what might be driving support for the Republican Party. Two items in particular,
partisanship and racial resentment, appear to be good explanations for support for the Republican
Party.
For decades, American politics scholars have argued that partisanship is a good
explanation for supporting a specific political party (Campbell et al. 1960). Particularly for those
who are not politically engaged at all times, partisanship can be useful as a quick and simple
heuristic (Zaller 1992) for choosing which party to select on the ballot. Within the context of the
ESS, there is no comparable variable and ultimately one was not included in the European
analysis. However, because this analysis is focused on votes for the Republican Party, a
partisanship control variable is more feasible and is also included for the analysis. In the ANES,
respondents are asked about their party identification. It is a seven-point scale that runs from 1Strong Democrat, 2-Weak Democrat, 3-Independent-Democrat, 4-Independent-Independent, 5Independent-Republican, 6-Weak Republican, and 7-Strong Republican. This question also has a
very long history in the ANES with it first being asked in 1952.
In addition to partisanship, there also appears to be some evidence indicating, particularly
in the Obama years, that racial resentment may have been playing a role in votes for Republican
presidential candidates (Tesler 2016). Among some on the American right, the rise in the
political and social influence of certain groups has been met with suspicion (Henderson and
Hillygus 2011; Knuckey 2011; Mendleberg 2001; Zelizer 2010). Attempting to capture racial
resentment, however, is a complicated task. Because of social desirability bias which makes it
difficult for individuals to outright disclose views on race, several scholars have developed more
indirect ways of measuring racial resentment (Kuklinski et al. 1997; Mendleberg 2001). Instead
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of asking questions such as whether a respondent believes one race is better or superior to
another, the ANES has a number of racial resentment questions that capture these sentiments.
While the ESS analysis would have been better served with the inclusion of a similar
variable, unfortunately the ESS does not have a comparable variable. The ANES has several
racial resentment questions which serve the same purpose. Unfortunately, many of these
questions are not available in the 1996 ANES. One question that is available in the entirety of the
post-Cold War time period is a seven-point hardworking-lazy scale placement for Blacks in
which 1 is hard working and 7 is lazy. This question was first asked in the 1992 ANES and is
available in all presidential year ANES waves.
The next step is to examine the variables related to exogenous shocks. Exogenous shocks
caused by the Migrant Crisis in Europe and Immigrant Crisis in the United States affected
support for populists; in the case of the United States, that would be Trump. As migration levels
had increased substantially on both sides of the Atlantic during the crises, the argument is that
fear over losing one’s dominant status to these newcomers is driving support for ethnocentric
populist actors while also increasing ingroup salience and outgroup biases (Morgan 2018).
These three sentiments should be powerful drivers in the immediate years following the crises
but perhaps not so in the years preceding the crises.
To start, status threat is related to a feeling that one is being displaced and losing one’s
dominant place in society (Morgan 2018). The ANES had a question that lined up well with the
general feeling of status threat which asked respondents how likely was it that immigration levels
would take jobs away from people. Unfortunately, the cumulative ANES does not questions that
are similar to the ESS question used in the previous chapter; in other words, nothing that directly
asks about immigrants serving as a form of competition. However, a question asks respondents
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about their tolerance of different moral standards which ranges from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree
somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly, and 8-DK.
This question measures the general sentiment of status threat because it asks respondents
whether they are willing to accept different individuals and not see them as a potential threat. In
addition, many immigrants would also potentially hold different moral standards as they hail
from different countries. Because this question measures the general suspicion one might have of
outsiders, it is used as the status threat variable for the ANES analysis. Those who responded DK
have been recoded as missing.
Beyond status threat, the theory outlines that increased outgroup bias could lead to more
support for ethnocentric populists. This indicates that suspicion towards outsiders should grow
immediately after the exogenous crises that Western Europe and the United States experienced.
Finding appropriate variables to measure outgroup bias and ingroup salience in the ESS was
difficult; the cumulative ANES unfortunately does not have variables which are a close match to
the ones used in the ESS. However, there are variables available which provide measurements
for the general spirit of ingroup salience and outgroup bias.
For both the ESS and the ANES, similar questions exist that can be used for the outgroup
bias variable. For outgroup bias, in the ESS analysis, a question asking respondents whether they
would allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as the majority: 1-Allow many
to come and live here, 4-Allow none, was used. The ANES has an analogous question asking
about immigration where respondents are asked whether they believe the number of immigrants
to the U.S. should be increased or decreased. The potential answers are 1-Increased, 3-Same as
Now, 5-Decreased.
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Similar questions were available for the ingroup salience variable in both the ESS and
ANES. In the ANES, there is a fairly similar question to the one posed in the ESS. It asks
individuals whether there should be more emphasis on traditional values. The responses range
from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat,
5-Disagree strongly, and 8-DK. Respondents who answered DK were recoded as missing.
Because the importance of demarcating when the exogenous shock occurs, a time dummy
is needed. In the European analysis the year variable was originally titled by ESS Round with the
data from rounds taking place in 2014 and beyond coded as one and all other data as zero. For
the ANES, data from the 1992-2016 time period is used as the variables needed for this analysis
only span that time period. Data taken before the Immigration Crisis of 2014-15 is coded as zero
while the data from the 2016 ANES is coded as one. Table 6.1 below summarizes the ESS
variables and the analogous ANES variables that will be used for the logistic regression.
Table 6.1: List of ESS Variables Along with Analogous ANES Variables
ESS Variable
(Status Threat) Country’s Cultural Life
Undermined or Enriched by Immigrants: 0Cultural Life Undermined, 10-Cultural Life
Enriched
(Ingroup Salience) Important to Follow
Traditions and Customs: 1-Not like me at all,
6-Very much like me

(Outgroup Bias) Allow many/few immigrants
of different race/ethnic group as majority: 1Allow many to come and live here, 4-Allow
none
(Year) 0-All Years Before 2014, 1-2014 and
After
(Euroskepticism) Trust in the European
Parliament: 0 No Trust at All, 10-Complete
Trust

ANES Variable
(Status Threat) Tolerance of Different Moral
Standards: 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree
somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly
(Ingroup Salience) Should be More Emphasis
on Traditional Values 1-Agree strongly, 2Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor
disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree
strongly
(Outgroup Bias) Increase or Decrease
Number of Immigrants to U.S. 1-Increased, 3Same as Now, 5-Decreased
(Year) 0-All Years Before 2016, 1-2016
None as Euroskepticism not Salient in United
States
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(Anti-Establishment) Trust in Politicians: 0No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust

(Anti-Establishment) Government
Responsiveness Index: 0-Least Responsive,
100 Most Responsive

(Alienation) How Satisfied with Life as a
Whole: 0-Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely
Dissatisfied

(Alienation) How Satisfied is Respondent
with Life: 1-Extremely Satisfied, 2-Very
Satisfied, 3-Moderately Satisfied, 4-Slightly
Satisfied, 5-Not Satisfied at All
(Economic Anxiety) How Much Better or
Worse Economy in Past Year: 1-Much Better,
2-Somewhat Better, 3-Stayed Same, 4Somewhat Worse, 5-Much Worse

(Economic Anxiety) How Satisfied with
Present State of Economy in Country: 0Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely
Dissatisfied
(Education) Highest Level of Education: 1ES-ISCED I, 2-ES-ISCED II, 3-ES-ISCED
IIIb, 4-ES-ISCED IIIa, 5-ES-ISCED IV, 6ES-ISCED V1, 7-ES-ISCED V2

(Education) Highest Level of Education:
Collapsed to 1-Less than High School 2-High
School Graduate, 3-Some College, 4Associate Degree, 5-Bachelor’s Degree, 6Anything Above a Bachelor’s Degree

(Female) Gender: Recoded to 0-Male, 1Female

(Female) Respondent-Gender: Recoded to 0Male, 1-Female

(Religiosity) How Religious are You: 0-Not
at all Religious, 10-Very Religious

(Religiosity) How Much Guidance from
Religion: 0-Religion not important, 1-Some,
2-Quite a bit, 3-A great deal
(Authoritarian Values) Federal SpendingDealing with Crime 1-Decreased (before
2012: or cut out), 2-Same, 3-Increased

(Authoritarian Values) Important that
Government is Strong and Ensures Safety: 1Not Like Me at All, 2-Not Like Me 3-A Little
Like Me, 4-Somewhat Like Me, 5-Like Me,
6-Very Much Like Me
None as No Comparable Variable Available

(Ideology) Placement on left right scale: 0left, 10-right

None as No Comparable Variable Available

(Partisanship) Party Identification of
Respondent-7-point scale: 1-Strong
Democrat, 2-Weak Democrat, 3-IndependentDemocrat, 4-Independent, 5-IndependentRepublican, 6-Weak Republican, 7-Strong
Republican
(Ideology) Liberal-Conservative Scale: 1Extremely liberal, 2-Liberal, 3-Slightly
liberal, 4-Moderate, middle of the road, 5Slightly conservative, 6-Conservative, 7Extremely conservative
(Racial Resentment) Hardworking-lazy (7pt)
scale placement for blacks (1 Hard-working,
7-Lazy)
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Analysis
Along with the shock caused by the Immigration crisis of 2014-2015, Trump’s more
direct overtures towards increasing the salience of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup
bias could potentially create a situation in which this exogenous shock continued to be in the
minds of many Americans even in 2016. In other words, it is possible that pre-Trump Republican
voters may not have considered these variables when voting but started to do so in the Trump
era. These observations lead to the following hypotheses.
H1: On average, the coefficient for status threat should be larger in 2016 than in the pre-2016
time period.
H2: On average, the coefficient for ingroup salience should be larger in 2016 than in the pre2016 time period.
H3: On average, the coefficient for outgroup bias should be larger in 2016 than in the pre-2016
time period.
Difference of Means Tests
This section conducts difference of means tests related to ideas and policy positions
relevant to ethnocentric populists to see if respondents believed in ethnocentric populist ideas
before the rise of Trump. To do this, this subsection will first discuss which individuals are a part
of the analysis, the variables which will be examined, and then the relevant time period before
conducting the actual analysis. An important question is whether those who supported the
Republican Party in the pre-Trump era differ from the post-Trump era. In the ANES, those who
are included in this analysis are respondents who in the question of party identification answered
that they are either independent-Republican, weak Republican, or Strong Republican recorded as
Republican while all other individuals were grouped together.
The next step is establishing which variables are relevant for the analysis. Within the
ANES there are a few variables which have been highlighted in the previous section which could
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be useful as a way to track ethnocentric populist sentiments through time. Regarding populism’s
key conflict between the people and elites, the ANES’s question on government responsiveness
(0-Least responsive, 25, 50, 75, and 100-Most responsive) is used. The ethnocentric element can
be captured by the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables. The status threat
variable related to immigration goes from 1-increased, 3-same as now, and 5-decreased. The
ingroup and outgroup variables, or the white and the Hispanic variables respectively, are also
used in their original 100-point scales to provide more descriptive power.
Additional variables could also be useful to look at broader trends. For example, an
economic policy question is also introduced as Trump broke with his Republican predecessors
by deemphasizing free market policies and calling for more government intervention through
increased tariffs. To measure how Republicans and leaners feel about economic policy, the
ANES’s question on guaranteed jobs and income scale (1-government see to job and good
standards of living, 7-government left each person get ahead on his own) is used. In addition,
because of the strong salience of race and ethnicity as part of this analysis, this section uses the
same question as highlighted in the variables section which asks whether Blacks have gotten less
than they deserve over the past few years.
The variables which will be used for the difference of means tests first appeared in the
ANES during different time periods. However, it may be more instructive to only look at the
same 1992-2016 time periods for all the different tests as this is the time period of interest for the
logistic regression analysis.
Finally, the results seek to answer the following questions: Are there any noticeable
difference between Republicans and non-Republicans during the 1992-2016 time period? Is there
any indication that those closer to the Republican Party were trending towards positions that
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indicating an openness towards ethnocentric populism? These questions are of particular interest
as there had been a debate regarding just how polarized the American public is in the 21st century
(Fiorina et al 2008). Here, one might be able to extend the question towards whether white
Americans are increasingly becoming polarized on questions related to ethnocentric populism.
Table 6.2: Anti-Establishment Sentiment
Year
N-GOP Median
GOP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
1992
45.149
43.935
(1,376)
(845)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
+1.214
t(2219)= 1.042
P>|t|=0.2976

1996

43.4
(928)

45.516
(591)

-2.116
t(1517)= -1.412
P>|t|=0.1582

2000

42.543
(932)

41.240
(605)

+1.303
t(1535)= 0.903
P>|t|=0.367

2004

45.511
(607)

30.769
(442)

+14.741
t(1047)=9.490
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

31.091
(1,457)

34.193
(601)

-3.102
t(2056)= -1.868
P>|t|=0.062

2012

45.897
(3,875)

46.715
(1,994)

-0.818
t(5867)= -0.837
P>|t|=0.403

2016

48.208
(2,511)

51.101
(1,726)

-2.893
t(4235)= -2.537
P>|t|=0.011*

*Significant at 95% Level
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The results for the difference of means tests for the anti-establishment sentiment variable
are shown on table 6.2. The anti-establishment sentiment variable is a Government
Responsiveness Index in which zero indicates “Most responsive” and one hundred “Least
responsive.” Through much of the pre-2016 time period, with the exception of 2004, there is no
statistically significant evidence of a major difference. The changes in 2004 may be the result of
the contentious nature of the Iraq War; Republicans may have felt a strong desire to support the
government’s war efforts while Democrats may have felt that the government was making a
mistake. However, beyond that time period, Republicans and non-Republicans, on average,
appear to feel about the same way about government responsiveness through the preImmigration Crisis time period: Feelings are lukewarm towards the government.
By 2016, the situation has changed with both groups, on average, exhibiting their
respective group’s highest level of anti-establishment sentiment in the time period examined in
this analysis. During the primary stage, both sides saw the rise of staunchly populist candidates
with Bernie Sanders running as a Democrat and Donald Trump as a Republican (Judis 2016).
Perhaps owing to the anti-establishment mood of supporters in both parties, Sanders in the
primary stage nearly defeating former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Trump not only
defeated his Republican rivals but also won the presidency.
An analogous result was also presented using ESS data. In Western Europe, among both
populists and non-populists, scores started to trend downwards, among both supporters of nonethnocentric populist parties and ethnocentric populist parties. Overall, on both sides of the
Atlantic, evaluations of the government indicated that there was mounting dissatisfaction by
individuals across the political spectrum. Such an environment would give populist actors a
chance to present their case as outsiders.
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Table 6.3: Status Threat
Year
N-GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
1992
2.357
(1,374)

GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
2.937
(844)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.581
t(2216)= -10.773
P>|t|=0.000*

1996

2.305
(927)

3.107
(588)

-0.802
t(1513)= -13.279
P>|t|=0.000*

2000

2.282
(933)

2.752
(601)

-0.470
t(1532)= -7.348
P>|t|=0.000*

2004

2.198
(605)

2.715
(442)

-0.517
t(1045)= -7.356
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

2.216
(1,456)

2.737
(601)

-0.521
t(2055)= -9.093
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

2.267
(3,622)

2.999
(1,854)

-0.732
t(5474)= -22.738
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

2.129
(2,137)

2.825
(1,478)

-0.696
t(3613)= -18.112
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
The results for the difference of means tests for the status threat variable are shown on
table 6.3. The question asked respondents about their tolerance of different moral standards with
the potential responses ranging from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor
disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, and 5-Disagree strongly. The results from the entire time period
indicate that there are strong differences, on average, between the two groups. For every year,
248

Republican supporters on average gave higher scores than their non-Republican counterparts.
Such a result indicates that Republican supporters are, on average, less willing to accept those
who live differently. An ethnocentric populist-style candidate’s message would be received more
readily among Republican supporters under these conditions.
While it is clear from the data that an ethnocentric populist candidate would find a more
receptive audience in the Republican Party’s support base, there is no evidence indicating that
those in the party were becoming less tolerant by 2016. On the other hand, those who support the
Democratic Party and those who considered themselves independents had the lowest average in
2016. Overall, the result indicates that there was a consistently strong gap between the two group
of supporters through the entire time period.
The strong gap between Republican supporters and non-Republican supporters in the
1992-2016 time period mirrors the results seen among ethnocentric populist supporters and nonethnocentric populist supporters. In Western Europe, the two types of supporters showed clear
gaps in how much status threat they felt with ethnocentric populist supporters, on average,
feeling more status threat.
Table 6.4: Ingroup Salience
Year
N-GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
1992
4.049
(1,377)

GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
4.365
(843)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.317
t(2218)= -7.300
P>|t|=0.000*

1996

4.132
(927)

4.485
(590)

-0.353
t(1515)= -7.263
P>|t|=0.000*

2000

4.167
(932)

4.547
(605)

-0.380
t(1535)= -7.552
P>|t|=0.000*
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2004

4.387
(607)

3.717
(442)

-0.670
t(1047)= -9.604
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

3.887
(1,457)

4.319
(602)

-0.432
t(2057)= -8.148
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

3.574
(3,617)

4.290
(1,855)

-0.716
t(5470)= -21.961
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

3.283
(2,139)

4.188
(1,480)

-0.905
t(3617)=-22.481
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
The results for the difference of means tests for the ingroup salience variable are shown
on table 6.4. Respondents were asked if there “Should be More Emphasis on Traditional Values”
with the potential answers ranging from 1-Disagree strongly to 5-Agree strongly. The results
indicate that for the entire time period, there is a statistically significant difference between the
two groups. In addition, except for a slight respite in 2008, the two groups are moving in
opposite directions from one another. Those who identify as Republican supporters are
increasingly closer to stating that they agree strongly that that there should be more emphasis on
traditional values while non-Republican supporters are moving the opposite direction. There also
appears to be a growing gap between the two groups with the difference the highest in 2016.
The Republican Party’s support base moving towards greater ingroup salience is like
what was seen among ethnocentric populist party supporters in the ESS analysis. In the previous
chapter, the results indicated that ethnocentric populist party supporters were increasingly feeling
greater ingroup salience than their non-ethnocentric populist party supporters. On both sides of
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the Atlantic, there is at least one group of supporters that have moved towards feeling more
ingroup salience.
Table 6.5: Outgroup Bias
Year
N-GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
1992
3.773
(1,341)

GOP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)
3.885
(818)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.113
t(2157)= -2.002
P>|t|=0.045*

1996

4.007
(914)

4.111
(582)

-0.103
t(1494)= -1.637
P>|t|=0.102

2000

3.631
(1,072)

3.827
(658)

-0.196
t(1728)= -3.040
P>|t|=0.002*

2004

3.675
(593)

3.820
(439)

-0.146
t(1030)= -1.751
P>|t|=0.080

2008

3.557
(1,430)

3.621
(596)

-0.064
t(2024)= -0.932
P>|t|=0.351

2012

3.446
(3,545)

3.804
(1,827)

-0.358
t(5370)
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

3.180
(2,129)

4.203
(1,476)

-1.023
t(3603)
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
The results for the difference of means tests for outgroup bias variable are shown on table
6.5. The question on immigration gave respondents the potential options to respond either 1Increased, 3-Same as now, or 5-Decreased. Although supporters of the Republican Party on
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average gave higher scores than their non-Republican supporting counterparts, for much of the
time period examined here, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups
except for data from 2000.
However, there is evidence of a growing divergence between the two groups by the
2010s. The 2012 and 2016 analysis indicate that the two groups are moving in opposite
directions. Republican supporters are, on average, moving closer to wanting immigration
decreased, or feeling more outgroup bias, while their non-Republican supporting counterparts are
moving closer to stating that they want immigration levels kept the same. Notably, nonRepublican supporters recorded their lowest averages during this time period; in other words,
those who did not support the Republican Party seem to feel less outgroup bias as time passes.
Of note is that the gap between the two groups started to grow before Trump announced
his candidacy; 2012 showed evidence of a significant gap. This result perhaps provides some
evidence that by the time Trump announced his candidacy in 2015, supporters of the Republican
Party were already starting to adopt more hardline stances on immigration. If this is the case,
then rather than activating latent feelings on immigration that were not active prior to the 2016
election cycle, it appears that Trump was taking advantage of an already occurring change
among Republican Party supporters.
The results from the data using American respondents differ from Western European
respondents. Among non-ethnocentric populist supporters and ethnocentric populist supporters,
there was clear evidence of a statistically significant difference between the two groups through
the entire 2002-2012 time period. However, in the United States, there was no evidence of a
significant difference between the two groups until the 2010s.

252

Table 6.6: Gov. Econ. Intervention
Year
N-GOP Median
GOP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
1992
4.105
3.043
(1,316)
(839)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
+1.062
t(2153)= 14.003
P>|t|=0.000*

1996

4.018
(935)

2.807
(611)

+1.211
t(1544)=14.265
P>|t|=0.000*

2000

3.733
(565)

2.745
(337)

+0.988
t(900)=8.496
P>|t|=0.000*

2004

4.371
(645)

2.980
(445)

+1.391
t(1088)=13.000
P>|t|=0.000*

2008

4.487
(714)

2.957
(299)

+1.531
t(1011)=12.259
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

4.396
(3,563)

2.744
(1,896)

+1.652
t(5457)=34.961
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

4.390
(2,183)

2.769
(1,577)

+1.621
t(3758)=30.196
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
The results for the difference of means tests for the economic variable are shown on table
6.6. A guaranteed jobs and income scale, which ran from 1-Government let each person get
ahead on his own to 7-Government let each person get ahead on his own, served as an economic
policy variable. The analysis indicates a consistent gap between the two groups. On average,
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supporters of the Republican Party are consistently more suspicious of more government
intervention in the economy.
The overall lack of a shift among Republicans in their stance regarding government
intervention in economic matters makes Trump’s messaging on economic matters interesting.
Unlike previous mainstream Republican politicians who preferred less government intervention
in economic matters (Hawley 2017), Trump argued for more government intervention in
economic matters; in particular he was very forceful in stating that the United States should
impose protectionist measures, such as tariffs, to better protect the American worker, pull out of
free trade agreements, and calling for more infrastructure spending (Judis 2016). While it may be
the case that Republicans in 2016 may have become more receptive of specific interventionist
policies, there is no evidence indicating that these individuals have become more receptive to
more government intervention as a whole.
In Western Europe, there was less evidence indicating a strong difference between
ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists on the question of government intervention
in the economy. While there was evidence of a difference in the 2000s, with non-populist
supporters more likely to prefer more intervention, for much of the 2010s, there was no evidence
of a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Table 6.7: Racial Resentment
Year
N-GOP Median
GOP Median
(Observations
(Observations
in Parentheses)
in Parentheses)
1992
4.008
4.176
(1,324)
(818)

1996

3.821
(900)

4.194
(571)

Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance
-0.168
t(2140)= -2.972
P>|t|= 0.003*
-0.373
t(1469)= -5.674
P>|t|= 0.000*
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2000

3.931
(900)

4.140
(592)

-0.209
t(1490)= -3.144
P>|t|=0.001*

2004

3.818
(593)

4.032
(440)

-0.214
t(1031)= -2.918
P>|t|=0.004*

2008

3.623
(1,584)

4.232
(630)

-0.609
t(2212)= -8.214
P>|t|=0.000*

2012

3.631
(3,608)

4.179
(1,851)

-0.549
t(5457)= -13.489
P>|t|=0.000*

2016

3.611
(2,093)

4.171
(1,459)

-0.560
t(3550)= -11.770
P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level
The results for the difference of means tests for the racial resentment variable are shown
on table 6.7. The variable uses a seven-point scale which asked respondents to place blacks on
how hardworking they are, with 1 meaning hard working and 7 meaning lazy served as a racial
resentment indicator. Just like the economic question, there is a statistically significant difference
between the groups for each time period. Republican supporters gave, on average, higher scores
than their counterparts. The average score decreased for non-Republican respondents over time,
increasing the gap between the two groups. Like on the question on immigration that measured
outgroup bias, the data indicates that in the 1992-2016 time period, the two sides started to
diverge. For the most part, the average scores for those in the Republican camp slightly
decreased from 2008-2016 while the scores in the non-Republican camp continued to move in
the opposite direction.
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The comparison with the Western European case yielded results that shared some
similarities but also differed. Often anti-establishment sentiment, feeling of status threat, ingroup
salience, and outgroup bias, which are important components of ethnocentric populism, were
most salient in the years during and after the Migrant Crisis. However, this is not always
observed in the American case. Republican Party supporters recorded their strongest feelings of
anti-establishment sentiment during the Trump campaign. On this front they matched up well
with ethnocentric populist supporters. However, on ingroup salience and outgroup bias, there
appeared to be no activation among Republican Party supporters like supporters of ethnocentric
populist parties experienced in Europe. In other words, it appears that Republican Party
supporters more closely resembled ethnocentric populists in the 2016 time period but did not
completely resemble them.
Logistic Regression Analysis Results
This subsection focuses on examining the results for a logistic regression analysis in
which support for the Republican Party presidential candidate is the dependent variable. This
analysis provides evidence indicating whether there is temporal variation in the size of the
coefficients of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, discusses the effects of the
control variables, and compares the results with the previous chapter.
Table 6.8 Logistic Regression for GOP Presidential Support
Independent
Vote for GOP Presidential Candidate (Dependent)
Variables
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
Post 2012
0.342*
(0.141)
Status Threat

0.151*
(0.071)

0.142
(0.090)

0.218
(0.113)

Ingroup Salience

0.393*
(0.076)

0.340*
(0.097)

0.577*
(0.103)
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Outgroup Bias

0.277*
(0.053)

0.203*
(0.063)

0.458*
(0.092)

Anti-Establishment
Sentiment

0.004
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)

0.006*
(0.003)

Alienation

-0.016
(0.071)

-0.106
(0.088)

0.195
(0.124)

-0.254*
(0.045)

-0.209*
(0.057)

-0.379*
(0.071)

Economic Anxiety

0.656*
(0.064)

0.639*
(0.076)

0.827*
(0.128)

Education

-0.024
(0.046)

0.032
(0.055)

-0.194*
(0.083)

Female

0.026
(0.133)

-0.040
(0.163)

0.115
(0.230)

Religiosity

0.109
(0.056)

0.126
(0.069)

0.087
(0.094)

Left-Right Scale

0.503*
(0.060)

0.474*
(0.071)

0.484*
(0.116)

Authoritarianism

-0.053
(0.109)

-0.026
(0.135)

-0.075
(0.182)

Republican Party ID

0.864*
(0.043)

0.913*
(0.053)

0.797*
(0.073)

Racial Resentment

0.074
(0.050)

0.103
(0.062)

0.056
(0.086)

Constant

10.329*
(0.624)

-10.196*
(0.750)

-10.946*
(1.178)

Gov. Econ.
Intervention
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N
*Significant at 95%

6,728

4,714

2,014

The results from Table 6.8 indicate that there was a positive relationship between many
of the control variables and the dependent variable. The results for anti-establishment sentiment,
economic anxiety, religiosity, the left-right scale, party ID, and racial resentment all consistently
indicated that there was a positive relationship with the dependent variable. The religiosity and
racial resentment variables were not significant at any time period. The anti-establishment
variable was the only one to become significant in the post-Immigration Crisis time period. Its
growing significance provides some evidence that a populist streak had entered the Republican
Party.
For some variables, there was a negative relationship. This was the case for the
government intervention and authoritarianism variables. The former was significant in all time
periods while the later was not in any time period. As the Republican Party was considered a
mainstream right-wing party for many years before the rise of Trump (Hawley 2017), the general
aversion to government intervention in economic matters is not surprising.
There were also variables that switched directions in the post-Immigration Crisis time
period. There is a positive and non-significant relationship between the education variable and
the dependent variable in the pre-time period but this becomes a negative relation that is
significant in the post-time period. The gender (female) variable, while not significant in either
time period, shifts from having a negative relationship to a positive one. The education, along
with the anti-establishment sentiment variable, provides some evidence that a shift had occurred
among supporters of the Republican Party.
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The directions of the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables are
similar to what was seen in the European models, but they differ in terms of significance.
Overall, the directions indicate a positive relationship just like with the European models with
the coefficients growing in size between the pre- and post-periods. However, the status threat
variable is not significant when divided between periods while the ingroup salience and the
outgroup bias variables are significant in both time periods.
Unlike the European models, the American analysis produces less evidence that conforms
to the theory. While there is evidence of a growth in the size of the coefficients of the theory
variables, the variables are either not significant in both the pre- and post-time periods, like
status threat, or are significant in both time periods.
In addition, there are some other important distinguishing factors. For example, the
direction of the education coefficient moves in opposing directions. In the U.S., the Trump era
has brought in many individuals with less education and perhaps indicates a growing contingent
of working-class support for the Republican Party. However, in Western Europe, the opposite
occurred. Following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, the education variable lost significance.
Whereas in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period those with less education, or those with a profile
closer to a member of the working class, were systematically supporting ethnocentric populist
parties, the beginning of the Crisis brought in a new group of individuals with different
educational profiles.
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Table 6.9 Probability of Supporting the Republican Presidential Candidate
(Variables Held at Means)
Predicted Probability
All
Pre-2012
Post-2012
Status Threat (Lowest
Value)
32.659%*
31.880%*
31.912%*
Status Threat (Highest
Value)
41.490%*
38.947%*
49.302%*
Ingroup Salience (Lowest
Value)
20.736%*
26.618%*
9.485%*
Ingroup Salience (Highest
Value)
57.704%*
55.576%*
63.652%*
Outgroup Bias (Lowest
Value)
34.634%*
38.581%*
23.182%*
Outgroup Bias (Highest
Value)
56.542%*
54.428%*
60.038%*
*Significant at 95%

The results shown on Table 6.9 indicate that the predicted probability of support
increases significantly between those who answered with the lowest value of a theory variable
and those who answered with the highest value. The difference between those who answered
with the lowest and highest values of status threat is about 7 percent in the pre-time period but
this jumps to over 17 percent in the post-time period. There is also a significant jump for ingroup
salience too with the difference being about 29 percent in the pre-Immigrant Crisis time period
and about 53 percent in the post-time period. Similar results can also be seen with the outgroup
bias variable where the difference between the lowest and highest value goes up from about 16
percent to about 37 percent. Overall, these differences are much greater than the single digit
differences often seen in the European models.
Conclusion
The big takeaway from this chapter is that the theory’s argument regarding exogenous
shocks affecting populist support does not conform with the results of the American analysis as
much as it did with the Western European analysis. In addition, the data from the difference of
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means tests and the logistic regression analyses indicate that for some of the variables, such as
anti-establishment sentiment, there is evidence that by 2016 Republican supporters had become
more similar to ethnocentric populists. However, in other ways, the two groups of voters differed
markedly; for example, ethnocentric populist supporters rely heavily on men for support while
this is not the case for the Republican Party even in the post-Immigration Crisis time period.
What the results for chapter five, and to an extent chapter six, indicate is that exogenous
shocks can matter. Sometimes, due to the result of exogenous shocks such as the Migrant Crisis
and the Immigration Crisis, sentiments can be activated within a broader population of
supporters. It is possible that new supporters who have different demographic characteristics
may come to support a populist party as evidenced by the influx of less educated supporters of
the Republican Party.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Beyond a Shock to the System
Introduction
What drives support for ethnocentric populist actors? This was the fundamental question
that started this investigation. The first three chapters provided an outline of ethnocentric
populism and how this project sought to conduct its analysis. The following three chapters
provided the analysis.
The introductory chapter discussed two events which occurred in 2014-15: The Migrant
Crisis in Western Europe and the Immigration Crisis in the United States. After initially mapping
out the situation on both sides of the Atlantic, chapter two discussed research related to
ethnocentric populism. It also provided definitions for key concepts such as left, right, and
populism. The rest of the chapter was dedicated to presenting a theory that discussed the
importance of exogenous shocks affecting support for ethnocentric populist parties.
Chapter three discussed the research design. An important component of the chapter was
case selection, and the decision was made to examine thirteen different Western European
countries. These countries were divided into two different groups: One group of nine countries
that saw an increase in support for ethnocentric populist parties in the immediate aftermath of the
Migrant Crisis and another group of four that did not. The United States, which witnessed an
ethnocentric populist-style candidate win an election, was also added the analysis as a separate
case. The chapter also discussed the use of party manifestos as the basis for the creation of
ethnocentric populism scores and left-right scores which were used to determine which parties
should be considered ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist parties. The last
section of the chapter focused on discussing the datasets that were to be used for the analytical
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chapters and explained why the European Social Survey (ESS) and the American National
Election Study (ANES) worked well for the project.
Chapter four provided qualitative descriptions of the thirteen Western European countries
and presented placement analysis for the parties that won at least one seat in the national
election. This chapter provided preliminary analysis on ethnocentric populist actors through the
use of party placement. Examining results of the party placement analysis from the pre- and postMigrant Crisis time periods indicated that many of the parties that saw increased electoral
support did not moderate their stances. In other words, being an outlier did not necessarily
impede an ethnocentric populist party from earning support.
Chapters five and six focused on the idea that exogenous shocks can affect support for
ethnocentric populist actors. In Western Europe, outgroup bias became a significant variable
only in the post-2012 model. One important takeaway from chapter five is that in the fourcountry model, there were not as many diverse factors driving support for ethnocentric populists.
For example, economically anxious individuals do not appear to have been supporting
ethnocentric populists to the extent that they were in the nine countries. In addition, those who
felt anger at the establishment or those who felt alienated do not appear to be systematically
supporting ethnocentric populists in the four countries where support did not increase. There also
appears to be less support from women in the four countries. This failure to garner a support
structure like the nine countries in the analysis may have hurt their electoral results. This chapter
also provided some insights into support for right-wing populist parties compared to more
general ethnocentric populist parties, with the evidence indicating that the economic positions of
the voters line up well with the more right-leaning economic positions of right-wing populist
parties.
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In chapter six, which focused on the United States, one major takeaway was the growth
of the marginal effects of ingroup salience and outgroup bias in 2016. While the outgroup bias
variable did not reach significance in 2016, the evidence indicates that GOP voters in the 2016
time period were becoming similar to ethnocentric populist voters in Western Europe in other
ways. For example, GOP voters in 2016 appeared to be economically anxious and to feel antiestablishment sentiment just like their counterparts across the Atlantic Ocean. However, GOP
supporters, even in the Trump era, still differ from ethnocentric populist party supporters in
Western Europe; for example, women are a much stronger component of the GOP’s base of
support than they are among ethnocentric populist parties.
This investigation provided some evidence indicating that exogenous shocks matter. The
rest of the conclusion will discuss the substantive real-world implications of the research and
comment on future avenues for research. It will then conclude with some parting thoughts.
The Contribution: On the Research Side and Substantive Real-World Implications
One of the major difficulties of this project was making a major contribution to a topic,
populism, that has received strong interest from scholars (Drapalova and Wegrich 2021; Lacatus
2019; Pauwels 2014; Peters and Pierre 2019). These authors have made many important
contributions that have helped increase understanding of this subject, but a question remains:
Where does this project fit into the grand scheme of populism research? Ultimately, this project
sought to build on existing research on changes through time, broaden intercontinental dialogue
on populism, and help increase the generalizability of findings.
The first contribution involved showcasing the importance of exogenous shocks.
Previous research has emphasized the importance of exogenous shocks causing changes in
preferences and this project attempted to build on the existing foundations. In the Western
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European context, changes in attitudes and preferences occurred after the 9/11 attacks (Bowen
2009), following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013), and
after the 7/7 bombings (Ratcliffe and Von Hinke Kessler Scholder 2015). This project sought to
extend the relationship between shocks and changes in preferences by bringing the Migrant
Crisis and Immigrant Crisis into the discussion.
The second contribution involved extending the research on European populism to the
case of the United States. If scholars argue that Trump is a right-wing populist (Donovan and
Redlawsk 2018; Montgomery 2017), then further research on Trump needs to be done using a
right-wing populist lens. Future research on Trump will need to draw not only from American
scholars but also those who have researched right-wing populism in other contexts. In other
words, the available research on right-wing populism in the European context needs to be
actively applied when examining Trump and his supporters. This project sought to examine
whether the findings presented in the European case can be generalized to ethnocentric populist
attitudes and support for such parties to the United States. The hope is that future projects
attempt to use the European literature and findings on populism as a framework for conducting
research related to the United States.
This section also focuses on what the analysis means for the real-world. During the late
2010s, ethnocentric populist actors gained considerable influence in several countries due to their
electoral success. In some places, such as Austria, they secured a place in a coalition
government. If these electoral victories mean ethnocentric populists taking power and
influencing public policy, then it is important to understand why members of the electorate are
voting for these actors and what supporters expect from these parties if they enter government.
From the research presented here, it appears that an important driving force for support in the
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late 2010s is a feeling of status threat. Those who are voting for these actors may be fearful that
the large number of immigrants entering their countries are bringing fundamental societal-level
changes.
Assuming that ethnocentric populists continue to remain a powerful force in these
countries, what sort of policies might they implement? If supporters of these actors fear the large
numbers of newcomers entering their countries, then ethnocentric populists in power may push
for legislation which would cut immigration. Such policies would not be without their detractors.
For example, cutting the number of immigrants entering a country could elicit the anger of
business groups, which rely on immigration as a source of labor, and people of color who might
feel that they are being targeted as many immigrants to the Western world hail from non-White
majority countries. These decisions could lead to bitter conflicts. Finding a middle ground could
prove to be very difficult; ethnocentric populists would desire strong cuts to immigration while
business and minority groups would prefer no cuts at all. The wide gap could make negotiations
difficult.
Future Avenues for Research
While this dissertation sought to show a link between ethnocentric attitudes and support
for ethnocentric populist parties, there are many more questions related to this topic could
provide extend this project. Some of these include the use of experiments, modifying the existing
model to answer the question of what might drive away support, and expanding the time frame
beyond the crisis time period could provide more generalizable answers. In addition, further
highlighting the point of connecting regions and expanding generalizability could elucidate this
investigation’s contributions.
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Experiments
While this investigation primarily made use of regression analyses, it may also benefit
from the use of an experiment. As the theory of this investigation focused on how exogenous
shocks can change the way that individuals feel and leading to an increase in support for
ethnocentric populist parties, an experiment might better help scholars understand how shocks
can affect support.
The experiment could make use of the racialized nature of both the Migration Crisis and
the Immigration Crisis. In the Migration Crisis, most of the migrants from the former
predominately hail from Africa and Asia (Judis 2016) while those involved in the Immigration
Crisis predominately hail from Central America (Zug 2014). Images showing many individuals
who look nothing like the dominant population entering Western Europe and the United States
may have been a shock to many who were watching the situation unfold.
One potential way to structure the experiment would be taking a page from an experiment
run by Gilliam and Iyengar (2000). The authors examined local television news and wanted to
know if looking at news reels of Black crime suspects would affect a respondent’s feelings
towards hardline crime prevention measures. The subjects were Americans from the L.A. metro
area with White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Asians recruited. All were exposed to one of four
different treatments: Some were exposed to a story in which the murder suspect was a Black
male. Others were shown the same story but with a White male suspect. Another group was
presented an edited version of the story where mentions of the suspect’s race was omitted while
the final group was exposed to a different story not related to crime. The authors found that
White respondents exposed to the Black suspect news reels were more willing to accept hardline
measures, this was not the case among Black respondents.
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Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) provide at least one interesting avenue for extending the
analysis of this dissertation. Their findings on the racialization of media images and the power of
these images to affect a respondent’s policy position could be extended to show how the
Migration and Immigration Crises affected policy positions. Their division of the test subject
pool into people of different races and ethnic groups helped show that the same treatment can
results in different effects. The 2022 Ukrainian Refugee Crisis provides a way to conduct this
type of analysis.
On Ethnocentrism Driving Voters Away
Another potential avenue of future research is examining whether ethnocentric populist
attitudes drive away certain groups. Research indicates that some communities may be repelled
by ethnocentrism, including members of the LGBTQ+ community (Spierings et al. 2017),
women (Mayer 2013), and ethnic minorities (Pettersson et al. 2016). Despite some indications
that these groups would oppose ethnocentric populist actors, there is no current evidence linking
these communities and their level of support for ethnocentric populists.
For example, there is evidence indicating that ethnocentric populism may not repel all
LGBTQ+ individuals. A common foundational logic among many ethnocentric populists is the
adulation of the heterosexual nuclear family as the core foundation of nation building. However,
to court members of the LGBTQ+ community, a number of ethnocentric populists, such as Geert
Wilders, have argued that tolerance for “alternative lifestyles” is a core value of Western society.
These populist actors frame themselves as champions protecting the LGBTQ+ community from
immigrants who might mean them harm. This attempt at building support has worked to a degree
as there is evidence indicating that a segment of the LGBTQ+ community support actors like
Geert Wilders (Spierings et al. 2017).
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Despite earlier evidence indicating that women tended not to support ethnocentric
populists, more recent evidence indicates that, at least in the case of the National Front, this
generalization no longer holds. Populist rhetoric involving heterosexual nuclear families often
promotes traditional gender norms which may not be agreeable to many women (Mudde and
Kaltwasser 2015). However, the National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, has shown a commitment
to moving away from rhetoric that may have alienated many women in the past (Shields 2013).
Her attempts at softening the image of the party appears to have worked as a larger percentage of
the National Front’s base is now composed of women than in years past (Mayer 2013).
There is also evidence that despite the strongly ethnocentric nature of these actors, at
times minority groups have supported either the parties themselves or their policies directly. One
of the United Kingdom Independence Party’s core policy positions, leaving the European Union,
was favored by some South Asians (Leidig 2019). There is also evidence that at least some
Indian immigrants have supported the Freedom Party in the Netherlands (Roopram and van
Steenbergen 2014). The Sweden Democrats is home to a wide variety of individuals of
immigrant backgrounds such as those hailing from South Korea, Iraq, and Poland (Pettersson et
al. 2016). Despite the ethnocentric nature of these actors, they have managed to find supporters
from all different backgrounds.
While the literature indicates that certain demographic groups may, on average, be
repelled by ethnocentric populism, this is not universally the case. Rather, there are at least some
examples of individuals from backgrounds that may be outside of the core constituency of
ethnocentric populists showing their support. It will be interesting to see whether there will be a
systematic shift in which ethnocentric populists are able to bring in more new supporters.
On Religiosity: The Case of the United States and Brazil
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A potential extension of this project could be through further examining the relationship
between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors. More religiosity could
theoretically decrease support for ethnocentric populist parties as there is a mismatch between
ethnocentric populist parties and religious individuals. Ethnocentric populist parties tend to treat
outsiders, such as Muslim immigrants, as a threat. Such assertions clash with Christian teachings
that emphasize compassion for those in need (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).
While this finding is important, research need to be extended cross-nationally. In the
2010s, Donald Trump of the United States and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil both won presidential
elections running ethnocentric populist-style campaigns. A cursory examination of how religious
individuals in these countries reacted to their campaigns indicates that the relationship between
religiosity and support for ethnocentric populists is more complicated than previous recognized.
Yet in the United States and Brazil, evangelicals supported Trump (Gorski 2017) and Bolsonaro
(Burity 2021). As the United States and Brazil are two recent examples of a rise in ethnocentric
populism, an examination of how religiosity might affect support for an ethnocentric populist
actor in these two countries may provide more generalizable findings.
In Brazil, evangelicals maintained a clear world view and were interested in advancing a
specific agenda. They were strongly interested in maintaining God as a central figure in life and
strongly championed the traditional family of a male provider, wife, and children (dos Santos
Duarte 2020). They were also staunch nationalists who were also deeply suspicious of nonmainstream Brazilian culture (Kibuuka 2020). In addition, because they were a minority in a
predominately Catholic Brazil, they were interested in maintaining their political independence
as a group (Burity 2021). Many evangelicals also maintained an authoritarian streak and had
supported the military dictatorship (dos Santos Duarte 2020).
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Evangelicals were, however, mostly ignored by the political class. Unlike the Western
European situation where religious individuals were actively courted by Christian Democrat and
mainstream right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009), Brazilian evangelicals were mostly
ignored by political figures for much of the twentieth century despite their strong allegiance to
the military dictatorship that had dominated much of the late twentieth century (dos Santos
Duarte 2020; Kibuuka 2020) partly due to making up only a small percent of the nation’s
population (Burity 2021).
However, evangelicals were strongly interested in influencing the political process.
During the 2000s, evangelicals worked with the leftist Worker’s Party, which did not share these
values but were in power for much of the early 21st century, to influence policy. However,
growing discord following an economic crisis and emergence of government corruption (Burity
2021) eventually led to a full breakdown in relations when Evangelicals called for removing
President Dilma Rousseff, a member of the Worker’s Party, from office (dos Santos Duarte
2020).
Jair Bolsonaro, a former military officer turned politician, courted evangelicals and
presented himself as their champion when he ran for president in 2018 (Kibuuka 2020). “God
Above All!” was a key campaign slogan used by Bolsonaro’s campaign and biblical verses such
as “Know the truth and the truth will set you free [John 8:32]” were used extensively during the
campaign (dos Santos Duarte 2020). Bolsonaro’s authoritarian slant (Burity 2020), staunchly
nationalist views, and his suspicion of outsiders (Setzler 2020) resonated with evangelicals who
were more than willing to support then candidate Bolsonaro (Kibuuka 2020).
While many Brazilian evangelicals embraced Bolsonaro, the reaction to Donald Trump
was more muted. Part of the reluctance was rooted in the life that Trump led before running for
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office. As someone who had been divorced multiple times and bragged about grabbing women,
his lifestyle went against what many American evangelicals viewed to be good. Others were
reluctant to support a man who had used highly racially divisive rhetoric. Because of these
issues, many evangelicals refused to support Trump and during the primaries preferred to support
other candidates such as Ben Carson, Ted Cruz, or Marco Rubio (Gorski 2017).
However, many evangelicals came around to the idea of voting for Trump due to several
different reasons. One important factor was abortion. During the 2016 campaign trail, Trump
steadfastly asserted his opposition to abortion, an important issue to many American
evangelicals, while his primary opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, endorsed
Planned Parenthood and abortion (Judis 2016). Trump’s messaging of an America that is in the
middle of a cultural and economic decline also spoke to evangelicals who also believed that
America was not on the right path (Gorski 2017). Trump also had an additional advantage in the
strong connection between evangelicals and the Republican Party. By the time that Trump was
running for office, evangelicals had been a part of the Republican Party for many decades
(Margolis 2020). These factors all helped Trump convince evangelicals to support him.
This short examination into the American and Brazilian situations indicate that the causal
relationship between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors is a complicated one.
Western European religious individuals’ general reluctance to support ethnocentric populists, the
open embrace of Bolsanaro by Brazilian evangelicals, and the view of Trump as “the lesser of
two evils” (Gorski 2017) by American evangelicals all indicate the relationship between
religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors may not be clear-cut. Rather, different
groups of religious individuals appear to react very differently.
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Conclusion
The investigation provided in this dissertation attempted to create a framework to analyze
support for ethnocentric populist actors. The theory was that exogenous shocks such as the
Immigration Crisis and Migration Crisis affect support for populist actors. The analysis provided
evidence that outgroup bias became activated among Western European supporters of
ethnocentric populists following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis.
Considering the role played by exogenous shocks in the growing electoral support for
ethnocentric populist actors, Western powers may consider creating plans to help mitigate major
political crises in other countries; the Syrian Civil War and gang violence in Central America
were primary drivers of migrants in Western Europe and the United States respectively. Helping
aid these types of conflicts could stem migration into the Western World which in turn would
deprive ethnocentric populist actors an important driving force behind their rise.
While the analysis presented here focuses on the populist wave in a select group of
Western countries, one possible extension of this project is the analysis of the reasons behind the
support for Brazilian president Jair Bolsanaro. While a cursory glance does not appear to indicate
that his rise was driven by immigration-related exogenous shocks, further investigations will be
needed to see how similar or different supporters of Bolsanaro are to their counterparts in the
United States or Western Europe. Extending this project to Brazil will be the next step in
attempting to answer the question on what is driving support for ethnocentric populists in the late
2010s.
Understanding why some individuals have chosen to support ethnocentric populist actors
may remain an important task for many years to come. If support for such politicians is here to
stay, an inevitable clash between those who want to cut immigration and those who wish to keep
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immigration at current levels may be a recurring political battle. Finding a negotiated settlement
between two sides that want two very different outcomes is not an easy task. However, the first
step of attempting to understand what drives supporters of ethnocentric populists is perhaps
somewhat clearer now than it was in the past. The next step will be to find a solution that both
sides can accept.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Ethnocentric Populist Calculations

Country and Party
Austria (September 2013)
Austrian People's Party
Social Democratic Party
Freedom Party
NEOS
The Greens
Team Stronach
Austria (October 2017)
Austrian People's Party
Social Democratic Party
Freedom Party
NEOS
PILZ
Belgium (June 2010)
New Flemish Alliance
Socialist Party
Christian Democratic and Flemish
Reformist Movement
Flemish Socialist Party
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Vlaams Belang
Humanist Democratic Centre
Ecolo
Groen!
Lijst Dedecker
Belgium (May 2014)
New Flemish Alliance
Socialist Party
Christian Democrats and Vlaams
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Flemish Socialist Party
Groen
Vlaams Belang
Worker's Party of Belgium
Denmark (September 2011)
Venstre
Social Democrats
Danish People's Party
Social Liberals
Socialist People's Party
Red-Green
Liberal Alliance
Conservative
Denmark (June 2015)
Social Democrats
Danish People's Party
Venstre
Red-Green
Liberal Alliance
The Alternative
Social Liberals
Socialist People's Party
Conservative People's Party
Finland (April 2011)
National Coalition Party
Social Democratic Party of Finland
True Finns
Centre Party
Left Alliance
Green League
Swedish People's Party
Christian Democrats
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Manifesto Final
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Total
Referenc
(Populist Score
Underpri
es to
Issues)
vileged
Refugees
Minority

3.44
1.93
0.87
0.2
1.84
0.16

2.58
0.83
0
1.96
1.96
0.16

3.87
1.24
1.74
13.99
3.84
11.33

1.64
1.24
0.87
4.7
5.17
8.41

1.55
0.69
12.17
1.17
1.75
3.48

5.94
12.28
6.09
6.36
11.31
5.18

1.29
0.97
12.17
0.29
0.21
0.73

1.38
0.28
4.35
0.59
0.04
1.21

4.3
1.1
5.22
0.59
0.88
1.86

0.78
0.83
0
3.23
1.63
0.16

0.17
0
0
0
0.29
0.08

0
0
0
0
0
0

2.68
-8.69
29.56
16.04
-1.88
21.6

26.94
21.39
43.48
33.08
28.92
32.76

0.0995
-0.406
0.6799
0.4849
-0.065
0.6593

1.9
1.87
0
3.17
0

0.39
1.73
0
9.52
0

7.55
7.56
3.54
11.11
1.41

0.54
0.77
1.55
6.35
18.31

0.54
0.77
1.55
0
15.49

4.72
12.81
5.75
12.7
5.63

3.11
1.8
5.75
0.79
2.82

1
0.15
4.87
0
0

5.83
4.41
6.42
0.79
1.41

3.58
1.5
3.32
1.59
1.41

0.07
0.44
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

15.07
0.11
21.25
-4.76
35.22

29.23
33.81
32.75
46.02
46.48

0.5156
0.0033
0.6489
-0.103
0.7577

2.21
1.34
3.48
1.06
3.48
2.25
1.61
1.75
7.36
2.67
0

2.35
1.92
2.55
1.55
1.41
1.12
1.03
1.78
2.72
0.85
0

11.18
5.77
12.68
16.27
10.44
12.23
2.49
16.92
8.14
5.98
4.88

0
0.09
0.25
0.82
1.63
1
0.15
0.69
2
1.21
2.44

14.71
1.43
11.75
3.74
7.17
10.67
18.91
0.34
0.03
12.77
7.32

3.31
10.68
6.22
4.01
10.11
5.93
0.44
8.09
5.1
12.17
4.88

0.37
0.09
0.25
0.84
0.11
0.44
0.29
0.25
0
0.15
0

0.37
0.27
1.52
1
0.44
0.87
1.32
2.31
0.19
0.4
0

5.88
5.14
6.95
6.42
10.22
10.36
18.62
3.31
0.56
4.37
9.76

1.32
0.81
0.2
0.31
0
0.69
0.88
0.65
0.91
2.31
0

1.62
3.71
3.92
2.41
2.5
1.56
0.88
1.07
6.89
3.37
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

24.34
-4.05
17.43
20.37
12.51
25.4
38.7
11.78
-10.2
8.13
19.52

43.32
31.25
49.77
38.43
47.51
47.12
46.62
37.16
33.9
46.25
29.28

0.5619
-0.13
0.3502
0.5301
0.2633
0.539
0.8301
0.317
-0.302
0.1758
0.6667

2.19
2.11
2.81
3.52
2.11
2.24
1.84
1.24

2.71
2.02
1
1.09
2.02
1.72
0
0.07

11.82
6.07
6.9
10.4
6.07
3.52
4.98
0.6

0.71
0
0.04
0
0
0.2
0.13
1.12

0.93
0.01
0.98
1.34
0.01
0.07
2.36
1.05

4.87
17.83
8.85
8.64
17.83
15.49
4.06
22.51

5.09
0.96
2.23
3.19
0.96
0.32
7.47
0.55

0.33
0
1.97
0
0
0.15
0.39
0.26

4.57
3.3
3.44
3.02
3.3
2.75
14.68
1.6

0.04
1.06
0.8
1.59
1.06
0.92
0
1.22

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

13.72
-10.6
3.7
6.29
-10.6
-11.5
24.11
-17.4

33.26
33.36
29.02
32.79
33.36
27.38
35.91
30.22

0.4125
-0.317
0.1275
0.1918
-0.317
-0.421
0.6714
-0.576

0
0
0
2.36
0.81
2
0
0

0
0
0
15.75
0.41
0
0
0

0
8.28
0
0
0.81
0
4.6
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3.1
13.02
8.38
0
5.5
1.78
10.35
6.34

4.42
2.37
3.18
1.58
7.54
11.78
1.15
12.68

0.44
1.18
5.49
0
0
0
0
8.45

0.44
0
0.29
0
0
0
0
4.22

0.89
0
12.43
2.36
0.2
0
0
14.79

1.77
0
0
11.81
0.61
6.67
0
0

0.89
0
0
1.58
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.33
20.11
23.41
-7.1
-1.64
-5.33
13.8
21.12

11.95
24.85
29.77
35.44
15.88
22.23
16.1
46.48

0.1113
0.8093
0.7864
-0.2
-0.103
-0.24
0.8571
0.4544

1.04
0
0
0.89
5.56
0
3.13
0
0

1.57
0
0
0
0
0
3.13
0
0

0
0
0
0
11.11
5.46
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

12.72
0
4.95
0
0
0.61
12.5
4.66
0

10.28
0
0.99
21.43
11.11
4.85
15.63
0
0

4.7
25
4.95
0
7.41
0.61
3.13
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.86

7.67
18.75
15.84
0
0
0
0
0
28.57

0
0
0
2.68
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

12.2
43.75
24.75
-19.6
1.85
1.83
-6.26
4.66
31.43

37.98
43.75
26.73
25
35.19
11.53
37.52
4.66
31.43

0.3212
1
0.9259
-0.786
0.0526
0.1587
-0.167
1
1

3.75
0.17
1.21
3.13
1.16
2.59
1.75
2.67

1.25
0
0.2
0.95
0
0.97
1.75
0.94

2.25
6.66
5.13
5.02
1.16
5.35
3.51
2.04

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6.25
0.7
4.52
1.23
5.81
0
0
0.47

2
3.85
4.25
3.79
11.63
7.62
3.51
4.39

0.25
0
10.45
0.28
0
0
0
1.25

0.25
0
2.23
6.82
0.58
0.65
0
7.05

1.75
0
5.33
0.28
2.91
0.65
0
4.86

2.25
1.23
1.48
0.76
0
2.11
0
2.19

0
0
0.14
0.38
0
0
9.36
0.16

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6
4.57
23.34
6.14
-2.33
-2.42
-12.9
9.7

20
12.61
34.94
22.64
23.25
19.94
19.88
26.02

0.3
0.3624
0.668
0.2712
-0.1
-0.121
-0.647
0.3728
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Finland (April 2015)
Centre Party
True Finns
National Coalition Party
Social Democratic Party
Green League
Left Alliance
Swedish People's Party of Finland
Christian Democrats
France (June 2012)
Union for a Popular Movement
Socialist Party
National Rally
The Greens
Radical Party of the Left
New Center
Centrist Alliance
Left Front
Centre for France
Radical Party
France (June 2017)
The Republicans
Socialist Party
National Rally
En Marche
La France Insoumise
French Communist Party
Democratic Movement
Union of Democrats and Independents
Radical Party of the Left
Germany (September 2013)
Christian Democratic Union
Social Democrats
Alternative for Germany
Linke
The Greens
Free Democratic Party
Germany (September 2017)
Christian Democratic Union
Social Democrats
Alternative for Germany
Linke
The Greens
Free Democratic Party
Greece (June 2012)
New Democracy
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Independent Greeks
Popular Association-Golden Dawn
Democratic Left
Communist Party of Greece
Greece (January 2015)
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)
New Democracy
Popular Association-Golden Dawn
The River (Potami)
Communist Party of Greece
Independent Greeks
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Italy (February 2013)
Left Ecology Freedom
Five Star Movement
Partito Democratico
South Tyrolean People's Party
The People of Freedom
Brothers of Italy
Northern League
Civic Choice
Union of the Center
Aosta Valley
Italy (March 2018)
Lega Nord
Forza Italia
Fratelli d’Italia
Noi com Italia
Five Star Movement
Partito Democratico
Più Europa
Insieme
Civica Popolare
SVP–PATT

2.61
0.72
2.51
0.81
1.08
3.39
3.82
2.32

1.74
0.11
1.95
2.42
0
0.18
1.53
1.49

6.09
4.16
6.41
1.61
0.72
2.5
3.56
3.48

0
0.06
0
0
0
0.18
0.25
1.16

0
1.33
0
0
1.44
0
0
0.33

2.61
4.27
1.11
10.48
12.95
9.45
4.58
2.15

0
6.43
0
0.81
1.8
0
0
0.83

2.61
2.94
0
0
0.36
0
0.76
4.8

1.3
6.71
3.06
1.61
0
0.89
0.51
7.45

0
2.5
0
0.81
0
0.36
4.33
0.17

0
0.83
0
0
0.36
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3.04
18.2
3.9
-8.87
-10.1
-9.09
-0.52
12.26

16.96
30.06
15.04
18.55
18.71
16.95
19.34
24.18

0.1792
0.6055
0.2593
-0.478
-0.538
-0.536
-0.027
0.507

8.26
4.67
1.35
3.72
0.87
0.28
1.39
3.08
3.39
3.5

9.75
2.34
0
7.26
9.17
6.94
0
6.02
7.02
8.04

3.39
1.4
3.03
1.5
0
3.19
2.78
0.27
1.45
12.94

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.13
0.48
0

0
0
0
0.09
0.66
0.56
6.94
0.13
1.94
0.35

2.75
6.54
1.35
5.13
7.86
12.64
1.39
9.37
6.29
4.2

5.72
0
9.43
0.09
0
0
1.39
0
1.94
5.25

1.06
0
3.03
0
0
0
0
0
0.24
0

8.05
4.21
13.13
5.04
1.09
3.75
0
1.07
3.39
3.15

0
0.47
0
0.09
0
0
0
0.27
0.48
0

0
1.4
1.01
1.5
1.75
0
0
1.07
0.48
2.8

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-2.54
-8.87
24.91
-10.8
-17.9
-12.4
8.33
-17.7
-7.26
3.15

38.98
21.03
32.33
24.42
21.4
27.36
13.89
21.41
27.1
40.23

-0.065
-0.422
0.7705
-0.442
-0.836
-0.452
0.5997
-0.825
-0.268
0.0783

0
0
0.78
0
4
0
2.21
0
0.56

2.34
5.26
0
4.7
0.1
0
3.98
2.34
5.03

5.45
1.32
3.88
9.12
2.05
0
5.97
5.45
7.26

0.39
2.63
0
2.76
1.17
0
2.43
0.39
0.37

0.39
2.63
0
0.28
2.34
16.67
2.43
7.39
1.3

7.39
9.21
5.43
11.88
7.02
8.33
7.08
7.39
4.84

7.39
0
12.4
4.97
3.8
2.78
4.65
7.39
1.12

0.78
0
1.94
0
0
0
0
0.78
0

8.56
11.84
12.02
6.35
2.34
2.78
3.1
8.56
4.1

0.78
0
3.1
0.83
0.39
0
2.21
0
0.37

0.78
0
0
0
0.68
0
0
0.78
0

0 13.23
0 3.95
0 27.13
0 7.73
0 0.29
0 13.9
0 7.52
0 19.45
0 4.09

34.25
32.89
39.55
40.89
23.89
30.56
34.06
40.47
24.95

0.3863
0.1201
0.686
0.189
0.0121
0.4548
0.2208
0.4806
0.1639

3.23
2.86
2.74
1.34
2.71
4.24

2.02
2.62
1.37
0.48
2.65
6.6

2.99
1.03
12.33
1.66
3.9
2.84

0
0.41
0
0.48
0.5
0

1.36
2.69
0
3.88
2.62
0.39

2.68
9.35
8.22
14.36
11.33
6.12

2.64
1
2.74
0
0.31
0.67

2.49
0.34
5.48
0.24
0.29
0

5.21
2.31
0
0.53
0.88
2.74

0.82
1.17
1.37
0.69
0.83
0.05

1.28
0.41
1.37
1.62
1.01
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

6.3
-6.29
8.22
-10.3
-8.37
-10.3

24.72
24.19
35.62
25.28
27.03
23.65

0.2549
-0.26
0.2308
-0.408
-0.31
-0.434

5.14
5.03
2.09
1.32
4.03
4.24

1.64
4.46
0
1.09
4.16
6.6

1.86
0.79
1.79
0.28
0.39
2.84

0
0.34
4.48
0.81
0.49
0

0
0.34
4.48
0.18
0.47
0.39

3.65
9.3
2.59
20.28
13.45
6.12

6.63
1.51
12.35
0
0.16
0.67

2.53
0.6
7.77
0
0
0

3.73
5.71
3.88
0.56
2.32
2.74

1.64
0.15
6.17
0
0
0.05

0.07
0
0.1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

5.89
-9.35
36.14
-20.9
-17.8
-10.3

26.89
28.23
45.7
24.52
25.47
23.65

0.219
-0.331
0.7908
-0.851
-0.699
-0.434

0
2.13
8.16
0
0
1.77
0

0
1.69
8.16
2.58
0
2.4
0

0
1.42
0
0
0
3.86
0

0
3.19
0
3.23
5.91
3.67
0

0
6.57
42.86
11.61
11.83
2.98
34.97

13.64
1.95
0
4.52
3.76
2.79
0.61

4.54
1.33
0
16.77
20.43
0.13
0.61

0
0.09
0
1.29
1.08
0
0

0
0.35
0
0
4.3
3.67
0

0
0
0
0
6.45
0.95
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0 -9.1
0 7.18
0 26.54
0 25.8
0 46.24
0
8.3
0 34.97

18.18
18.72
59.18
40
53.76
22.22
36.19

-0.501
0.3835
0.4485
0.645
0.8601
0.3735
0.9663

1.33
0
0
3.06
0
0
2.4

0.66
0.62
0
2.13
0
0
8.73

3.97
2.47
0
2.26
0
0
2.91

6.62
8.64
4.65
5.59
4.84
0
1.03

0.66
3.7
5.81
2
40.32
0
0.51

0.66
0.62
0
0.93
3.23
7.69
3.42

0
1.24
13.95
2.53
6.45
46.15
1.03

0
0
2.33
0
0
11.54
0

0
0
11.05
0.27
0
0
0.17

0
0
1.74
0
0
0
0

0.66
0
0
0
0
0
0

0 7.94
0 14.81
0 39.53
0 6.53
0 48.38
0
50
0 -8.9

14.56
17.29
39.53
18.77
54.84
65.38
20.2

0.5453
0.8566
1
0.3479
0.8822
0.7648
-0.441

4.86
0
1.47
0.15
0.48
0
0.48
3.27
3.1
0

1.34
0
11.77
2.77
2.86
0.22
2.86
7.14
1.43
0

3.02
1.29
8.33
4.92
9.52
8.03
9.52
11.61
0.24
0

2.01
5.16
0.98
0
2.38
2.39
2.38
2.68
3.1
0

0.34
0
9.8
3.38
0.48
4.99
0.48
0
31.27
0

7.04
0
18.63
5.07
0.95
0.65
0.95
10.12
5.73
0

0
0
0
8.45
0
0
0
0
1.91
0

0
0
0
1.38
0.95
1.52
0.95
2.08
5.49
0

4.19
1.29
3.43
1.23
4.29
15.4
4.29
10.12
1.67
0

0
0
0
2.15
0
0
0
0
0.95
0

0
0.65
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.24
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-3.68
7.09
-9.33
13.52
13.33
31.46
13.33
5.96
34.13
0

22.8
8.39
54.41
29.5
21.91
33.2
21.91
47.02
55.13
0

-0.161
0.8451
-0.171
0.4583
0.6084
0.9476
0.6084
0.1268
0.6191
-

0.76
1.04
0.55
0.56
0.75
1.56
0.23
0.95
0
0

0.15
0
0
3.37
1.06
8.03
14.52
7.84
3.6
0

5.34
8.33
2.75
5.06
3.75
7.64
7.6
0.71
2.7
5.88

0.69
0
0.55
0
4.54
0.16
0
0
0.9
0

2.37
4.17
1.1
1.69
5.65
5.46
0.92
4.04
4.05
0

1.53
5.21
1.65
0
0.8
5.62
3.23
5.94
3.6
0

4.05
2.08
4.95
4.49
0.17
1.4
0
0.95
1.35
0

0.92
1.04
1.65
1.69
0
0
0
0
1.35
0

11.15
9.38
11.54
5.62
4.39
2.03
0.92
0.24
2.25
0

2.75
0
3.85
0
0
0
0
0.24
0
0

5.72
1.04
0.55
0.56
0.38
0.7
0
0.24
0.9
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

19.11
17.71
23.64
14.06
15.51
0.78
-8.54
-8.79
4.5
5.88

35.43
32.29
29.14
23.04
21.49
32.6
27.42
21.15
20.7
5.88

0.5394
0.5485
0.8113
0.6102
0.7217
0.0239
-0.311
-0.416
0.2174
1
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Netherlands (September 2012)
Christian Democratic Appeal
Labour Party
Party for Freedom
Democraten‘66
GroenLinks
Socialists
ChristenUnie
Party for the Animals
50Plus
Reformed Political Party
Party for Freedom
Netherlands (March 2017)
Christian Democratic Appeal
Labour Party
Party for Freedom
Democraten‘66
GroenLinks
Socialists
ChristenUnie
Party for the Animals
50Plus
Reformed Political Party
Denk
Forum for Democracy
Norway (September 2013)
Labour Party
Conservative Party
Progress Party
Christian Democratic Party
Centre Party
Liberal Party
Socialist Left Party
Green Party
Norway (September 2017)
Labour Party
Conservative Party
Progress Party
Centre Party
Socialist Left Party
Liberal Party
Christian Democratic Party
Green Party
Red Party
Sweden (September 2010)
Moderate Party
Swedish Social Democratic Party
Sweden Democrats
Green Party
Centre Party
Left Party
Liberals
Christian Democrats
Sweden (September 2014)
Moderate Party (Sweden)
Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sweden )
Sweden Democrats (Sweden)
Green Party
Centre Party
Left Party
Liberals
Christian Democrats
Switzerland (October 2011)
Christian Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Swiss People's Party
Free Democratic Party
Green Party
Green Liberal Party
Conservative Democratic Party
Evangelical People's Party
Geneva Citizen's Movement
Switzerland (October 2015)
Christian Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Swiss People's Party
Free Democratic Party
Green Party
Green Liberal Party
Conservative Democratic Party
Evangelical People's Party
Swiss Party of Labour
Geneva Citizen's Movement

2.1
3.51
1.57
3.32
4.69
3.59
2.99
2.86
2.43
4.58
2.7

3.69
2.36
2.73
6.58
3.97
1.3
1.15
0.25
0.97
0.94
0.22

4.95
3.95
9.89
4.67
2.44
4.89
3.48
0.42
10.19
3.48
4.75

0.17
0.14
0.17
0.16
0.07
0.33
0
0.34
0.97
0
1.62

2.69
5.69
5.59
3.37
1.26
3.19
3.73
1.43
8.74
1.93
9.06

3.36
8.19
2.44
2.23
7.2
6.52
2.25
2.02
3.88
1.93
0.86

1.26
1.41
0.47
0.21
0.2
0.13
0.41
0.08
0
0.44
4.32

4.36
0.29
0.47
0
0.4
0
4.7
0
0
22.74
0.32

5.37
5.04
10.59
2.9
3.04
6.71
5.1
2.69
6.31
7.29
10.68

1.93
0.83
0.29
0.36
1.65
0.91
2.99
0.08
0
3.42
0.22

3.27
4.71
2.97
3.11
6.74
5.87
4.1
1.76
0.97
4.86
0.43

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8.31
-1.42
17.76
-3.57
-13.5
-1.12
9.92
-1.85
17.96
26.99
26.76

33.15
36.12
37.18
26.91
31.66
33.44
30.9
11.93
34.46
51.61
35.18

0.2507
-0.039
0.4777
-0.133
-0.428
-0.033
0.321
-0.155
0.5212
0.523
0.7607

1.91
3.97
0
3.73
1.32
3.39
2.47
3.78
1.62
3.74
3.43
1.76

2.05
2.06
0
6.3
3.88
0.23
1.45
0.28
0
0.04
0.46
0

1.2
2.51
0
3.07
1.06
2.57
1.83
2.31
2.22
1.55
0.46
7.25

0.21
0
0
0
0.35
0.35
0
0
0.81
0
0
14.12

0.21
0
0
0.71
1.85
0.82
0.27
1.12
2.42
0.34
0
6.67

2.19
7.95
0
6.28
9.88
6.08
3.99
2.31
7.47
0.71
9.38
0

1.13
5.43
28
0.6
2.56
0.12
2.24
0.21
2.83
1.76
0.69
9.22

8.62
1.37
0
0.94
0.97
1.4
8.02
0.84
0
18.66
0
0.78

8.55
2.37
8
1.84
2.38
7.6
3.92
1.54
7.07
7.35
6.29
4.9

2.19
0.69
12
0
0
0.82
0.53
0.42
0
2.14
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.46
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

15.96
-1.61
48
-9.15
-5.91
3.98
8.9
0.07
6.26
27.31
-6.29
41.18

28.26
26.35
48
23.47
24.25
23.38
24.72
12.81
24.44
36.29
21.17
44.7

0.5648
-0.061
1
-0.39
-0.244
0.1702
0.36
0.0055
0.2561
0.7525
-0.297
0.9213

4.31
3.66
2.58
6.56
2.22
4.25
3.32
5.03

0.33
0.73
0.36
0.28
0.12
0.66
0
0

5.87
6.23
6.59
3.42
4.32
4.6
1.85
3.09

0
0
0
0.06
0
0.04
0
0.24

0.33
0.15
0
0.03
0.06
0.35
0.11
0.12

4.5
1.39
0.52
2.95
1.99
2.28
6.58
3.39

2.9
1.76
2.42
0.5
1.58
0.54
0.97
0.36

1.15
1.47
0.64
6.65
1.81
0.31
0.47
1.03

5.02
8.21
6.39
5.31
3.21
3.71
6.83
1.82

3.57
0.81
0.44
3.09
0.99
0.89
2.71
0.24

0.22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0 9.48
0 12.85
0 13.02
0 9.27
0 7.64
0 3.25
0 3.04
0 -1.52

28.2
24.41
19.94
28.85
16.3
17.63
22.84
15.32

0.3362
0.5264
0.653
0.3213
0.4687
0.1843
0.1331
-0.099

3.98
2.76
1.6
2.24
2.58
3.51
3.64
2.63
1.43

0.25
0.73
0
0
0.04
0.87
0.07
0.34
0

1.9
4.06
2.65
3.15
0.68
2.91
1.01
0.68
0.3

0.13
0.05
0.22
0.08
0.07
0.63
0.07
0.34
0.35

0.09
0
0.16
0
0
0
0
0.05
0.05

4.87
3.17
2.69
5.32
11.51
7.18
7.91
3.7
11.87

1.23
1.41
3.8
1.41
0.39
0.46
0.65
0.24
0.05

0.34
1.09
0.35
1.29
0.18
0.14
7.67
0.1
0.05

2.62
4.22
4.83
4.21
2.62
1.71
1.88
2.92
3.26

0.55
1.25
0.26
1.52
3.55
2.23
1.91
3.36
3.21

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-2.24
5.42
7.98
4.1
-6.64
-3.48
1.57
1.02
-6.03

15.96
18.74
16.56
19.22
21.62
19.64
24.81
14.36
20.57

-0.14
0.2892
0.4819
0.2133
-0.307
-0.177
0.0633
0.071
-0.293

2.69
0.71
2.94
0
2.11
0.39
1.97
2.3

2.11
0
0
0
2.24
0
2.51
0.21

3.11
0
0.49
0
0.4
0
0.76
0

0.11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.11
6.03
0.98
1.15
1.71
10.24
2.51
1.25

6.38
14.18
1.47
7.63
5.4
16.54
2.95
6.05

0.47
0
12.26
0
0
0.39
0.76
0

2
0.35
4.9
0
0
0
0.98
8.35

2.79
1.42
8.82
3.05
0.79
0.39
9.06
5.43

0.37
0
0
0.38
0.53
0.39
0.66
1.46

1.58
1.06
0
1.15
0.79
0.39
2.62
1.25

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-2.8
-8.15
23.04
-4.2
-7.11
-5.91
4.68
6.68

22.72
23.75
31.86
13.36
13.97
28.73
24.78
26.3

-0.123
-0.343
0.7232
-0.314
-0.509
-0.206
0.1889
0.254

2.08
3.5
5.7
1.41
0
1.11
0.92
1.03

1.41
0.74
0
0
0
0
2.06
0

2.93
1.11
0
0.2
1.58
0.56
1.84
2.31

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.31
2.39
1.27
2.41
6.32
5.28
6.19
1.03

4.52
6.45
3.8
7.04
2.63
15.83
5.5
7.2

0.06
0.18
9.81
0.6
0
0
0
1.03

0.12
0
0.95
0
0
0
0
1.54

8.19
2.95
7.59
4.22
0.26
0.56
8.95
7.46

2.57
0
0.63
2.82
1.32
0
1.84
0.51

0.06
0
0
0
0
0
0.69
0

0 6.11
0 -4.06
0 10.75
0
1.8
0 6.85
0 -10.5
0 9.65
0 5.65

22.25
17.32
29.75
18.7
12.11
23.34
27.99
22.11

0.2746
-0.234
0.3613
0.0963
0.5656
-0.452
0.3448
0.2555

1.35
0
0
0.96
5.77
2.82
0
12
0

0
0
0
0
0
4.22
1.3
0
0

1.35
0
0
9.13
0
1.41
0
0
5.26

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8.11
5.63
16.67
25.48
0
0
0
0
0

0
11.27
0
0.48
8.41
4.22
2.6
8
0

1.35
0
2.5
9.13
0.24
1.41
5.2
0
0

6.08
0
0
0
0
0
3.9
12
0

13.51
0
7.5
1.44
0.24
1.41
10.39
0
21.05

0
0
0
0
0.96
2.82
0
4
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

29.05
-5.64
26.67
43.74
-12.7
-4.21
15.59
-4
26.31

31.75
16.9
26.67
46.62
15.62
18.31
23.39
36
26.31

0.915
-0.334
1
0.9382
-0.816
-0.23
0.6665
-0.111
1

1.8
0.77
1.2
6.31
3.55
4.89
12.46
2.88
0.28
0

1.8
4.62
0.15
0
0
2.67
1.82
0
0
0

1.08
0
5.42
4.5
1.58
4.89
4.25
1.62
0
4.76

0
0
0
0
1.97
0
0
1.08
0.28
0

0
0
0
8.11
0.99
1.33
0.61
0
2.83
4.76

0.72
17.69
0.53
0
6.11
4.89
6.08
2.7
1.13
0

4.68
0.77
8.13
9.01
0.2
0
1.52
0.54
0
19.05

1.44
0
5.49
0
0
0
0
6.13
0
9.52

12.23
0
5.94
3.6
0.39
2.67
7.6
2.7
0.28
0

3.6
0
4.82
2.7
0
1.33
1.22
0.36
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

18.71
-22.3
27.92
21.61
-4.53
-2.23
-5.16
6.85
1.98
38.09

27.35
23.85
31.68
34.23
14.79
22.67
35.56
18.01
4.8
38.09

0.6841
-0.935
0.8813
0.6313
-0.306
-0.098
-0.145
0.3803
0.4125
1
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United Kingdom (May 2010)
Conservative Party
Labour Party
United Kingdom Independence Party
Scottish National Party
Liberal Democrats
Democratic Unionist Party
Sinn Fein
United Kingdom (June 2015)
Conservative Party
Labour Party
Scottish National Party
Liberal Democrats
Democratic Unionist
Sinn Fein
Plaid Cymru
Social Democratic and Labour
Ulster Unionist
United Kingdom Independence Party
Green Party
United States (November 2012)
Republican Party
Democratic Party
United States (November 2016)
Republican Party
Democratic Party

4.68
4.85
1.3
1.4
5.03
0.46
0.52

0.99
1.5
0.28
2.92
2.21
0.23
12.44

8.72
1.77
3.89
1.78
5.52
6.24
0

1.71
1.15
2.04
0
1.1
0
2.07

12.14
3.88
2.04
0.64
10.18
6
1.55

0.99
3.35
3.89
6.48
3.19
1.39
9.33

2.43
1.06
6.11
0.38
0.12
12.01
0

3.24
6.35
1.11
0.25
2.7
0
0

5.67
3.8
9.81
2.41
3.8
5.08
0

0.18
0.09
1.57
0
0
0.46
0

0.63
2.38
1.57
0.64
1.72
1.16
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

26.8
6.02
19.53
-5.98
11.27
26.55
-18.7

41.38
30.18
33.61
16.9
35.57
33.03
25.91

0.6477
0.1995
0.5811
-0.354
0.3168
0.8038
-0.721

3.4
3.37
1.23
3.86
0
0
2.06
1.72
0
0.96
4.29

0.57
2.87
2.47
2.66
0
2.21
0.9
5.16
0.72
0.67
0.81

2.58
0.69
0.34
1.25
9.61
1.47
0.39
0
1.92
3.19
0.27

0.25
0.1
0
0
0.44
0
0
0.98
0
0.82
0.85

0.38
0.3
1.01
0.1
2.62
0.73
0.52
0
0
0.74
1.39

4.66
5.75
8.3
15.23
9.61
9.56
13.53
13.51
13.19
3.49
16.91

4.16
3.67
0.11
0.36
19.21
0
0.26
0
6.95
8.46
0.04

0.82
0
0
0.16
0
0
0
0
0
0.15
0.13

8.44
7.73
2.69
3.39
0.87
0
0.13
2.21
4.08
4.82
0.18

0.13
0.1
0.22
0.47
0
1.1
5.54
4.67
3.36
0
0.54

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8.13
0.6
-7.63
-16
23.14
-8.47
-9.65
-12.5
2.4
13.06
-18.6

25.39
24.58
16.37
27.48
42.36
15.07
23.33
28.25
30.22
23.3
25.41

0.3202
0.0244
-0.466
-0.583
0.5463
-0.562
-0.414
-0.444
0.0794
0.5605
-0.732

1.97
9.88

0
0

4.36
2.27

0.78
1.1

3.17
3.66

2.03
5.86

3.05
2.42

6.93
1.32

2.81
2.86

0.78
1.46

0.06
0.59

0 17.82
0 -1.24

25.94 0.687
31.42 -0.039

3.79
5.51

0
0

1.23
1.08

0.36
1.08

0.36
1.08

5.7
17.01

2.83
2.35

8.48
0.2

3.37
1.82

0.14
0.07

0
0

0 7.28
0 -14.8

26.26 0.2772
30.2 -0.491

Appendix 2: Left-Right Calculations

Country and Party
Austria (September 2013)
Austrian People's Party
Social Democratic Party
Freedom Party
NEOS
The Greens
Team Stronach
Austria (October 2017)
Austrian People's Party
Social Democratic Party
Freedom Party
NEOS
PILZ
Belgium (June 2010)
New Flemish Alliance
Socialist Party
Christian Democratic and Flemish
Reformist Movement
Flemish Socialist Party
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Vlaams Belang
Humanist Democratic Centre
Ecolo
Groen!
Lijst Dedecker
Belgium (May 2014)
New Flemish Alliance
Socialist Party
Christian Democrats and Vlaams
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Flemish Socialist Party
Groen
Vlaams Belang
Worker's Party of Belgium

Per 401:
Positive
Referenc Per 402: Per 403: Per 404:
e to a Incentiv Market Economi
Free
es:
Regulati
c
Market Positive
on
Planning
Econom
y

Per 406:
Per 407:
Positive
Free
Referenc
Trade +
es to
Open
Protectio
Markets
nism

Per 409:
Per 701:
Per 412:
Per 504:
Keynesia
Positive
Controll Per 413: Welfare
n
Referenc
ed
Nationali State
Demand
es to
Econom zation Expansio
Manage
Labor
y
n
ment
Groups

Total

% of
Manifest How
o
Populist
Addressi
(or
ng
Unpopuli
Populist
st)
Issues

2.67
0.41
0
1.96
0.5
1.46

4.04
1.93
2.61
2.15
1.67
0.81

4.22
5.66
2.61
4.5
5.09
6.71

0
0
0
0
0
0.24

0
0.14
0
0.1
0
0.16

0.09
0
0
0.2
0
0

0
0.55
0
0
0.33
0

1.12
0.28
0.87
0.49
1.21
0.89

0.52
1.93
0
0
0.17
0

6.28
12.55
10.44
4.3
6.84
3.15

4.82
10.48
4.35
3.13
5.93
1.78

-10.16
-29.25
-15.66
-8.21
-17.4
-10.66

23.76
33.93
20.88
16.83
21.74
15.2

-0.42761
-0.86207
-0.75
-0.48782
-0.80037
-0.70132

4.62
0.15
0.22
3.17
0

5.97
4.48
2.88
1.59
1.41

1.72
5.1
1.11
0
5.63

0
0
0
0
0

0.07
1.87
0
0
0

0.57
0.11
0
0
0

0.18
0.33
0.22
0
0

0.11
1.47
1.99
0
0

0
0.33
0.44
0
0

6.26
8.63
5.53
3.97
5.63

4.19
7.82
4.87
2.38
5.63

-1.37
-20.81
-11.06
-1.59
-15.48

23.69
30.29
17.26
11.11
18.3

-0.05783
-0.68703
-0.64079
-0.14311
-0.8459

2.43
0.13
2.4
3.48
0
2.68
2.93
1.19
0.06
0.65
19.51

0.52
2.59
1.52
1.17
0.44
0.44
0.29
1.24
2.13
0.6
0

2.21
9.88
5.39
7.69
12.61
1.81
1.47
7.49
4.76
5.68
0

0
0.89
0.05
0.15
0.11
0.25
0.15
0.5
0.22
0.15
0

0
0.09
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0.1
0

0.22
0.09
0.1
0.09
0.11
0.06
0
0.01
0
0
0

0
0.22
0
0.02
0
0
0
0.04
0.69
0
0

0
2.1
0
0.13
0.76
0
0
0.53
3.6
0
0

0.22
0
0.44
0
0.65
0
0.59
0
0
0.1
0

4.56
20.3
6.56
11.65
8.37
3.74
0.59
23.11
14.68
7.09
2.44

8.68
3.08
6.81
2.5
6.52
10.92
3.67
1.26
3.07
5.08
0

-12.5
-33.75
-15.23
-17.4
-28.47
-13.54
-3.25
-30.5
-24.83
-16.95
17.07

18.84
39.37
23.27
26.88
29.57
19.9
9.69
35.38
29.21
19.45
21.95

-0.66348
-0.85725
-0.65449
-0.64732
-0.9628
-0.6804
-0.3354
-0.86207
-0.85005
-0.87147
0.777677

2.34
0.23
0.9
3.44
0.23
0.16
0.39
0

3.16
2.82
2.54
4.87
2.82
1.07
0.92
0

1.71
6.27
0.94
3.52
6.27
8.06
0.92
8.42

0.04
0.41
0.29
0.08
0.41
0.15
0
0.41

0.07
0.11
0.12
0
0.11
0.05
0.13
0.14

0.41
0.24
0.33
0.5
0.24
0.07
0
0

0
0.39
0.16
0
0.39
0.07
0
0.62

0.04
1.08
0.57
0
1.08
0.86
0
2.8

0
0.03
0
0
0.03
0.18
0
4.28

4.24
8.62
5.8
6.63
8.62
5.26
5.64
6.87

5.5
5.55
4.06
8.56
5.55
4.63
3.54
9.79

-5.69
-19.17
-8.17
-9.98
-19.17
-17.96
-8.92
-33.33

17.51
25.75
15.71
27.6
25.75
20.56
11.54
33.33

-0.32496
-0.74447
-0.52005
-0.36159
-0.74447
-0.87354
-0.77296
-1
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Denmark (September 2011)
Venstre
Social Democrats
Danish People's Party
Social Liberals
Socialist People's Party
Red-Green
Liberal Alliance
Conservative
Denmark (June 2015)
Social Democrats
Danish People's Party
Venstre
Red-Green
Liberal Alliance
The Alternative
Social Liberals
Socialist People's Party
Conservative People's Party
Finland (April 2011)
National Coalition Party
Social Democratic Party of Finland
True Finns
Centre Party
Left Alliance
Green League
Swedish People's Party
Christian Democrats
Finland (April 2015)
Centre Party
True Finns
National Coalition Party
Social Democratic Party
Green League
Left Alliance
Swedish People's Party of Finland
Christian Democrats
France (June 2012)
Union for a Popular Movement
Socialist Party
National Rally
The Greens
Radical Party of the Left
New Center
Centrist Alliance
Left Front
Centre for France
Radical Party
France (June 2017)
The Republicans
Socialist Party
National Rally
En Marche
La France Insoumise
French Communist Party
Democratic Movement
Union of Democrats and Independents
Radical Party of the Left
Germany (September 2013)
Christian Democratic Union
Social Democrats
Alternative for Germany
Linke
The Greens
Free Democratic Party
Germany (September 2017)
Christian Democratic Union
Social Democrats
Alternative for Germany
Linke
The Greens
Free Democratic Party

6.64
0.59
0.87
1.58
0
0.22
14.94
10.56

1.77
1.77
0
3.94
0.61
0
6.9
1.41

0
1.18
0
0
2.44
5.33
0
0

0.44
0
0
0
0.2
1.56
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5.31
4.73
0
0
3.06
0.22
0
0

0
4.73
0
0
8.15
9.56
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0.89
0
0

20.8
13.61
5.78
3.15
17.31
9.56
8.05
0

5.31
7.1
0.58
6.3
6.11
12
0
3.52

-23.45
-28.99
-5.49
-3.93
-36.66
-38.9
13.79
8.45

40.27
33.71
7.23
14.97
37.88
39.34
29.89
15.49

-0.58232
-0.85998
-0.75934
-0.26253
-0.96779
-0.98882
0.461358
0.545513

0
0
4.95
0
18.52
1.21
0
0
34.29

1.92
0
1.98
0
0
10.3
3.13
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1.82
0
0
0

2.27
0
0
0
0
0
6.25
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.35
0
0
0
0.93
0
0
0
0

2.09
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
5.46
0
0
0

0
0
0
5.36
0
0
0
0
0

20.56
25
19.8
24.11
3.7
0.61
6.25
22.28
0

1.39
0
2.97
14.29
0
20.61
12.5
0.52
0

-24.04
-25
-15.84
-43.76
15.75
-16.99
-21.87
-22.8
34.29

28.58
25
29.7
43.76
23.15
40.01
28.13
22.8
34.29

-0.84115
-1
-0.53333
-1
0.680346
-0.42464
-0.77746
-1
1

1.5
0
0.07
1.33
0
0.16
2.34
0.31

0.75
3.68
1.55
2.46
0.58
1.78
5.26
3.61

1.5
1.75
5.73
2.08
5.81
3.73
1.75
3.13

0.25
3.33
0.81
0.28
1.16
0.32
2.34
0.31

0
0.7
0
0.1
0
0.32
0
0.63

0
0.35
0.07
0.1
0
0.32
0
0.16

0.5
0.17
0.14
0.76
0
0
0.58
0

0
0
0.14
0
1.74
0
0
0

0
0.7
0.2
0.66
0
0
0
0

10
3.15
9.64
10.98
24.42
12.32
14.04
18.65

8.75
15.41
1.15
4.83
8.72
6.64
8.19
8.46

-18.75
-21.18
-16.12
-15.8
-41.27
-21.07
-19.3
-27.1

23.25
29.24
19.5
23.58
42.43
25.59
34.5
35.26

-0.80645
-0.72435
-0.82667
-0.67006
-0.97266
-0.82337
-0.55942
-0.76858

0.87
0.78
0
0
0
0
0.76
0.17

7.39
1.94
5.57
4.03
1.8
0.54
3.56
8.11

0.87
3.16
1.67
1.21
0.72
4.81
2.29
2.98

0.44
0
0
0.81
0.72
0.54
0.25
0

0.87
1.28
0.84
0.4
0.36
0.36
0.25
0.66

0
0
0.56
0
0
0
0.51
0.33

0
0.17
0
2.82
0.36
3.03
0.51
0.33

0
0.39
0
0
0
0.54
0
0

0.44
0.06
0
0
0
0.71
0
0.17

12.61
16.81
8.91
17.74
15.83
12.48
8.91
13.24

6.09
1.72
9.19
14.52
8.63
9.8
9.41
2.98

-13.06
-20.87
-14.48
-33.47
-24.82
-31.73
-16.79
-11.75

29.58
26.31
26.74
41.53
28.42
32.81
26.45
28.97

-0.44151
-0.79323
-0.54151
-0.80592
-0.87333
-0.96708
-0.63478
-0.40559

0
0
0
0
0
0
1.39
0
0
0

5.09
4.67
2.02
1.06
1.97
6.11
5.56
1.34
6.54
4.54

2.12
12.62
8.08
12.21
18.56
2.78
13.89
11.78
6.29
5.94

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.21
0
1.01
0.18
0
0
0
0.13
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.13
0
0

0
0
0
0.09
0.44
0
0
1.87
0
0

0
0.94
0.34
0.35
2.18
0
0
1.47
0.24
0

9.32
11.22
11.45
13.36
12.88
17.5
2.78
14.73
9.93
13.99

0
1.4
1.01
2.12
1.97
0.97
2.78
1.87
0.73
1.75

-6.56
-21.51
-19.87
-27.25
-34.06
-15.14
-12.5
-30.64
-10.65
-17.14

16.74
30.85
23.91
29.37
38
27.36
26.4
33.32
23.73
26.22

-0.39188
-0.69724
-0.83103
-0.92782
-0.89632
-0.55336
-0.47348
-0.91957
-0.4488
-0.6537

2.34
0
0.78
1.93
0
0
0.22
2.34
0

3.5
0
1.55
3.04
0
0
1.99
3.5
5.21

0.39
0
3.49
1.38
6.24
2.78
5.75
0.39
6.52

0
0
0.78
0.55
0
0
1.11
0
0

1.95
1.32
5.43
1.11
2.53
0
0.66
1.95
0.56

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1.16
0
1.27
2.78
0.44
0
1.3

0
1.32
1.94
0
2.05
8.33
0.44
0
0.56

0
0
1.16
0
2.05
0
0
0
0

6.23
17.11
5.81
5.25
3.9
0
6.42
6.23
4.84

8.56
9.21
5.81
5.53
9.55
27.78
3.98
8.56
5.59

-11.29
-28.96
-23.25
-8.85
-27.59
-41.67
-16.59
-11.29
-14.16

22.97
28.96
27.91
18.79
27.59
41.67
21.01
22.97
24.58

-0.49151
-1
-0.83303
-0.471
-1
-1
-0.78962
-0.49151
-0.57608

1.98
0.79
1.37
0.16
0.55
6.88

4.43
2.97
0
0.97
1.22
5.83

4.62
7.87
0
3.32
6.15
7.61

0.35
0.1
0
0.28
0.09
0

0
0.04
0
0.45
0.07
0

0.58
0
0
0
0.17
0.72

0.54
0.48
0
0.81
0.37
0.1

0.23
1.03
0
2.23
0.55
0.19

0.16
0.66
0
3.28
0.31
0

4.82
10.04
2.74
9.63
6.5
3.95

3.46
7.73
0
10.64
5.25
5.63

-7.19
-24.19
-1.37
-29.51
-17.35
-4.05

21.17
31.71
4.11
31.77
21.23
30.91

-0.33963
-0.76285
-0.33333
-0.92886
-0.81724
-0.13103

0.89
0.19
4.08
0
0.05
6.88

4.25
2.76
2.29
0.18
1.55
5.83

5.22
3.59
3.98
3.1
5.37
7.61

0.22
0.04
0
0
0
0

0.22
0.04
1.2
0.46
0
0

0.15
0
0
0
0
0.72

1.49
0.23
0
0.08
0.03
0.1

1.64
5.41
1.49
8.43
4.36
0.19

0
0.11
0.6
1.98
0.03
0

6.18
7.26
3.59
11.22
5.6
3.95

4.1
6.35
2.79
9.14
6.48
5.63

-13.78
-20.08
-7.28
-34.23
-20.27
-4.05

24.36
25.98
20.02
34.59
23.47
30.91

-0.56568
-0.7729
-0.36364
-0.98959
-0.86366
-0.13103

279

Greece (June 2012)
New Democracy
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Independent Greeks
Popular Association-Golden Dawn
Democratic Left
Communist Party of Greece
Greece (January 2015)
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)
New Democracy
Popular Association-Golden Dawn
The River (Potami)
Communist Party of Greece
Independent Greeks
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Italy (February 2013)
Left Ecology Freedom
Five Star Movement
Partito Democratico
South Tyrolean People's Party
The People of Freedom
Brothers of Italy
Northern League
Civic Choice
Union of the Center
Aosta Valley
Italy (March 2018)
Lega Nord
Forza Italia
Fratelli d’Italia
Noi com Italia
Five Star Movement
Partito Democratico
Più Europa
Insieme
Civica Popolare
SVP–PATT
Netherlands (September 2012)
Christian Democratic Appeal
Labour Party
Party for Freedom
Democraten‘66
GroenLinks
Socialists
ChristenUnie
Party for the Animals
50Plus
Reformed Political Party
Party for Freedom
Netherlands (March 2017)
Christian Democratic Appeal
Labour Party
Party for Freedom
Democraten‘66
GroenLinks
Socialists
ChristenUnie
Party for the Animals
50Plus
Reformed Political Party
Denk
Forum for Democracy
Norway (September 2013)
Labour Party
Conservative Party
Progress Party
Christian Democratic Party
Centre Party
Liberal Party
Socialist Left Party
Green Party

9.09
0
0
1.29
0
0.06
0

0
0
6.12
0
0
0.95
0

0
0.8
0
0
0
0.51
0

2.27
0.18
0
0
0
0
0

0
0.44
0
9.68
0.54
0.13
0

18.18
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0.53
0
2.58
0.54
2.02
0

0
2.93
0
1.94
1.61
0.51
5.52

6.82
8.43
8.16
6.45
2.69
6.08
1.84

20.45
8.43
6.12
1.94
0
0.44
14.11

-2.27
-21.74
-8.16
-21.3
-5.38
-8.68
-21.47

56.81 -0.03996
21.74
-1
20.4
-0.4
23.88 -0.89196
5.38
-1
10.7 -0.81121
21.47
-1

0
4.94
0
0.67
0
3.85
0

0
8.64
0
1.73
0
0
1.03

1.99
2.47
0
0.67
0
0
1.88

0.66
0
0
0.27
0
0
0.34

0
0
0.58
0.27
0
0
1.03

0
0
0
0
0
0
1.54

2.65
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.66
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.99
0
3.49
0
0
0
0.17

18.54
20.37
5.81
7.86
1.61
3.85
16.1

10.6
8.64
0
4.79
1.61
0
2.4

-37.09
-17.9
-9.88
-11.46
-3.22
0
-19.35

37.09
-1
45.06 -0.39725
9.88
-1
16.26 -0.7048
3.22
-1
7.7
0
24.49 -0.79012

0
0
0
2.92
2.38
3.47
2.38
0
2.39
0

2.51
2.58
0.49
1.69
16.19
7.38
16.19
5.66
2.63
0

1
23.23
3.43
2.46
6.19
3.47
6.19
3.27
0.95
0

0
0
0
0
0.48
0
0.48
0
0
0

0
0
0
0.31
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0.46
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.51
0.65
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5.53
14.19
0
6.3
6.67
6.07
6.67
7.74
2.15
9.09

5.86
1.29
9.8
4.15
3.33
4.12
3.33
3.57
2.86
9.09

-11.39
-36.78
-12.74
-9.07
1.9
-2.81
1.9
-8.92
-0.94
-18.18

16.41
41.94
13.72
18.29
35.24
24.51
35.24
20.24
10.98
18.18

-0.69409
-0.87697
-0.92857
-0.4959
0.053916
-0.11465
0.053916
-0.44071
-0.08561
-1

0.23
5.21
0
0
0.08
0.16
3
0
0.9
0

3.51
7.29
5.5
12.92
0.83
4.6
5.76
1.43
13.51
0

4.2
1.04
4.95
7.3
4.73
1.17
0.46
1.19
0.9
0

0
0
0
0
0.11
1.17
0
0
0
0

0.92
0
4.95
0
0.35
0.08
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1.12
0.09
0.23
0.69
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0.34
0.16
0
0
0
0

2.21
0
0
0
0.49
1.01
0
0
0
0

0
0
1.1
0
0.45
0
0
0
0
0

4.81
9.38
8.79
6.74
3.09
9.52
5.99
8.08
16.67
0

2.06
0
1.65
0.56
1.55
5.46
2.77
5.46
6.31
0

-10.46
2.08
-15.94
-0.56
-10.11
-13.58
0.23
-13.3
-9.47
0

17.94
22.92
26.94
28.64
12.11
23.56
18.67
16.16
38.29
0

-0.58305
0.09075
-0.59169
-0.01955
-0.83485
-0.5764
0.012319
-0.82302
-0.24732
-

2.94
1.96
7.74
3.52
0.46
0
3.07
0
0.48
2.81
2.16

1.34
1.09
1.4
1.14
0.33
0.59
1.52
0.17
0
0.44
0.22

1.59
3.8
2.27
3.27
4.36
6.26
5.92
2.77
1.94
1.38
1.62

0
0.07
0
0
0
0
0
0.34
0
0
0

0
0.11
0
0
0.13
0.13
0.04
0.08
0
0.06
0

0.17
0.07
0.17
0.26
0.46
0.2
0.04
0.08
0
0.06
0.32

0
1.01
0
0
0.33
0.52
0
0
0
0
1.51

0
0.72
0
0
0.07
0.98
0
0.08
0
0
0.11

0.17
1.2
0
0
0
2.22
0.19
0.42
0.97
0
0.32

6.63
5.14
2.73
5.81
4.43
8.67
3.62
4.03
11.16
2.81
3.99

2.1
6.59
4.54
1.5
3.31
3.13
2.11
0.5
2.91
1.38
1.62

-6.04
-15.52
-0.23
-5.66
-11.38
-21.12
-7.25
-7.97
-16.5
-2.32
-6.47

14.94
21.76
18.85
15.5
13.88
22.7
16.51
8.47
17.46
8.94
11.87

-0.40428
-0.71324
-0.0122
-0.36516
-0.81988
-0.9304
-0.43913
-0.94097
-0.94502
-0.25951
-0.54507

1.27
0.32
4
2.68
0.35
0.23
0.42
0.21
0.2
0.92
0.8
8.63

0.64
0.5
0
1.23
0.18
0.58
2.02
0.7
1.01
1.35
5.61
1.57

6.5
2.74
4
2.39
1.85
4.44
4.98
5.96
2.22
0.59
2.17
0

0
0.59
0
0.03
0
0.23
0.3
0
0.61
0.08
0
0

0.21
0.69
0
0.24
0.44
0.47
0.84
3.08
0
0.59
0.57
0

0
0
0.07
0
0
0
0
0.07
0
0
0
0

0.56
0.09
0
0.29
0.53
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4.24
6.26
4
2
2.73
4.68
1.18
2.24
3.64
2.77
1.6
0

0.42
1.64
0
0.03
1.06
2.69
0.49
0.77
0.81
0.13
0.57
2.75

10.18
8.68
12
5.83
6.26
7.95
7.68
5.47
31.31
5.63
16.59
0.98

0.42
0.46
0
0.53
0.79
1.29
1.41
0.56
0
0.25
0.34
0.2

-20.62
-20.33
-15.93
-7.43
-13.13
-20.94
-14.44
-17.1
-37.38
-7.77
-15.43
6.27

24.44
21.97
24.07
15.25
14.19
22.56
19.32
19.06
39.8
12.31
28.25
14.13

-0.8437
-0.92535
-0.66182
-0.48721
-0.9253
-0.92819
-0.74741
-0.89717
-0.9392
-0.63119
-0.54619
0.443737

0.04
2.05
4.92
0.03
0
1.51
0
0

0.22
0.73
1.51
0.81
0.35
1
0.3
0

1.12
0
0.12
1.47
0.99
0.7
1.8
0.85

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.19
0

0.04
0
0
0.14
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0.06
0
0
0
0

0.48
0
0.2
0
0
0.08
0.17
0.3

0
0
0
0.03
0
0.08
0.28
1.09

0.82
0
0.04
0.22
0.7
0
0.75
0.06

17.02
17.44
14.73
16.24
16.06
14.53
15.25
8.61

4.46
2.2
3.06
2.03
1.81
1.7
6.3
1.15

-23.68
-16.86
-11.72
-19.23
-19.21
-14.58
-24.44
-12.06

24.2
22.42
24.58
21.03
19.91
19.6
25.04
12.06

-0.97851
-0.75201
-0.47681
-0.91441
-0.96484
-0.74388
-0.97604
-1
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Norway (September 2017)
Labour Party
Conservative Party
Progress Party
Centre Party
Socialist Left Party
Liberal Party
Christian Democratic Party
Green Party
Red Party
Sweden (September 2010)
Moderate Party
Swedish Social Democratic Party
Sweden Democrats
Green Party
Centre Party
Left Party
Liberals
Christian Democrats
Sweden (September 2014)
Moderate Party (Sweden)
Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sweden )
Sweden Democrats (Sweden)
Green Party
Centre Party
Left Party
Liberals
Christian Democrats
Switzerland (October 2011)
Christian Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Swiss People's Party
Free Democratic Party
Green Party
Green Liberal Party
Conservative Democratic Party
Evangelical People's Party
Geneva Citizen's Movement
Switzerland (October 2015)
Christian Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Swiss People's Party
Free Democratic Party
Green Party
Green Liberal Party
Conservative Democratic Party
Evangelical People's Party
Swiss Party of Labour
Geneva Citizen's Movement
United Kingdom (May 2010)
Conservative Party
Labour Party
United Kingdom Independence Party
Scottish National Party
Liberal Democrats
Democratic Unionist Party
Sinn Fein
United Kingdom (June 2015)
Conservative Party
Labour Party
Scottish National Party
Liberal Democrats
Democratic Unionist
Sinn Fein
Plaid Cymru
Social Democratic and Labour
Ulster Unionist
United Kingdom Independence Party
Green Party
United States (November 2012)
Republican Party
Democratic Party
United States (November 2016)
Republican Party
Democratic Party

0.04
2.92
11.89
1.63
0
1.79
0.48
0
0

0.89
5.21
1.05
2.43
1.5
2.04
1.3
2.04
0.1

7.36
0.83
2.97
4.4
6.45
5.38
3.98
3.36
5.49

0.97
1.51
0.26
0.42
0.22
0.63
0.24
0.73
0

0.13
0.16
0
0.68
0.14
0.14
0.07
0.2
0.4

0
0.21
2.01
0
0
0.73
0
0.29
0

0.04
0.26
0
0.08
0.11
0.52
0.1
0
0.05

0.09
0.1
0.1
0.19
0.97
0.35
0.36
0.1
0.5

1.48
0.42
0.1
1.22
1.54
0.08
0.34
0.63
1.73

11.81
11.09
10.36
13.93
11.36
8.24
14.11
7.93
14.39

6.22
3.12
1.15
2.28
3.23
1.9
1.57
1.36
5.64

-27.17
-9.15
0.01
-19.14
-22.52
-12.68
-18.99
-11.98
-28.1

29.03
25.83
29.89
27.26
25.52
21.8
22.55
16.64
28.3

-0.93593
-0.35424
0.000335
-0.70213
-0.88245
-0.58165
-0.84213
-0.71995
-0.99293

1.64
0
0.49
0
4.74
0
0.66
2.09

4.06
3.55
5.88
5.72
5.01
0
3.38
3.76

0.69
1.06
0
1.15
0
0
1.53
0

0
2.13
0
0.38
0.26
1.18
0
0.21

0
0.35
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.32
0
0
0
0
0
0.66
0.63

0.05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0.79
0
0

11.97
25.89
13.73
11.83
8.83
16.14
15.94
17.12

0.79
3.9
0
1.15
0.66
12.99
0.22
0

-7.48
-29.78
-7.36
-8.79
0
-31.1
-12.99
-10.85

19.52
36.88
20.1
20.23
19.5
31.1
22.39
23.81

-0.3832
-0.80748
-0.36617
-0.4345
0
-1
-0.58017
-0.45569

3.61
0.37
0.95
0.6
5.53
0
0.69
0.51

1.22
2.58
2.53
1.41
7.89
1.39
2.29
6.17

0.73
0.18
0
0.2
0
0.56
0
0

0.49
1.66
0
0.2
0.26
1.39
0
0

0.12
0.18
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.92
0
0
0
0.79
0
2.52
0

0.8
0
0
0
0
0
0.69
0.51

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.61
0.18
0
0.4
0
0
0
0

12.65
19.89
16.46
11.07
5
19.72
5.5
21.08

11.49
17.5
8.54
10.66
10
17.78
9.86
4.11

-21.14
-36.64
-21.52
-20.52
-1.05
-38.06
-10.55
-19.02

32.64
42.54
28.48
24.54
29.47
40.84
21.55
32.38

-0.64767
-0.86131
-0.75562
-0.83619
-0.03563
-0.93193
-0.48956
-0.5874

0
0
0.83
0.96
0
0
0
0
0

0.68
0
0
4.33
0
1.41
1.3
0
5.26

6.76
15.49
0
0.48
0
0
6.49
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1.68
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
8.45
0
0
0.24
0
0
0
0

2.03
0
0
0
1.2
0
0
0
0

14.87
28.17
0
12.98
5.53
16.9
1.3
24
15.79

2.7
2.82
0.83
5.77
0.72
0
0
0
5.26

-25.68
-54.93
0
-13.94
-9.37
-15.49
-6.49
-24
-15.79

27.04
54.93
1.66
24.52
9.37
18.31
9.09
24
26.31

-0.9497
-1
0
-0.56852
-1
-0.84599
-0.71397
-1
-0.60015

0.72
0
10.01
0.9
0
3.11
1.82
0.36
0
0

2.88
0
1.43
0
0.59
0.44
0
0.36
0
4.76

5.75
3.85
4.82
2.7
0.99
4
2.74
5.41
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
2.17
0.44
0
0.9
0.57
9.52

0.36
0
0.68
0
0
0.44
0
0.18
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1.33
0
0
0
0

0
5.38
0.07
0
3.94
3.11
0
3.42
4.53
0

0.72
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.72
3.4
0

17.63
25.39
1.28
0
5.33
2.22
9.73
5.59
8.21
0

1.08
12.31
0.53
1.8
2.56
0
0.3
2.34
6.52
0

-21.22
-46.93
5.42
-3.6
-14.4
-7.11
-10.95
-17.48
-23.23
-4.76

29.14
46.93
18.82
5.4
15.58
15.09
14.59
19.28
23.23
14.28

-0.72821
-1
0.287991
-0.66667
-0.92426
-0.47117
-0.75051
-0.90664
-1
-0.33333

0.63
0.35
1.48
0.38
0.25
1.62
0

3.33
3.44
2.13
2.29
2.7
2.31
0.52

1.8
2.03
2.04
5.84
3.07
0.23
0.52

0.27
0.97
0.19
0
0.86
0.23
0

0
0
0.37
0
0
0
0

0
0
2.41
1.52
0
4.62
5.18

0
0
0.56
0
0
0
0

0
0
0.09
0.89
0
1.85
0

0
0
0
0.38
0.37
0
0.52

5.22
8.21
14.54
17.66
3.68
4.62
13.47

1.08
4.06
2.31
6.86
1.84
3.23
5.18

-4.41
-11.48
-14.08
-27.44
-6.87
-1.61
-13.99

12.33
19.06
26.12
35.82
12.77
18.71
25.39

-0.35766
-0.60231
-0.53905
-0.76605
-0.53798
-0.08605
-0.551

1.26
0.3
0
0.47
0.44
0
0
0
0
0.82
0

2.65
0.79
6.05
1.25
5.24
5.88
1.42
1.72
6.71
3.71
0.09

4.97
8.13
7.62
6.42
2.62
0.73
6.19
2.7
3.36
5.19
6.85

5.86
0.4
2.24
0.1
0
0
0.26
0
0
1.04
0

0.38
0.1
0.45
0.36
0
0
0.26
0
0
2.89
0.09

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.59
0

0.57
0.99
2.69
0.16
0
0
0.13
0
0
0.22
0.31

0.57
1.19
1.91
0.52
0
0.73
1.16
0.49
1.2
0.15
0.63

0
0.3
0.79
0.1
0
0
1.55
0
0
0.3
3.09

8.69
12.79
13.9
10.12
5.68
9.56
11.73
16.22
14.15
15.13
10.78

1.57
6.94
2.92
2.4
0.44
5.51
4
3.44
0
1.41
2.86

-18.7
-29.75
-26.47
-18.46
-3.06
-10.65
-23.86
-21.13
-12
-21.21
-24.52

26.52
31.93
38.57
21.9
14.42
22.41
26.7
24.57
25.42
31.45
24.7

-0.70513
-0.93173
-0.68628
-0.84292
-0.21221
-0.47523
-0.89363
-0.85999
-0.47207
-0.6744
-0.99271

5.85
0.59

1.37
2.93

1.08
4.39

0
0

0.9
0.22

1.08
1.9

0
0

0
0.29

0
0

3.58
5.42

3.17
6.15

-0.43
-11.05

17.03 -0.02525
21.89 -0.5048

9.71
0.47

1.82
1.01

3.15
9.62

0
0

0.36
0.13

0.46
0.27

0
0.27

0
0.27

0
0

2.28
7.73

1.55
5.04

4.65
-21.31

19.33 0.240559
24.81 -0.85893
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